Fields v. State.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1892
• Citation: 32 N.E. 780,134 Ind. 46
• Parties: FIELDS v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

134 Ind. 46

32 N.E. 780

FIELDS

v.STATE.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 29, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Elkhart county; J. M. Vanfleet, Judge.

Simon Fields, having been convicted of murder in the second degree, appeals. Reversed.

Osborne & Zook and E. A. Dausmann, for appellant. John T. Sullivan, for appellee.

Miller, C. J.

The appellant was indicted for murder in the first degree, tried, and convicted for murder in the second degree. The accused on the witness stand admitted the killing, but claimed that the deed was done in self-defense. The court gave to the jury the following instructions:

“(1) Unless the evidence given in this cause satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 7th day of April, 1890. at this county, the defendant did cut and stab Silas Bell, thereby causing his death, as charged in the indictment, you will find the defendant not guilty. Section 1824 of the statute reads thus: ‘A defendant is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proven. Where there is a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he must be acquitted. Where there is a reasonable doubt in which of two or more degrees of an offense he is guilty, he must be convicted of the lowest degree only.’ In applying this section you will start out with the presumption that the defendant is entirely innocent, and unless the evidence given in the cause satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant gave the fatal thrust, as charged in the indictment, he must be found not guilty. But if you are thus satisfied that he gave the fatal thrust, as charged in the indictment, then, if there remains a reasonable doubt as to whether he gave it with premeditated malice, he cannot be found guilty of murder in the first degree; and, if there remains a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he gave the fatal thrust, as charged in the indictment, purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, he cannot be found guilty of murder in the second degree; and, if there remains a reasonable doubt as to whether he gave the fatal thrust, as charged in the indictment, unlawfully, he cannot be found guilty of manslaughter, and must be acquitted. In order to remove all reasonable doubt as to the truth of the matters and things heretofore mentioned, the evidence tending to prove the same must so overcome all opposing evidence, and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from any want of evidence, that a prudent man might, without mistrust, voluntarily act upon the truthfulness of such matter or thing in matters of the highest import to himself. If there is any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the defendant, which does not contradict any credible evidence given in the cause, you must acquit. If any one juror has a reasonable doubt on any material point, you cannot convict, but may disagree.

(2) If the defendant did not seek a fight with said Bell, and walked away, and if said Bell followed him up, and caught hold of him, and began to strike him with his fist, those facts alone would not justify the defendant in using his knife. But if the defendant, being without fault, as just supposed, then honestly believed himself to be in imminent danger of great bodily harm, and could think of no other less dangerous means of preventing such great bodily harm than the use of his knife, he would be justified in making such use of it as then appeared to him to be necessary. On this point you must be very careful. The right of Mr. Bell to life was just as sacred as the right of the defendant to self-defense. In order to determine whether or not the defendant honestly believed that it was necessary to use his knife as he did, to prevent great bodily harm to himself, if you find he did use it, you ought to consider the relative size and strength of the two men, their character and dispositions, and the efforts, if any, made by the defendant to free himself from said Bell. If the defendant, during the fight, made no outcry nor request for Bell to desist, nor warned him at any time that he would use his knife unless he did desist, or if the defendant at any previous time used language showing malice or ill will towards said Bell, you may take such matters into consideration in determining his good faith in using his knife as he did. If from all the evidence given in the cause, or from any want of evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant did then honestly believe himself to be in imminent danger of great bodily harm, and could think of no other less dangerous means of preventing such great bodily harm than the use of his knife as he did, he being without fault, as above supposed, you must acquit. In other words, the defense of self-defense does not need to be made out by a preponderance of the evidence; it is sufficient if a reasonable doubt be raised.

(3) If the defendant dared or challenged said Bell to fight, in order that he might have an opportunity to kill him, or to do him great bodily harm, with his knife; and if during the fight, without warning to said Bell, and without believing himself to be in imminent danger of great bodily harm, in pursuance of his original intention, gave said Bell the thrust with his knife which caused his death, as charged in the indictment,-he is guilty of murder in the first degree; and if the defendant dared or challenged said Bell to fight, and if said Bell accepted said challenge, and entered into said fight with his fists only, it was the duty of the defendant, if he desired to stop the fight, to warn said Bell of that fact, and request him to desist; but if, instead of so doing, he purposely and maliciously gave said Bell the thrust with his knife which caused his death, as charged in the indictment, he is guilty of murder in the second degree; and if, under the same circumstances, the defendant, in the heat of the fight, but without malice, gave said Bell the thrust with his knife which caused his death, as charged in the indictment, he is guilty of manslaughter.

(4) You are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact, of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the bearing and weight of the evidence, and on none of these matters do I express my opinion. You have also the right to determine the law contrary to my opinions herein expressed.

(5) If you find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you will fix his punishment at death or imprisonment in the state prison during life, in your discretion. If you find him guilty of murder in the second degree, you will fix his punishment at imprisonment in the state prison during life. If you find him guilty of manslaughter, you will fix his punishment in the state prison not more than twenty-one years nor less than two years. If you find him not guilty, you will simply say so. Forms of verdicts for murder in both degrees, for manslaughter, and not guilty will be furnished you. When you have all agreed, fill up the blank according to the fact, if it needs filling, let the same be signed by your foreman, selected by you, and return it in open court.”

The giving of the first, second, and third of these instructions were made causes for which a new trial was asked, the overruling of which motion has been assigned as error here. Italics indicate the portions of those instructions of which...