Field v. Langsdorf

• Decision Date: 31 October 1868
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: RICHARD R. FIELD et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. LANGSDORF & ROSENSTEIN, Defendants in Error.

43 Mo. 32

RICHARD R. FIELD et al., Plaintiffs in Error,

v.LANGSDORF & ROSENSTEIN, Defendants in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1868.

Error to St. Louis Circuit Court.

A general statement of the facts in this case will be found in 36 Mo. 441.

Krum, Decker & Krum, for plaintiffs in error.

The facts now presented are different from the last transcript. In this record it appears beyond all doubt that there was an absolute sale and transfer of the whole stock of goods. The mere fact that the purchaser directs a levy upon his own goods, after they are in the possession of the constable under an attachment, is undoubtedly evidence, “and a circumstance going strongly” against him, but may be explained. This explanation is conclusively furnished in this record. They are advised by counsel that the sheriff can take them as their agent; that it would be a more convenient way to obtain possession than by an action of replevin; that they would not lose their title by the prior purchase, as the sheriff would be regarded merely as their agent. A trespasser who has seized the goods unlawfully cannot claim an estoppel in his favor by anything which occurs after his trespass has been committed.

The court below, in the last trial, gave as a declaration of law this instruction: that the interpleaders were estopped from claiming the goods in any other way than by reason of said levy, if they did cause an execution to be levied on the goods. This instruction was given notwithstanding the fact that the only title of plaintiffs (if any) accrued by their attachment before the levy of the execution. In other words, the instruction amounts to this: that, although the interpleaders had a perfect title to the goods before Langsdorf's attachment, yet if after that attachment the interpleaders claimed by another title ( i. e., by execution), then such subsequent claim would estop them from asserting their perfect title. No such instruction can stand for a moment, nor does the opinion of the Supreme Court sanction such an interpretation. Such a theory is in direct conflict with every decision made by this court on the law of estoppel. (Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482; Newman v. Hook, 37 Mo. 213.) In the last case the rule of estoppels in pais is recognized. To constitute an estoppel three elements must combine: 1. An admission inconsistent with the evi?ence proposed to be given or the claim offered to be set up. 2. An action by the other party upon such admission. 3. An injury to this other party by allowing the admission to be disproved. Further, the doctrine of estoppel prevents parties from proving the truth because they have before that either said or acted falsehoods, and third persons have acquired rights upon the faith of these falsehoods being true; and their rights cannot be destroyed by disproving these former statements. Now, as the execution was levied after the attachment of Langsdorf, it is utterly impossible that the plaintiffs could have levied their attachment upon the faith of the execution levy, or that they could have based any action on a levy which had not been made. “What former execution,” in the language of this court, “did Field Bros. levy on these goods, as the property of Meirand, to mislead the plaintiffs in issuing their attachment?” If Field Bros. had issued any former execution on these goods, then such execution or levy might form the basis of an estoppel in favor of a subsequent attaching creditor. Otherwise, this instruction of estoppel is simply absurd. It is not sufficient that the two claims, one by purchase and the other by levy, are inconsistent; it would be preposterous to say that, because a...