Fields v. Balkcom

• Decision Date: 12 September 1955
• Docket Number: No. 19018,19018
• Citation: 211 Ga. 797,89 S.E.2d 189
• Parties: Jennings Edward FIELDS v. R. P. BALKCOM, Jr., Warden.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 189

89 S.E.2d 189

211 Ga. 797

Jennings Edward FIELDS v. R. P. BALKCOM, Jr., Warden.

No. 19018.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 12, 1955.

Syllabus by the Court

A petition for the writ of habeas corpus, brought by one whose conviction for murder has been reviewed by a motion for new trail and affirmed by this court, upon grounds that were either urged in the motion for a new trial or could have been asserted therein as newly discovered evidence under Code, §§ 70-204, 70-303, did not show any valid ground for the release of the petitioner, and the trial court did not err in remanding him, after a hearing, to the custody of the respondent.

J. E. B. Stewart, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., E. Freeman Leverett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert H. Hall, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

ALMAND, Justice.

On January 10, 1955, this court affirmed the conviction of Jennings Edward Fields of the offense of murder. 211 Ga. 335, 85 S.E.2d 753. On March 17, 1955, Fields filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus against R. P. Balkcom, Jr., Warden of the Georgia State Prison. In his petition, Fields claims that his restraint and imprisonment are illegal and void, and violate his rights under specified provisions of the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of Georgia. The alleged grounds of the illegality of his restraint are: that (a) he was arrested without a warrant; (b) he was coerced into signing a confession; (c) the jury which convicted him were biased and not impartial, because one of the jurors was heard to state, after the jury had returned their verdict and been dismissed, that 'It is too bad that the State had to waste so much time and money trying Fields. I have known ever since the killing that he is guilty, and I believe everybody else knows the same thing'; (d) at the time he was arrested until be was sentenced, there had been a constant threat of mob violence, and therefore it was impossible for him to receive a fair trial, and the judge on his own motion should have granted a change of venue (this ground was expressly abandoned in his counsel's written brief); (e) the solicitor-general who prosecuted the case knowingly withheld from the jury evidence which had been obtained by the State, showing the mental condition of the petitioner, such evidence being the testimony of a physician and phychiatrist who had examined the petitioner; and (f) inflammatory and inaccurate newspaper accounts, and circumstances occurring on the trial, made it impossible for the petitioner to have a fair and impartial trial. The respondent filed a response, in which he denied all the material allegations of the petition. The court after hearing evidence entered an order denying the prayers of the petitioner, and remanded him to the custody of the respondent. A bill of exceptions brings the case here for review.

Error is assigned on the court's refusal to permit a witness for the respondent to testify what an unidentified person, who sat as a juror in the trial of the case, stated after the verdict had been rendered and the jury had been dismissed, it being contended that, if the witness had been allowed to answer the question, he would have stated that the unidentified juror said: 'It is too bad that the State had to waste so much time and money trying Fields. I have known ever since the killing that he is guilty and I believe everybody else knows the same thing.'

It was not error for the court to refuse to permit the witness so to testify. Even if it be conceded--which we do not--that a statement made by a juror subsequently to the rendition of a verdict, showing his disqualification by reason of prejudice or bias, is admissible in evidence, see Code, § 110-109; Bowden v. State, 126 Ga. 578(1), 55 S.E. 499; Ward v. Morris, 159 Ga. 526(3), 126 S.E. 291; Peagler v. Huey, 183 Ga. 677(3), 188 S.E. 906; Gossett v. State, 203 Ga. 692(5), 48 S.E.2d 71; Reece v. State, 208 Ga. 690(1), 69 S.E.2d 92, no reason is shown why such matter was not urged in the petitioner's motion for a new trial; bias or prejudice of a juror discovered after verdict being proper ground for a new trial as newly discovered evidence. Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85(7); Glover v. State, 128 Ga. 1(4), 57 S.E. 101.

'A writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, writ of error, or other remedial procedure for the correction of errors or irregularities alleged to have been committed by a trial court.' McKay v. Balkcom, 203 Ga. 790(1), 48 S.E.2d 453. Where a defendant has been tried and convicted of a criminal offense, and his motion for a new trial has been denied and the ruling affirmed by this court, the writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy only 'when the court was without jurisdiction in the premises, or where it exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the sentence by virtue of which the party is imprisoned, so that such sentence is not merely erroneous, but is absolutely void.' Wells v. Pridgen, 154 Ga. 397(2), 114 S.E. 355. 'A defendant may not assert his defense by piecemeal, nor will he be permitted to rest his chances for a new trial upon some of the errors alleged to have been committed upon the trial of his case, and thereafter, upon the denial of his motion for new trial, substitute the writ of habeas corpus to review alleged assignments of error which might have been included in the former motion for new trial, had such assignments been properly predicated upon some adverse ruling by the trial court.' Wallace v. Foster, 206 Ga. 561(1a), 57 S.E.2d 920, 922, certiorari denied by U. S. Supreme Court, 340 U.S. 815, 71 S.Ct. 43, 95 L.Ed. 599. In the lastcited case, after the defendant's motion for a new trial and his extraordinary motion for a new trial had been denied and the rulings affirmed by this court, Wallace v. State, 204 Ga. 676, 51...