Fieldhouse v. Regency Coachworks, Inc.
| Docket Number | AC 44225 |
| Decision Date | 12 July 2022 |
| Citation | 213 Conn.App. 662,279 A.3d 195 |
| Parties | Linda FIELDHOUSE v. REGENCY COACHWORKS, INC., et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
David C. Davis, East Hartford, for the appellant (named defendant).
Lawrence C. Sgrignari, Hamden, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant Regency Coachworks, Inc.,1 appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) reversing the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Second District (commissioner) determining that the plaintiff, Linda Fieldhouse, failed to satisfy the notice requirement set forth in General Statutes § 31-294c and that her claim for workers’ compensation benefits failed to satisfy an exception to the notice requirement as set forth in § 31-294c (c). On appeal, the defendant claims that the board erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that the commissioner misapplied the totality of the circumstances standard and that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice requirements such that the defendant was provided with constructive notice of the claim. We affirm the decision of the board.
The following facts, as found by the commissioner, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On November 27, 2015, in the course of her employment for the defendant, the plaintiff fell down several stairs. The fall caused her to hit her head on the door at the bottom of the stairs, hit her knee on something, and bend her foot. She was unable to get up from the floor on her own, and her direct supervisor on that date, Robert Charland, had to help her. He assisted her up the stairs to her office where she sat down at her desk; however, after a few hours, she realized that the pain was not receding. After she informed Charland about her pain, he gave her permission to leave. The plaintiff left the office and drove herself to an urgent care clinic in Enfield.
At some point following the incident, the plaintiff told Charland that, because she was not getting any better, she was considering filing a workers’ compensation claim, and he advised her to do so. Thereafter, she called the defendant's workers’ compensation insurance agency, Paradiso Insurance Agency (agency), and told a representative that she needed to file a claim. On November 16, 2016, after previously leaving several messages in an attempt to make an appointment, the plaintiff visited the agency in person as its office is located just one street over from the defendant's office.
At the agency, the plaintiff specifically stated that she wanted to file a workers’ compensation claim, but an agency employee, Stephanie Fanelli, told her not to worry because she had two years to file a claim. Fanelli also helped her to complete a first report of injury and told the plaintiff that she would file the claim for her.
Because the plaintiff was unaware of the specific time frame for filing a workers’ compensation claim, she relied on Fanelli's statement that she had two years to file a claim and that Fanelli would file the claim. The plaintiff believed that the first report of injury that she had completed with Fanelli initiated her claim. After that report was completed, she received a number of communications from the defendant's workers’ compensation insurer, BerkleyNet Underwriters, LLC (BerkleyNet), which she thought meant that her claim had been opened. First, on November 22, 2016, the plaintiff received a telephone call from a BerkleyNet representative, to whom she gave an approximately twenty-five minute long recorded statement. The plaintiff believed that her recorded statement provided BerkleyNet with information about the incident and the treatment she had received, allowing her to continue her claim. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff also received correspondence from BerkleyNet, dated November 22, 2016, indicating that the insurer had opened a claim and assigned a claim number for a date of injury of November 27, 2015, and enclosed a pharmacy card. The plaintiff then received a letter, dated March 27, 2017, stating in relevant part: "In accordance with your [w]orkers’ [c]ompensation claim from Friday, November 27, 2015, BerkleyNet ... has arranged for you to be examined ...." The wording of this letter solidified the plaintiff's belief that she had a pending workers’ compensation claim that had been commenced on November 16, 2016. Moreover, on May 4, 2017, the plaintiff received correspondence welcoming her to the BerkleyNet pharmacy program, along with a second pharmacy card. As of the date of the formal hearing on November 20, 2018, however, the plaintiff had not received any workers’ compensation benefits.
At trial, the defendant did not dispute that an incident occurred at the workplace on November 27, 2015. It argued, however, that the Workers’ Compensation Commission (commission) was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the plaintiff did not file a notice of claim (form 30C)2 within one year from the date of injury and (2) none of the statutory exceptions to that requirement were satisfied. In opposition, the plaintiff asserted that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant was aware of her claim within one year of her date of injury.
The commissioner took administrative notice of a form 30C dated June 29, 2017, which was received by the commission on July 3, 2017, and a second copy of the same form 30C, which was received by the commission on July 26, 2017. The commissioner also took administrative notice of a denial of claim (form 43)3 that was received by the commission on July 26, 2017, in which the defendant challenged both jurisdiction and compensability. Additionally, the commissioner took administrative notice of the fact that the first hearing request was received from the plaintiff on July 28, 2017, and that the first hearing was held on August 21, 2017. The commissioner then made the following findings: the plaintiff failed to file a form 30C within one year of November 27, 2015, her date of injury; no hearing was requested and none was held within one year of November 27, 2015; no voluntary agreement was ever issued; and the defendant and BerkleyNet did not provide the plaintiff with any medical or surgical care.
Ultimately, the commissioner determined that, because the plaintiff failed to meet the statutory notice requirements for filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits set forth in § 31-294c, the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the commissioner denied and dismissed the plaintiff's claim. Subsequently, on appeal, the board concluded that the commissioner misapplied "the totality of circumstances standard" and that "[t]he actions taken by [BerkleyNet] on and after November 22, 2016, serve[d] to demonstrate that the claimant's interactions with her immediate supervisor, coupled with her personal appearance at the workers’ compensation insurance agency with the express intention of filing a workers’ compensation claim, reflect that the claimant substantially complied with the statutory notice provisions such that the [defendant was] provided with constructive notice of this claim."
On appeal to this court, the defendant asserts that the board erred, as a matter of law, in reversing the commissioner's decision because " ‘totality of circumstances’ or ‘substantial compliance’ are not statutory exceptions to the notice requirement as set forth in the plain language of the [Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. ]." More specifically, the defendant contends that the commission is a body created by statute, whose jurisdiction is outlined by the legislature, and it is legal error to carve out another exception to the notice of claim requirements of § 31-294c (a). Thus, the defendant argues that, without proper notice, the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
We first set forth our standard of review and the general principles applicable to workers’ compensation appeals. "The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. ... Neither the ... board nor this court has the power to retry [the] facts. It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers’ compensation statutes by the commissioner and [the] board. ... The commissioner has the power and duty, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts. ... Our scope of review of the actions of the board is similarly limited. ... The role of this court is to determine whether the review [board's] decision results from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. ...
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Izikson v. Protein Science Corp. , 156 Conn. App. 700, 707, 115 A.3d 55 (2015).
Section 31-294c (a) provides in relevant part: "No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident ...." Our Supreme Court has explained that "[f]iling a notice of claim or ... satisfaction of one of the ... exceptions [contained in § 31-294c (c) ] is a prerequisite that conditions whether the [commission...
To continue reading
Request your trial