Izikson v. Protein Sci. Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 36325.,36325.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ruvim IZIKSON v. PROTEIN SCIENCE CORPORATION et al.

156 Conn.App. 700

115 A.3d 55

Ruvim IZIKSON

v.PROTEIN SCIENCE CORPORATION et al.

No. 36325.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 5, 2014.

Decided April 21, 2015.

Brian J. Mongelluzzo, with whom, on the brief, was Nicholas R. Mancini, Waterbury, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Elycia D. Solimene, Middletown, with whom, on the brief, was Robert L. O'Brien, for the appellees (defendants).

LAVINE, SHELDON and KELLER, Js.

Opinion

KELLER, J.

The plaintiff, Ruvim Izikson, appeals from the decision of the Workers' Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Eighth District (commissioner) dismissing his workers' compensation claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He claims that the board erred in affirming the commissioner's dismissal of his claim as untimely on the basis of its erroneous conclusions that (1) he had failed to satisfy the notice of claim requirement set forth in General Statutes § 31–294c (a), and (2) the filing of a form 43¹ by one of the defendants did not constitute an exception to the notice of claim requirement of § 31–294c (a). We affirm the decision of the board.

The following facts, as determined by the commissioner and the board to have been stipulated to by the parties or as apparent in the record, and procedural history are relevant here. On July 12, 2010, in the course of his employment for the defendant Protein Science Corporation (Protein Science), the plaintiff injured his back and one of his legs while lifting a box.

He notified David Turrill, Protein Science's controller, of his injuries on or about July 14, 2010.² Turrill prepared a first report of injury form³ on July 14, 2010, and transmitted the form to Protein Science's insurance provider, the defendant Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company (Chubb).⁴

In an e-mail dated July 14, 2010, Turrill informed the plaintiff that Protein Science's insurance adjuster wanted to speak with him and the plaintiff regarding the plaintiff's injuries. In an e-mail dated July 22, 2010, Turrill informed the plaintiff that he had contacted Chubb to learn more about the process for pursuing a workers' compensation claim. In an e-mail dated July 23, 2010, Turrill advised the plaintiff to contact Chubb directly to discuss his injuries and to learn how to proceed with the matter. In an e-mail dated August 24, 2010, Turrill informed the plaintiff that he had been “playing phone tag” with an investigator at Chubb and that Turrill would “call [the investigator] now to see where he is at in the case.” On the basis of the e-mails, the plaintiff believed that Chubb was investigating the matter.

On or before July 21, 2010, Chubb mailed a prescription card to the plaintiff. A letter accompanying the card contained a disclaimer indicating that any payment issued by Chubb for prescriptions did not indicate that it had accepted any claim. The plaintiff did not make any purchases with the card. On August 25, 2010, Chubb filed a form 43 contesting the plaintiff's assertion that he had injured his back in the course of his employment.

The plaintiff did not file a form 30C⁵ or request a hearing within one year of the injuries he sustained on July 12, 2010, as required by General Statutes § 31–294c.⁶

Furthermore, at no point did the defendants furnish any medical treatment, surgical care or indemnity payments to the plaintiff in connection with his injuries. In addition, although not stipulated by the parties, the record contains no evidence that the parties reached a voluntary agreement concerning a workers' compensation claim. Instead, the plaintiff underwent surgery at an unspecified time and sought benefits to pay for the surgery through his group health insurance carrier.

More than one year after he incurred his injuries, the plaintiff commenced pursuit of a workers' compensation claim. In October, 2012, the commissioner held a hearing to determine whether the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) had subject matter jurisdiction over his claim.⁷ The parties submitted exhibits and stipulated to facts during the hearing. In December, 2012, the commissioner issued a decision dismissing the claim. The commissioner concluded that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because the plaintiff had failed to file a form 30C within one year of July 12, 2010, the date on which he sustained his injuries, and the defendants did not provide any medical care or pay any indemnity benefits in connection with those injuries.⁸ Therefore, the commissioner determined that the commission could not entertain his untimely claim.

On appeal, the board affirmed the commissioner's dismissal of the claim in November, 2013, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to meet the notice of claim requirement set forth in § 31–294c (a). The board determined that the commissioner reasonably concluded that he did not meet any of the express statutory exceptions, under § 31–294c (c), to the notice of claim requirement prescribed by § 31–294c (a). Furthermore, the board concluded that the commissioner reasonably determined that the plaintiff failed to prove, under the totality of the circumstances, that he had provided the defendants with adequate notice of his pursuit of a workers' compensation claim. The board emphasized that the plaintiff had failed to file a form 30C or any equivalent form indicating that he was pursuing benefits, and that neither defendant had furnished any medical care to the plaintiff for the injuries he had suffered.

In addition, the board rejected the plaintiff's assertion that Chubb's preemptive filing of a form 43 indicated that the defendants had received sufficient notice that he was seeking workers' compensation benefits to give the commission jurisdiction over his claim. The board cited its prior decision in Gaffney v. Stamford, 15 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 257, 260 (1996), in which it had determined, as a matter of law, that the filing of a form 43 does not create an automatic exception to the notice of claim requirement prescribed by § 31–294c (a). Furthermore, the board concluded that requiring the plaintiff to take further action upon receipt of Chubb's preemptive form 43 was not inequitable because the plaintiff had failed to prove, under the totality of the circumstances, that he had provided the defendants with adequate notice of his intention to pursue a claim for workers' compensation benefits.

For the foregoing reasons, the board affirmed the commissioner's dismissal of the plaintiff's workers' compensation claim on the basis of the commission's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff asserts that the board erred in affirming the commissioner's dismissal of his claim. Specifically, the plaintiff maintains that, despite his failure to file a form 30C, the totality of the circumstances indicate that the defendants had sufficient notice, under § 31–294c (a), that he was pursuing a workers' compensation claim. Alternatively, he argues that the filing of a form 43 by Chubb should qualify as an additional exception to the notice of claim requirement set forth in § 31–294c (a). As a result, he contends that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. We disagree and address each claim in turn.⁹

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review. “The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.... Neither the ... board nor this court has the power to retry facts. It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and [the] board.... The commissioner has the power and duty, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts.... Our scope of review of the actions of the board is similarly limited.... The role of this court is to determine whether the review [board's] decision results from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 145 Conn.App. 261, 268, 76 A.3d 657, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 935, 78 A.3d 859 (2013).

“Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.... Because the filing of a notice of claim implicates the [commission's] subject matter jurisdiction ... we review this determination applying a plenary standard of review.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Estate of Haburey v. Winchester, 150 Conn.App. 699, 706, 92 A.3d 265, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 922, 94 A.3d 1201 (2014).

I

First, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants had sufficient notice, under § 31–294c (a), that he was pursuing or intended to pursue a workers' compensation claim. Although the plaintiff concedes that he did not file a form 30C or meet one of the express exceptions in § 31–294c (c) to the notice of claim requirement set forth in § 31–294c (a), he asserts that, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, the defendants had notice that he was pursuing or intended to pursue workers' compensation benefits and, therefore, the commission had subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. We conclude that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the notice of claim requirement set forth in § 31–294c (a).

“Administrative agencies [such as the commission] are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and their jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the validity of the statutes vesting them with power and they cannot confer jurisdiction upon themselves.... The plain language of the Workers'...