Field v. State

Decision Date23 February 2010
Docket NumberNo. 2008-KA-00793-COA.,2008-KA-00793-COA.
Citation28 So.3d 697
PartiesDebra S. FIELD, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

Edmund J. Phillips, Jr., Newton, P. Shawn Harris, Forest, attorneys for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry, Jr., attorney for appellee.

Before KING, C.J., BARNES and ROBERTS, JJ.

BARNES, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. On May 29, 2007, Debra S. Field was indicted on two counts stemming from drugs found in her car at a license and safety checkpoint: possession of cocaine in an amount more than .10 gram but less than 2 grams, and possession of marijuana in an amount less than 30 grams. Field was subsequently convicted of possession of marijuana; however, a mistrial was declared on the possession of cocaine charge as the jury was unable to reach a verdict. A second trial was held on April 16, 2008, and Field was convicted by a jury in the Newton County Circuit Court on a count of felony possession of cocaine and sentenced to eight years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). It is from this second conviction that Field now raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the circuit court erred in sentencing Field to the maximum sentence allowable by law; (2) whether the circuit court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction which allegedly articulated Field's theory of the case; (3) whether the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of other crimes; and (4) whether the search of the truck Field was driving was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finding no error, we affirm Field's conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On June 10, 2006, Newton County Sheriff's Deputy Toby Pinson (Deputy Pinson) and his brother, Jeremy Pinson (Officer Pinson), a police officer from Hickory, Mississippi, established a license and safety checkpoint at about 3:00 p.m. According to Deputy Pinson, the checkpoint was authorized by Chief Deputy Sheriff Billy Pat Walker of the Newton County Sheriff's Department.

¶ 3. At about 3:20 p.m., a truck driven by Field arrived at the checkpoint and was stopped. Deputy Pinson asked Field for her driver's license whereupon she informed the deputy that her license was suspended. Deputy Pinson detected the smell of alcohol and instructed Field to pull over to the side of the road. After Field complied, Deputy Pinson instructed her to step out of the truck and asked Field whether she had been drinking. Field informed Deputy Pinson that she had been "at the river" where she had a couple of drinks, prompting Deputy Pinson to ask if he could search her truck for alcohol. Field consented, telling Deputy Pinson that she did not care if he searched the truck because it did not belong to her. As Deputy Pinson searched the truck, Officer Pinson watched over Field.

¶ 4. During his search, Deputy Pinson noticed a purse and, inside the purse, a cigarette case. Deputy Pinson testified that within the cigarette case, and in his plain view, was a rolled-up marijuana joint. At this point, Deputy Pinson read Field her Miranda rights. After Field nodded that she understood her rights, Deputy Pinson asked whether the cigarette case belonged to her, wherein Field told the deputy that she forgot the joint was in the case.

¶ 5. Beyond the marijuana joint, the cigarette case held a plastic bag with a white rock substance, which was later proved to contain cocaine. Asked whether the white substance belonged to her, Field told Deputy Pinson that it did not. The officers then terminated the checkpoint as Field was taken into custody and transported to the Newton County Sheriff's Department.

¶ 6. On December 10, 2007, Field was found guilty of misdemeanor possession of marijuana and fined. As to the count of felony possession of cocaine, the jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the cause was continued until April 2008. At the April 2008 trial, Field testified that she and a group of friends had been camping along the Pearl River near Carthage, Mississippi when her van broke down. In an effort to arrange a tow, Field borrowed a truck from a friend and had started for Newton, Mississippi when she encountered the police checkpoint. While Field admitted that she consented to the search of the truck and that the cigarette case belonged to her, she continued to deny that the cocaine found in the cigarette case was hers, insisting that while camping other people had access to her purse.

¶ 7. During Deputy Pinson's testimony, defense counsel made repeated objections concerning the witness's revelation that Field was in possession of marijuana, arguing that any reference to this fact violated Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). The court found that the evidence linking Field to the marijuana was admissible as its discovery led to the discovery of the cocaine. At this point, Field's attorney moved to introduce evidence that the jury in the defendant's first trial was unable to reach a verdict as to the charge of possession of cocaine. The circuit court denied this motion, holding that it was irrelevant. Field was found guilty of felony possession of cocaine and sentenced to serve eight years in the custody of the MDOC. She now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

I. Whether the circuit court erred in sentencing Field to the maximum sentence.

¶ 8. Field asserts that her sentence of eight years was disproportionate to the crime, considering both her age and status as a first-time offender. Urging that a sentence necessarily must be tailored to the offender and not simply the offense, Field argues that the circuit court erroneously believed it was required to sentence her to the maximum term of imprisonment, thus abdicating its role as a discretionary body. Field points to the circuit court judge's expressed belief that he "had no choice ... but to sentence [Field] to a term of 8 years." Further, Field argues that the sentence imposed falls within the reach of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

¶ 9. In turn, the State argues that only after careful deliberation of Field's history of addiction, present employment, and existing family obligations did the circuit judge sentence Field to eight years. To this point, the judge's "no choice" expression is reflective of all the facts involved in Field's case rather than an abdication of discretion.

¶ 10. "Sentencing is within the complete discretion of the trial court and not subject to appellate review if it is within the limits prescribed by statute." Wall v. State, 718 So.2d 1107, 1114 (¶ 29) (Miss.1998) (quoting Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 537 (Miss.1996)). The consistent rule in Mississippi is that a sentence that does not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute will not be disturbed on appeal. Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 302 (Miss.1992). This Court, however, "will review a sentence that allegedly imposed a penalty disproportionate to the crime." Nichols v. State, 826 So.2d 1288, 1290 (¶ 10) (Miss.2002).

¶ 11. The United States Supreme Court has established a three-prong test for an Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, wherein courts need to balance the following factors: (i) "the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty"; (ii) "the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction"; and (iii) "the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). However, to the extent that there exists a guarantee of proportionality within the Eighth Amendment, Solem has been overruled. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). The Mississippi Supreme Court has noted that, in light of Harmelin, the factors articulated in Solem are to apply "only when a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of `gross disproportionality.'" Hoops, 681 So.2d at 538 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680). Absent this initial showing, Mississippi appellate courts will not apply the three-prong test from Solem. Williams v. State, 784 So.2d 230, 236 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2000). "[A] sentence that is within the statutorily defined parameters of the crime, usually is upheld and is not considered cruel and unusual punishment." Nichols, 826 So.2d at 1290 (¶ 12). Thus, "outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of a particular sentence will be exceedingly rare." Clowers v. State, 522 So.2d 762, 765 (Miss. 1988) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90, 103 S.Ct. 3001).

¶ 12. Section 41-29-139(c)(1)(B) of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev.2005) provides that any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses a Schedule II drug, such as cocaine, in an amount of more than .10 gram but less than two grams shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years but not more than eight years. Thus, the maximum sentence permitted under section 41-29-139(c)(1)(B) for possession of cocaine is eight years. The circuit court sentenced Field to eight years, which clearly is within the statutory authority. Further, although Field claims that she was a first-time offender, it was noted at Field's sentencing hearing that she had been previously charged three times for driving under the influence (DUI) (which is why she did not possess a driver's license), and that she was addicted to marijuana and alcohol. Accordingly, we find no inference of "gross disproportionality." This assignment of error is without merit.

II. Whether the circuit court erred in refusing to give jury instruction D-2.

¶ 13. Field asserts that the circuit court erred in refusing to give jury instruction D-2, which reads:

The Court instructs the jury that the Defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and his testimony should not be disregarded simply because he is the...

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