Fields v. State

• Decision Date: 20 February 2001
• Citation: Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2001)
• Parties: Jehiel FIELDS v. STATE of Tennessee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

40 S.W.3d 450

Jehiel FIELDS v.STATE of Tennessee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville.

February 20, 2001.

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James F. Logan, Jr., Cleveland, TN, for the appellant, Jehiel Fields.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

BARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA, BIRCH, and HOLDER, JJ., joined.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether our decision in State v. Burns,6 S.W.3d 453(Tenn.1999), changed the standard by which appellate courts review denials of post-conviction relief based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Court of Criminal Appeals in this case affirmed the denial of the appellant's post-conviction petition, although it expressed concern that this Court inadvertently changed the standard of appellate review in Burns to require a de novo review of a trial court's factual findings regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.While we reaffirm that such claims are mixed questions of law and fact subject to de novo review, we emphasize that Burns did not change the standard of review in this context.Consistent with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, our language in Burns meant only that a trial court's findings of fact be reviewed de novo, with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.A trial court's conclusions of law are also reviewed under a de novo standard, although the trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no deference or presumption of correctness on appeal.Because the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly applied the appropriate standard of review in this case, the judgment of that court is affirmed, and the appellant's petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

The facts originally giving rise to this case occurred on October 22, 1994, when the appellant, Mr. Jehiel Fields, shot and killed Ms. Odessa Rouser.Earlier that afternoon, Ms. Rouser approached the appellant and offered to trade a marijuana cigarette and ten dollars for a rock of crack cocaine.The appellant agreed, but upon later discovering that the cigarette had been laced with PCP, he became angry and confronted Ms. Rouser at her house.During this confrontation, the appellant apparently assaulted Ms. Rouser, and in response, she stabbed him with a knitting needle.Although the appellant left Ms. Rouser's house after his stabbing, he attended a party later that evening at a nearby house in the same neighborhood.Sometime during this party, the appellant returned to Ms. Rouser's house, kicked open her front door, and shot her three times with a Raven .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol.

During his trial in September of the following year, the State presented testimony from Travis Ware, an acquaintance of the defendant, who testified that he accompanied the appellant from the party to Ms. Rouser's house and saw the appellant kick open her door.Ware also testified that he heard three gunshots and saw Ms. Rouser's husband attempting to pull the appellant back inside the house as the appellant tried to leave through a window.Apart from also introducing physical evidence that the appellant had been in Ms. Rouser's house, the State introduced the testimony of a neighbor who identified the defendant as the person she saw running from Ms. Rouser's house after she heard several shots fired.The State also called a police officer who testified that he saw the defendant earlier that evening wearing a hat similar to one found lying near Ms. Rouser's body.

The appellant defended on the basis that he was not the person responsible for Ms. Rouser's death, but that Travis Ware was the actual perpetrator of the crime.The appellant's counsel argued that Ware's testimony identifying the appellant as the perpetrator was not credible given his previous criminal convictions, his inconsistent statements to the police, and his acceptance of a lesser charge in a plea with the State.¹The appellant also argued that Ware was the responsible party because he was able to lead the police to other evidence, including the murder weapon, that was later used to convict the appellant.Despite possessing some evidence that the appellant was angry and not acting rationally that evening, the appellant's counsel did not pursue any other defenses, such as one based upon diminished capacity.

On September 6, 1995, the jury found the appellant guilty of first degree murder and especially aggravated burglary, and the court sentenced the appellant to serve an effective life sentence in the Department of Correction.On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the appellee's conviction and sentence for first degree murder, although the court reduced the conviction for especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary.The appellant did not file an application with this Court requesting permission to appeal.

On March 6, 1998, the appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not presenting the defenses of diminished capacity or self defense.According to the appellant, the State's case as to the identity of the perpetrator was very strong, and as such, counsel should have pursued other defenses.The trial court appointed counsel for the appellant and held a hearing on the petition on March 25, 1999, at which the appellant and his original trial counsel testified.

Trial counsel testified that he had discussed the possibility of a diminished capacity defense with the appellant before his trial, but he decided against pursuing this defense because he had no physical evidence of drug intoxication, and, most importantly, because the defense was inconsistent with the appellant's repeated assertions that he did not commit the crime.According to counsel's testimony,

Mr. Fields said that he didn't shoot this woman, and so I approached it from the standpoint that Mr. Fields didn't shoot this woman, that there were a lot of other people with the opportunity to have done this, that there were a lot of other people in the area, there was other proof that could at least cast suspicion on Travis Ware, if not maybe one other person....So there was at least the ability to point the finger at one or two other people, and that's the way we approached it....He said, "I didn't do this, I didn't do this shooting."We approached it from the standpoint of he didn't do this, he didn't do the shooting.

While counsel further stated that "Mr. Fields has never to this date said that he did this shooting,"he admitted on re-direct examination, "I mean my impression was that he just didn't do it, and I'm not exactly sure what he said at different times, but ... that's certainly possible that he said he didn't know what happened, that's certainly possible."²During his own direct examination, the appellant denied ever having told his attorney anything other than he simply did not know what happened the night of the murder.Moreover, he specifically denied telling his attorney that he did not commit the crime or that his attorney discussed with him the possibility of presenting a diminished capacity defense.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled from the bench denying relief to the appellant.The court stated that "what we have here in my opinion is like Monday morning quarterbacking of a trial strategy.I feel like based on the circumstances and having heard the trial that trial counsel made decisions, after consulting with his client, that all went to trial strategy."The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.After reviewing the testimony and the record, the intermediate court expressed its concern that our decision in State v. Burns,6 S.W.3d 453(Tenn.1999), inadvertently changed the standard for reviewing denials of ineffective assistance of counsel claims by requiring a de novo review of the trial court's factual findings.Nevertheless, the court concluded that any such change in the standard of review did not affect its analysis, as "both standards yield the same result in this case."The intermediate court then affirmed the dismissal of the appellant's petition by stating that

the petitioner presented some evidence at the evidentiary hearing that might arguably support his contention of intoxication at the time of the offense, specifically Mr. Ware's preliminary hearing testimony and the trial attorney's testimony regarding peoplehe interviewed who had seen the petitioner on the night of the offense.However, Mr. Ware was not present to explain in greater detail his preliminary hearing testimony, nor did the petitioner present any of the witnesses his trial attorney interviewed to explain in what manner and to what degree the petitioner was acting angry or irrational.In the absence of more compelling evidence, the petitioner has simply failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his attorney's failure to pursue intoxication or diminished capacity as defenses resulted in prejudice.

The appellant then requested permission to appeal to this Court, which we granted on the sole issue of determining the proper standard of appellate review, after our decision in State v. Burns, for denials of post-conviction claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.For the reasons given herein, we hold that the standard of appellate review traditionally applied to these post-conviction appeals was not changed by our decision in Burns, although we take this opportunity to further clarify the reasoning of that decision.We also affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which, despite its concern as to the proper scope of its...