Field v. Field
Decision Date | 06 July 1956 |
Citation | 91 So.2d 640 |
Parties | Florence Dills FIELD, Appellant, v. George C. FIELD, Jr., Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Paul & Sams, Miami, for appellant.
Samuel D. Wallace and Redfearn & Ferrell, Miami, for appellee.
In a previous appeal in this litigation, Field v. Field, Fla., 68 So.2d 376, we affirmed the dismissal on the merits, by the chancellor below, of a prior divorce suit filed by the husband, George Field, against his wife, Florence Field. The husband filed a subsequent suit for divorce and in a final decree now appealed from by the wife, the divorce was granted.
The main question we must resolve on this appeal is whether or not the chancellor should have accorded full faith and credit to a separate maintenance decree entered in the wife's favor by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, and affirmed by the Appellate Division of that court in Field v. Field, 1954, 31 N.J.Super. 139, 105 A.2d 863.
The New Jersey final decree is a conclusive adjudication that the husband, and not the wife, was at fault in the separation of the parties which occurred in February, 1951. The New Jersey court found that 'the defendant [husband] without any justifiable cause has abandoned and does abandon the plaintiff [wife] and has separated and does separate himself from her, and has refused and neglected, and does refuse and neglect to provide for her'. This judgment was attacked by the husband in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, by petition to vacate and was appealed by him to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, where it was affirmed. As the New Jersey court found, Field v. Field, supra, 105 A.2d 863, the husband subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court and is bound by the final decree. In Haas v. Haas, Fla., 59 So.2d 640, in a similar situation, we said at page 642:
'[B]y filing in the New York court his motion to vacate and set aside the 1948 decree, the respondent must be held to have submitted to the New York court the question of the validity of such decree, and its order denying such motion is conclusive on the question in this court.'
It is clear that the New Jersey court acquired personal jurisdiction of Field, and that the final decree is binding upon him. The Appellate Division, in its opinion, stated in part, 105 A.2d at page 871:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The gist of the final decree here appealed from, granting the husband a divorce, is that the wife was guilty of desertion (the desertion commencing with the original separation, referred to above) and also of mental cruelty which consisted primarily of the same desertion. The New Jersey decree was entered on February 19, 1952. The only scintilla of competent evidence in this record that the husband asked his wife to come back to him is a letter which he wrote to her on October 15, 1951, in which he said in part: (R. 268.) The wife immediately replied, questioning the sincerity of this small invitation, as she had every reason to do considering the surrounding circumstances. It will be observed that since the husband's letter was dated October 15, 1951, it was written some time before the entry of the New Jersey final decree, which the New Jersey court established as the critical date up to which it was conclusively shown that the wife had not deserted the husband. Therefore the final decree here appealed from is in sharp and basic conflict with the adjudication of this matter by the New Jersey courts, and cannot stand.
The New Jersey decree of separate maintenance bars relitigation of the question of who was at fault in the separation, and establishes that the wife is living apart from the husband under a valid and binding separate maintenance decree of the court.
In Anders v. Anders, 153 Fla. 54, 13 So.2d 603, we held that where the husband's responsibility for separation from his wife had been determined adversely to the wife...
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