Fields v. State

• Decision Date: 21 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. 75406-8-I,75406-8-I
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: CHRISTAL FIELDS, Appellant, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF EARLY LEARNING, Respondent.

CHRISTAL FIELDS, Appellant, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF EARLY LEARNING, Respondent.

No. 75406-8-I

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

August 21, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LEACH, J. — Christal Fields appeals the superior court's summary judgment dismissal of her constitutional challenge to a Department of Early Learning (DEL) rule imposing on any person convicted of certain crimes a lifetime ban on working in a childcare facility.¹ She contends that this ban disqualifying her as a childcare worker violates her substantive and procedural due process rights. Because the rule has a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose, the protection of children, and DEL provided an adequate review process, we affirm.

Background

Fields grew up in a dysfunctional home environment with rampant drug abuse. At the age of 16, she became homeless and turned to prostitution anddrugs. In 1988, Fields attempted to snatch a purse to help pay for her drug habit. She pleaded guilty to attempted second degree robbery.²

Fields continued to lead a troubled life until 2006 when she turned her life around by successfully completing a drug program. She has been clean and sober ever since. For two years she resided in group housing. During this time, she was promoted to resident manager because of her responsibility and commitment to working with others. Many support letters from employers and coworkers since then attest to Fields's character.

On February 6, 2013, Fields submitted a portable background check to DEL. Based on the information Fields provided, DEL cleared Fields to work at a childcare facility. She worked in that childcare facility for six months after she received her background clearance. Fields loves working with children and has taken advantage of every available training opportunity to improve her skills.

A local news report on childcare centers brought Fields's undisclosed criminal history to DEL's attention. DEL later sent Fields a letter disqualifying her from unsupervised contact with childcare children. This disqualification prevented Fields from being on the premises of a licensed facility during the hours it is licensed to provide childcare.³

Fields appealed DEL's action. Citing her conviction for attempted second degree robbery, DEL moved to dismiss her appeal on summary judgment. Fields contested the summary judgment. She claimed that the lifetime ban was unconstitutional facially and as applied to her circumstances. The administrative law judge (ALJ) had no authority to decide and thus did not consider these constitutional issues. He found that Fields's robbery conviction disqualified her.

WAC 170-06-0120 imposes a lifetime ban on persons working in childcare if they were convicted of any of 50 listed crimes, including second degree robbery. Because Fields did not dispute her conviction, this rule precludes her from working in her chosen field.

Fields moved for an internal appeal. The reviewing judge affirmed the ALJ's determination that constitutional challenges had to be brought in the superior court.

Fields next sought review in the superior court. She asserted that WAC 170-06-0120 violated her constitutional due process protections because it deprived her of the opportunity to explain the conviction and submit evidence of her rehabilitation, character references, and other information showing her qualifications to continue in her chosen profession. The superior court held that despite potential compelling facts in Fields's favor, the rule did not violate Fields's due process rights because a rational relationship existed between a legitimatestate interest and the rule.

Fields appeals.

Analysis

The Washington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA)⁴ governs judicial review of agency actions.⁵ The validity of an administrative agency rule presents a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.⁶ A court presumes the validity of a duly adopted rule. Thus, the party challenging a rule has a heavyburden of proving the rule's unconstitutionality. Because constitutional issues fall outside the realm of agency expertise, this court does not defer to an agency's application of constitutional principles.⁷ An individual is entitled to relief if this court determines that "[t]he order, or the statute or rule on which the order is based, is in violation of constitutional provisions on its face or as applied."⁸

Both the United States Constitution and the Washington Constitution provide that no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.⁹ While they use nearly identical language to provide these rights, our Supreme Court has held that interpretation of the federal due process clause does not control our analysis of the state due process clause.¹⁰ Whether the state due process clause provides greater protection than the federal due process clause depends on the particular context in which a litigant asserts a due process violation.¹¹

Fields makes no claim that the state due process clause provides broader protection than the federal due process clause in the context of her circumstances and has not offered a Gunwall¹² analysis advocating such aposition. In the absence of a Gunwall analysis, "we cannot consider an argument that the Washington Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart."¹³ Therefore, we analyze Fields's claims under only the federal due process clause.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers both procedural and substantive due process rights. A substantive challenge involves an individual's right to be free from arbitrary action of the government.¹⁴ A procedural challenge questions whether the government has given an individual enough notice and the chance to be heard.

We first consider Fields's substantive due process claims. To prevail on a substantive due process claim, Fields must identify a property or liberty interest and show that state action arbitrarily and capriciously deprived her of that right.¹⁵ The level of review a court applies to a substantive due process challenge depends on the nature of the right involved.¹⁶

The right to pursue an occupation or profession is a protected liberty interest.¹⁷ Thus, Fields has established a liberty interest and that DEL's challenged rule deprived her of that interest. Because the right to pursue a particular occupation is not a fundamental right, courts use a rational basis test to review state actions affecting it.¹⁸ This means that Fields must show that no rational relationship exists between the DEL rule and a legitimate state interest.¹⁹

A party may make either a facial or an as applied challenge to state action. To prevail on a facial challenge, a party must show that "no set of circumstances exists in which the statute, as currently written, can be constitutionally applied."²⁰ To prevail on an as applied challenge, an individual must prove that an otherwise valid statute is unconstitutional as applied to that individual.²¹

Fields has failed to show that no rational basis exists for the challenged DEL rule or, alternatively, that as applied to her particular circumstances no rational basis exists.

The legislature created DEL in 2006²² to "safeguard and promote the health, safety, and well-being of children receiving child care and early learning assistance, which is paramount over the right of any person to provide care."²³ DEL administers childcare and early learning programs and adopts minimum licensing requirements.²⁴ Division Three of this court has upheld DEL's rulemaking authority.²⁵

DEL adopted rules governing the licensing of childcare in Washington. WAC 170-06-0070(1) states that an "[i]ndividual who has a background containing any of the permanent convictions on the director's list, WAC 170-067-0120(1), will be permanently disqualified from providing licensed child care, caring for children or having unsupervised access to children receiving early learning services." "Disqualified" means that "DEL has determined that a person's background information prevents that person from being licensed or certified by DEL or from being authorized by DEL to care for or haveunsupervised access to children receiving early learning services."²⁶ An attempted second degree robbery conviction permanently disqualifies a person.²⁷

At oral argument, DEL claimed that a federal statute requires the bans contained in its rule as a condition of receiving federal monies. States that receive funds from the federal government for childcare services must establish requirements for and conduct criminal background checks of childcare staff members.²⁸ But the controlling federal statute identifies only nine crimes that make a childcare staff member ineligible for employment. Robbery is not one of those crimes. But this statute does permit states to disqualify individuals for other crimes. 42 U.S.C. § 9858f(h)(1) provides,

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a State from disqualifying individuals as child care staff members based on their conviction for crimes not specifically listed in this section that bear upon the fitness of an individual to provide care for and have responsibility for the safety and well-being of children.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, federal law allows DEL to include other crimes if they bear on the individual's fitness to provide care. Support for DEL's decision to include second degree robbery in the 50 enumerated crimes can be found in RCW 43.43.830(7) which states,

"Crime against children or other persons" means a conviction of any of the following offenses: Aggravated murder; first or second degree murder; first or second degree kidnapping; first, second, or third degree assault; first, second, or third degree assault of a child; first, second, or third degree rape; first, second, or third degree rape of a child; first or second degree robbery; first degree arson; first degree burglary; first or second degree

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