Field v. Lang

• Citation: 32 A. 1004,87 Me. 441
• Parties: FIELD v. LANG.
• Decision Date: 16 April 1895
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

32 A. 1004

87 Me. 441

FIELD

v. LANG.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 16, 1895.

(Official.)

Exceptions from supreme judicial court, Somerset county.

This was an action of trespass q. c. by Horace E. Field against Peter H. Lang, in which a verdict was returned for the defendant, and the plaintiff took exceptions, and moved for a new trial. Sustained.

Henry Hudson, for plaintiff.

Frank W. Hovey, for defendant.

STROUT, J. Trespass quare clausum upon a parcel of land which had been assigned to Lucinda H. Field, as her dower in the farm of Cyrus Field. Plaintiff acquired title to this parcel by levy on execution against Lucinda. He also had title to the residue of the farm. Defendant denied the act of trespass alleged. He also claimed that at the request of the plaintiff, and for him, he had obtained from Lucinda a quitclaim to himself of her right of dower in the Cyrus Field farm, which had not then been assigned and set out to her, and also title to certain personal property which had been allowed by the judge of probate from the estate of Cyrus, for all which he paid $350 of his own money; and that he did this at the request of and for the plaintiff, and, in consequence, had an equitable lien upon the parcel of land afterwards set out to Lucinda for her dower, to secure the repayment of the amount he had paid for her release, and for the personal property. Upon this claim the presiding judge instructed the jury that "if the defendant was requested by the plaintiff to purchase for him the dower interest of the widow and certain personal property at a certain definite price, or not to exceed a certain price, and, if successful in making the purchase, to take the deed in his (defendant's) name, and pay the consideration for the same, and if the defendant, in compliance with the request and in accordance with the plaintiff's directions, purchased the widow's dower and other property, acting and intending to act for the plaintiff and for his benefit, and took the deed in his name for the plaintiff, paying the consideration therefor, then, as between the defendant and the plaintiff, who afterwards acquired title, the defendant would have an equitable lien upon the premises as security for the amount advanced; and, until payment, defendant would be entitled to the possession of the property, and plaintiff would be estopped from commencing or maintaining suits for such acts as are complained of in this suit." To this instruction the plaintiff excepted.

The case shows that defendant took to himself a deed of release of dower, without covenants, from Lucinda H. Field, on September 13, 1890. At that date her dower had not been...