Fifield v. Close

• Decision Date: 25 May 1867
• Citation: 15 Mich. 505
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Francis W. Fifield v. Marvin J. Close

15 Mich. 505

Francis W. Fifield v. Marvin J. Close

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 25, 1867

Heard April 27, 1867.

Error to Oakland circuit.

This was action of trespass, commenced before a justice of the peace. There was no appearance on the return day, and judgment was rendered for plaintiff for one hundred dollars damages and costs.

The case was removed by certiorari to the circuit court, on the ground that the summons issued by the justice of the peace was void, because no United States revenue stamp was attached thereto.

The circuit court reversed the judgment of the said justice of the peace.

Judgment reversed, with costs.

M. E Crofoot, for plaintiff in error:

The act of congress taxing the process of state courts is void: 2 Pet. 449, 467; 22 Ind. 276; Law. Reg., January, 1865, p. 157; 19 Wis. 369; 5 Mich. 368; 26 Howard's Pr., 119; 29 Id 253, 357; 19 Abb. Pr., 121; 30 Id. 378.

O. F Wisner, for defendant in error,

Cited 19 Wis. 380.

Campbell, J. Christiancy, J. and Cooley, J. concurred. Martin, Ch. J. concurred in the result.

OPINION

Campbell J.:

There is but one question raised in this case, and that is, whether the stamp tax on legal process in state courts is valid. The power of congress to impose such a charge, as a condition upon litigation, is denied by the plaintiff in error, as inconsistent with the control which the constitution of the United States guarantees to the state authorities over all such matters as have been left by that instrument under local regulation. The question is one of much importance, inasmuch as it involves fundamental principles bearing upon the nature and attributes of both local and general governments.

In order to comprehend the full meaning of the inquiry, it will be well to consider how far this power of taxation may be carried, if it exists, and what consequences it will draw after it. For, while consequences can not alter the law, they may be of the utmost value in aiding us to discover what the law is, in reference to such constitutional questions as refer to the nature of our institutions, and the distribution of the various functions of government.

If this power exists, it is derivable from the specific power vested in congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States:" Art. 1, § 8. It is very well settled that such a tax as is involved in this cause is not a direct tax, within the sense of the constitution, and, therefore, need not be distributed by the rule of population: Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171. The constitution imposes no limit on any but direct taxes, beyond the requirement that they "shall be uniform throughout the United States:" Art. 1, § 8. There is, therefore, no limit upon the power of congress (if it can levy these taxes at all), to select any objects within the taxing power, and draw from them any amount of uniform contributions which it may see fit to require. The power to tax any specific thing is unlimited, or it is entirely wanting. There are no bounds within which the discretionary action must be confined. The legislature levying the tax is the sole and ultimate judge of the expediency or necessity of requiring it, and of the extent to which it shall be charged upon any class of taxable articles. And where a legislature acts within the line of its constitutional powers, the motives of its action can never be judicially reviewed, nor can courts in any way determine the propriety of its enactments. Its expressed will disposes of all questions of reason or policy.

Having this unqualified discretionary power to tax to any extent whatever is taxable, that power may easily be extended far enough to destroy anything on which burdens may be imposed by making those burdens so heavy as to become prohibitory. It is within the experience of most countries that duties may become prohibitory, and where taxes are chargeable specifically, so that particular objects may be taxed at pleasure, the same result may easily be reached by specific impositions upon domestic interests. The argument that such prohibitory action is improbable, has no force whatever in determining the existence or non-existence of the power. There is no legitimate power possessed by any legislature which it may not lawfully carry to an extreme, where extreme action is deemed expedient by the majority of the members. And where a power of destruction has been conferred, it is always possible that it may be exercised, although it may be very improbable. Where a constitution does not limit the action of such an assembly, it must be assumed that the people do not regard a right or institution as important enough to be removed from the control of their representatives. And when those representatives make up their minds that policy requires the abrogation of any system over which they have complete authority, they can not be held legally incompetent to abolish it. The principle that an unrestrained right to tax involves in law a right to destroy by taxation, has been recognized from the beginning by our courts. It is the foundation of all of those decisions which have been made by the Supreme Court of the United States, asserting the immunity from state interference of the United States government, and its various offices and instrumentalities. In some of the tax cases the danger of destruction to the agencies of the government was more than theoretical, and the design of the obnoxious legislation was to defeat the measures which congress had determined on for the public interest. And, therefore, in holding that the general government, and its various agencies and machinery, are exempt from state taxation, the Supreme Court expressly rested their decisions upon the assumption that the power to tax involves the power to control and to destroy: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Id., 733; Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Peters 449; People of New York v. Commissioners of Taxes, 67 U.S. 620, 2 Black 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wallace 200; Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Id. 573; Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435. A similar principle has led to the...