Price v. State
| Decision Date | 11 November 1908 |
| Citation | 98 P. 447,1 Okla.Crim. 321,1 Okla.Crim. 358,1908 OK CR 32 |
| Parties | PRICE v. STATE. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Syllabus by the Court.
Objections to the admissibility of evidence must at least be as definite as is required by Act 1905 (Laws 1905, p. 327, c. 27, art. 7 § 2), or they will not be considered by this court.
[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2654; Dec. Dig. § 1043. [*]]
(a) Declarations, to be a part of the "res gestae," need not be precisely coincident in point of time with the principal fact. If they spring out of it, shed light upon and tend to explain it, are voluntary and spontaneous, and are made at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication, then they are to be regarded as contemporaneous, and are admissible as evidence.
(b) See facts in opinion that were properly admitted as part of the res gestae.
(c) See opinion for reasons for admitting spontaneous exclamations as a part of the res gestae, and showing why they should not be treated as hearsay evidence.
[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 804; Dec. Dig. § 363. [*]
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp 6130-6136; vol. 8, p. 7787.]
(a) Where an objection to a question is sustained, and it is desired to preserve the matter for review in this court, the facts expected to be proven by the witness, in answer to the question excluded, should be incorporated in the record, so that this court can determine as to whether material and legal evidence has been excluded.
(b) When threats are relied upon as part of the ground for reasonable apprehension of danger, it is proper to admit any evidence which will tend to show the true character of the threats so made, and which tends to add weight to or detract from them.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2932; Dec. Dig. § 1120; [*] Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 399-413; Dec. Dig. § 190. [*]]
It is error on cross-examination, for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a witness, to ask as to whom he married, for the purpose of showing that he had married a woman with whom he had committed adultery.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1139; Dec. Dig. § 349. [*]]
When there was evidence of threats to kill the defendant, and that deceased had fired the first shot in the fatal difficulty, it was error to refuse to allow the defendant to prove that the deceased was under indictment for arson for burning a barn of the defendant, and that defendant was a witness against deceased on the charge of arson. This evidence was admissible, upon the ground that it tended to show motive on the part of deceased to kill defendant, and the further ground that it gave additional weight to the threats made, as ground of reasonable apprehension of danger, on the part of defendant.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 399-414; Dec. Dig. §§ 191, 194. [*]]
Where there is the least degree of acting together between two or more parties in the perpetration of an unlawful act, the threats or declarations of one, in furtherance of the common design, are admissible against all of his associates, although made in the absence of the others.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 990; Dec. Dig. § 423. [*]]
(a) See opinion for statement of facts, under which the defendant should have been permitted to state what conclusion he arrived at with reference to the acts and intentions of the deceased and those acting with him.
(b) Statements made by a defendant, which constitute a part of the res gestae, are just as admissible in his favor as res gestae statements of the deceased are admissible against a defendant.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 810, 1037; Dec. Dig. §§ 364, 448. [*]]
(a) It is error to instruct a jury that the words "reasonable doubt" "mean a doubt for which the jury can give a reason."
(b) It is error, by constant repetitions, to give to even a correct instruction undue prominence in the minds of the jurors. Such instructions are, in effect, a charge on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
(c) It is error to instruct a jury as to the law in an argumentative manner.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1918, 1973, 1991, 1959; Dec. Dig. §§ 789, 806, 807. [*]]
(a) It is error to instruct the jury that "it must be apparent from the evidence that the circumstances and surroundings of the defendant, at the time of the homicide, were such as to cause in him a reasonable belief, founded upon reasonable evidence that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased," before his right of self-defense would arise. The jury are not required to find him innocent, but must acquit, unless his guilt is proven beyond all reasonable doubt.
(b) In a murder case, the jury should be affirmatively, clearly, and distinctively instructed that they must determine, from the defendant's standpoint, the question of his guilt or innocence and as the facts and circumstances in evidence reasonably appeared to him at the time of the homicide.
(c) Instructions to juries should be considered as a whole, and when so considered, and they harmonize with each other, and present the law of the case fully and fairly, they are sufficient.
(d) Where there is a correct instruction upon a material question in a case, and in another portion of the instructions there is an incorrect statement of the law upon the same question, it cannot be said that the law has been clearly and fully given to the jury, and reversible error has been committed.
(a) When threats, in connection with reasonable appearances of danger, are relied upon, the court should clearly and affirmatively instruct the jury as to the bearing of threats upon reasonable appearances of danger. A negative instruction upon this matter is insufficient.
Appeal from Roger Mills County Court.
William P. Price was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree and appealled to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma Territory, whence the case was transferred under the enabling act (Act June 16, 1906, c. 3335, 34 Stat. 267) and the Constitution of Oklahoma (Const. Schedule, § 27; Bunn's Ed. § 476) to the Supreme Court of that state, and from that court to the Criminal Court of Appeals. Reversed and remanded.
On the 5th day of May, 1904, the grand jury of Roger Mills county returned an indictment against Wm. P. Price (hereinafter called defendant), in which defendant was charged with the murder of James Yandell, on the 18th day of September, 1903. On the 18th day of September, 1906, the trial began, and on the 22d of September the jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the second degree against the defendant. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed, and overruled. The court, on the verdict of the jury, sentenced the defendant to four years' confinement in the penitentiary at Lansing, Kan. The defendant then brought this case by appeal to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma Territory. Upon the admission of Oklahoma into the Union, under the provisions of the enabling act (Act June 16, 1906, c. 3335, 34 Stat. 267) and the Constitution of the state (Const. Schedule, § 27; Bunn's Ed. § 476) this case was transferred to the Supreme Court of the state. Upon the creation of the Criminal Court of Appeals, as directed by law, this case was transferred by the Supreme Court to this court.
S. B. Garrett, A. R. Garrett, J. W. Johnson, D. B. Welty, and John B. Harrison, for appellant.
W. O. Cromwell, J. H. Cline, and W. C. Reeves, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
We will consider the assignment of errors in the order in which the matters complained of arise during the trial, and will state only so much of the testimony as is necessary to a proper understanding of the legal questions involved. As this case will be remanded for a new trial, we do not deem it necessary to state the evidence in full.
First. Defendant complains of the action of the trial court in overruling an objection made by his counsel to a question propounded by the prosecution, in its direct examination of the witness A. D. Jones. This witness had testified at some length to the facts leading up to the fatal difficulty. It appears, among other things, that the witness and the defendant had gone into a saloon, at the request of the witness, to get some beer; that a man named Parks and James Yandell, the deceased, came into the saloon, also, and went up to the counter. It was in evidence that bad blood existed between these parties and the defendant, and that threats had been made by Parks and deceased against defendant. Parks stepped up to the bar, and took some change out of his pocket, and slammed it down on the counter pretty hard, and said: "By God, give us something to drink!" Defendant was standing at the bar with witness. In the language of the witness: The witness was then asked this question ...
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