Fields v. City of Hopkinsville
| Docket Number | 2021-CA-0547-MR |
| Decision Date | 23 June 2023 |
| Parties | RONNIE B. FIELDS, JR. APPELLANT v. CITY OF HOPKINSVILLE APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Jacob P. Mathis Clarksville, Tennessee
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: James A. Sigler James P. Landry Paducah Kentucky H. Douglas Willen Hopkinsville, Kentucky
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND CETRULO, JUDGES.
OPINION REVERSING
Appellant Ronnie Fields, Jr. appeals the Christian Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, City of Hopkinsville. Appellant's complaint alleged the governing authorities of Appellee failed to fulfill a ministerial duty to protect burial grounds within the Hopkinsville corporate limits in violation of KRS[1] 381.690. Having reviewed the record, we conclude there are genuine issues of material fact whether Appellee's governing authorities, defendants below, are performing that ministerial duty; therefore, we reverse the summary judgment.
On February 28, 2020, Fields initiated this lawsuit against the City of Hopkinsville alleging the city maintains a road traversing known but unmarked graves in the Riverside Cemetery.[2] Appellant alleges one of the graves belongs to John Wesley Long, his direct lineal ancestor. (Record (R.) 1).[3]
Long served as a Confederate soldier in the American Civil War and died in Hopkinsville after various diseases spread through his camp. (R. 85). Soldiers surviving the outbreak buried Long, and approximately 226 others, in the Riverside Cemetery from December 1861 to February 1862. (Meacham's Deposition at 15). Those who buried the dead did not mark the graves. To commemorate them, in 1888, the city of Hopkinsville exhumed the remains of approximately 101 soldiers from the cemetery and reinterred them beneath a memorial statue. The city dedicated the statue to the "Unknown Confederate Dead." At the time, the city did not know approximately 126 graves remained which had not been relocated.
In 1899, eleven years after memorializing the unknown 101 soldiers, a "Mr. Gant" discovered a memorandum notebook hidden away in a desk at the Bank of Hopkinsville. (R. 11). The Daily Kentucky New Era published the contents of the notebook, which purportedly belonged to George "Cotton Gin" Anderson. (R. 9-11). Per the article, the notebook contained the names of each person buried and the precise location of his respective grave. (R. 11). Anderson detailed twelve rows of buried soldiers and, pertinent here, Anderson lists "Jno W Long, 3rd Miss, Feb 19, '62" as being buried in row eleven. (R. 11). Without evidentiary basis, Appellee challenges the trustworthiness of the May 1899 publication, but archeologist William Meacham verified the accuracy of part of the list in 2015.
Meacham is an archeologist who spent his career working for the Chinese government in Hong Kong preserving items of antiquity. (Meacham Deposition at 8-9). Meacham first became aware of the Riverside Cemetery and the unmarked graves after he buried his father there in 1999 and saw the 1888 memorial. Meacham's research of the monument and the history of the Confederate burials convinced him he could find the remaining 126 graves. Additionally, he too discovered he descended from one of the soldiers buried in the unmarked graves. (Meacham Deposition at 12).
In 2015, the city issued Meacham a permit to conduct exploratory digs based on the information in the Anderson notebook. This dig lasted about twelve days and Meacham positively identified graves in rows one through five and rows eight and nine listed in the notebook. (Meacham Deposition at 23). Rows eight and nine lie approximately four and a half meters from the road in question. (R. 15, 26-27). Following the patterns of discovered graves, Meacham and Fields draw the inference that graves listed in rows eleven and twelve lie underneath the road. (R. 13). Meacham expressed his own belief, based on his expertise and professional experience as an archaeologist, that there is nearly 100 percent certainty the graves are underneath the road. (Meacham Deposition at 40, 69).
The most notable discovery during Meacham's dig was an iron coffin found when Meacham excavated row 4. (R. 81). The coffin had a nameplate that, once Meacham removed and cleaned it, bore the name Anderson recorded in his notebook for the specific plot where Meacham found it. (R. 81). This discovery allowed Meacham to positively identify the other remains found. This discovery further serves as the basis for Meacham's expectation and inference that the graves comprising rows eleven and twelve lie underneath the road.
Eventually, the city revoked Meacham's permit to excavate graves. Appellee alleges revocation was based on its interpretation of the permit and its conclusion that removing the coffin and other items of antiquity from the graves violated its scope. A fair reading of the record does not support this interpretation. In fact, Meacham immediately informed the city he discovered the coffin and that he removed it shortly afterward, explaining why he did so.[4] However, it was not until years later that the city first characterized his handling of the coffin as a basis for revoking his permit.
Appellant filed a complaint that, fairly construed in the context of notice pleading, alleges the Appellee's maintenance of a road over unmarked graves violates the city's duty imposed by KRS 381.690.[5] The statute, entitled "Protection of burial grounds by cities," says in its entirety:
Whenever any burial grounds lie within the corporate limits of a city the governing authorities of the city shall protect the burial grounds from being used for dumping grounds, building sites, playgrounds, places of entertainment and amusement, public parks, athletic fields or parking grounds.
In his prayer for relief, Appellant specifically sought a "Temporary Restraining Order restraining [Appellee] from using the section of the road in question running through the cemetery immediately [and] until further expert excavation can be done" and that Meacham be allowed to "conduct the proper excavation to identify the unmarked graves[.]"[6] Appellee answered the complaint and asserted a variety of defenses.
After a little less than a year of discovery, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, re-characterizing Appellant's claim as a petition for a writ of mandamus, and arguing it "must be dismissed as he can only compel public officials to act, not a municipality." (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 88) (citing City of Pineville v. Helton, 188 S.W.2d 101 (Ky. 1945)). The motion alternatively argued: (1) Appellee "does not have a duty to act"; (2) Appellant "does not have a legal right to the relief he requests"; and (3) Appellant "does not meet the criteria for an easement to an unmarked gravesite in an unknown location." (R. 89).
Appellant responded to the motion for summary judgment, but also filed a motion to amend the complaint to add, as defendants, the Mayor, City Grounds Maintenance Superintendent, and Public Works Director (hereafter, the individual defendants). (R. 259).
The circuit court granted Appellant's motion to amend the complaint. Then, the court granted the motion for summary judgment, stating (1) "[a] writ of mandamus is not a viable cause of action against [Appellee]" and there is no legal basis to justify mandating the individual defendants to order excavation activity in the cemetery; (2) Appellee "has not violated any duty . . . imposed by KRS 381.690 . . . "; and (3) Appellant "does not have an easement to an unmarked, unidentified gravesite in an unknown location." (R. 289-90).
Appellant filed a notice of appeal but named only the City of Hopkinsville as an appellee. Our review thus proceeds.
On appeal, we must answer two questions. First, because some of the circuit court's reasons for dismissing the complaint are based solely in law, implicitly presuming the truth of the complaint's allegations without the need to look beyond the pleadings, we must determine whether the circuit court's legal conclusions are correct regarding the legal viability of Appellant's claim. This is, in effect, a determination whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See CR[7] 12.02(f). If so, we will proceed to the second question and determine whether the record indicates there are no genuine issues of material fact such that Appellee would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See CR 56.03.
Before turning to the merits of this appeal, however, we must address two preliminary questions. First, what is the effect of failing to name the individual defendants in the notice of appeal? Second, should this Court grant Appellee's motion to strike Fields' brief? We answer these questions in that order.
City of Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Ky. 1990). "This Court has no jurisdiction relative to persons not named as parties to the appeal." Watkins v. Fannin, 278 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Ky. App. 2009); see also Doe v. Golden &Walters, PLLC, 173 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Ky. App. 2005) (footnotes omitted) (The matter of jurisdiction is an issue we are required to raise sua sponte, "as it cannot be acquired by waiver, consent, or estoppel.").
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