Fields v. State
Citation | 40 S.W.3d 450 |
Parties | Jehiel FIELDS v. STATE of Tennessee. |
Decision Date | 20 February 2001 |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
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James F. Logan, Jr., Cleveland, TN, for the appellant, Jehiel Fields.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether our decision in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn.1999), changed the standard by which appellate courts review denials of post-conviction relief based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals in this case affirmed the denial of the appellant's post-conviction petition, although it expressed concern that this Court inadvertently changed the standard of appellate review in Burns to require a de novo review of a trial court's factual findings regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. While we reaffirm that such claims are mixed questions of law and fact subject to de novo review, we emphasize that Burns did not change the standard of review in this context. Consistent with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, our language in Burns meant only that a trial court's findings of fact be reviewed de novo, with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. A trial court's conclusions of law are also reviewed under a de novo standard, although the trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no deference or presumption of correctness on appeal. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly applied the appropriate standard of review in this case, the judgment of that court is affirmed, and the appellant's petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.
The facts originally giving rise to this case occurred on October 22, 1994, when the appellant, Mr. Jehiel Fields, shot and killed Ms. Odessa Rouser. Earlier that afternoon, Ms. Rouser approached the appellant and offered to trade a marijuana cigarette and ten dollars for a rock of crack cocaine. The appellant agreed, but upon later discovering that the cigarette had been laced with PCP, he became angry and confronted Ms. Rouser at her house. During this confrontation, the appellant apparently assaulted Ms. Rouser, and in response, she stabbed him with a knitting needle. Although the appellant left Ms. Rouser's house after his stabbing, he attended a party later that evening at a nearby house in the same neighborhood. Sometime during this party, the appellant returned to Ms. Rouser's house, kicked open her front door, and shot her three times with a Raven .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol.
During his trial in September of the following year, the State presented testimony from Travis Ware, an acquaintance of the defendant, who testified that he accompanied the appellant from the party to Ms. Rouser's house and saw the appellant kick open her door. Ware also testified that he heard three gunshots and saw Ms. Rouser's husband attempting to pull the appellant back inside the house as the appellant tried to leave through a window. Apart from also introducing physical evidence that the appellant had been in Ms. Rouser's house, the State introduced the testimony of a neighbor who identified the defendant as the person she saw running from Ms. Rouser's house after she heard several shots fired. The State also called a police officer who testified that he saw the defendant earlier that evening wearing a hat similar to one found lying near Ms. Rouser's body.
The appellant defended on the basis that he was not the person responsible for Ms. Rouser's death, but that Travis Ware was the actual perpetrator of the crime. The appellant's counsel argued that Ware's testimony identifying the appellant as the perpetrator was not credible given his previous criminal convictions, his inconsistent statements to the police, and his acceptance of a lesser charge in a plea with the State.1 The appellant also argued that Ware was the responsible party because he was able to lead the police to other evidence, including the murder weapon, that was later used to convict the appellant. Despite possessing some evidence that the appellant was angry and not acting rationally that evening, the appellant's counsel did not pursue any other defenses, such as one based upon diminished capacity.
On September 6, 1995, the jury found the appellant guilty of first degree murder and especially aggravated burglary, and the court sentenced the appellant to serve an effective life sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the appellee's conviction and sentence for first degree murder, although the court reduced the conviction for especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary. The appellant did not file an application with this Court requesting permission to appeal.
On March 6, 1998, the appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not presenting the defenses of diminished capacity or self defense. According to the appellant, the State's case as to the identity of the perpetrator was very strong, and as such, counsel should have pursued other defenses. The trial court appointed counsel for the appellant and held a hearing on the petition on March 25, 1999, at which the appellant and his original trial counsel testified.
While counsel further stated that "Mr. Fields has never to this date said that he did this shooting," he admitted on re-direct examination, "I mean my impression was that he just didn't do it, and I'm not exactly sure what he said at different times, but ... that's certainly possible that he said he didn't know what happened, that's certainly possible."2 During his own direct examination, the appellant denied ever having told his attorney anything other than he simply did not know what happened the night of the murder. Moreover, he specifically denied telling his attorney that he did not commit the crime or that his attorney discussed with him the possibility of presenting a diminished capacity defense.
The appellant then requested permission to appeal to this Court, which we granted on the sole issue of determining the proper standard of appellate review, after our decision in State v. Burns, for denials of post-conviction claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons given herein, we hold that the standard of appellate review traditionally applied to these post-conviction appeals was not changed by our decision in Burns, although we take this opportunity to further clarify the reasoning of that decision. We also affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which, despite its concern as to the proper scope of its...
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...is reviewed de novo, with a presumption of correctness given only to the post-conviction court's findings of fact.See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001); Burns v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner ha......
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Dellinger v. State, No. E2005-01485-CCA-R3-PD (Tenn. Crim. App. 8/28/2007)
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