Hylton v. The United States
| Decision Date | 08 March 1796 |
| Citation | 1 L. Ed. 556,2 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2155,3 Dall 171,3 U.S. 171 |
| Parties | <P><B><CENTER>Hylton, Plaintiff in Error,</CENTER></B></P> <P><B><CENTER>v.</CENTER></B></P> <P><B><CENTER>the United States.</CENTER></B></P> |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
2 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2155
February Term, 1796.
Hylton, Plaintiff in Error,
v.
the United States.
On the 4th of February, a commission, bearing date the 27th
of January, 1796, was read, appointing Samuel Chase, one of the
justices of the Supreme Court.
On the 8th of March, a commission, bearing date the 4th of March, 1796, was read, appointing Oliver Ellseworth, Chief Justice.
This was a writ of Error directed to the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia; and upon the return of the record, the following proceedings appeared. An action of debt had been instituted to May Term, 1795, by the attorney of the district, in the name of the United States, against Daniel Hylton, to recover the penalty imposed by the act of Congress, of the 5th of June, 1794, for not entering, and paying the duty on, a number of carriages, for the conveyance of persons, which he kept for his own use. The defendant pleaded nil debet, whereupon issue was joined. But the parties, waving the right of trial by jury, mutually submitted the controversy to the court on a case, which stated After argument, the court (consisting of Wilson & Justices) delivered their opinions; but being equally divided, the defendant, by agreement of the parties, confessed judgment, as a foundation for the present writ of error; which (as well as the original proceeding) was brought merely to try the constitutionality of the tax.
The cause was argued at this term, by Lee, the Attorney General of the United States, and Hamilton, the late Secretary of the Treasury, in support of the tax; and by Campbell, the Attorney of the Virginia District, and Ingersoll, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, in opposition to it. The argument turned entirely upon this point, whether the tax on carriages for the conveyance of persons, kept for private use, was a direct tax? For, if it was not a direct tax, it was admitted to be rightly laid, within the first clause of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, which declares 'that all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States:' But it was contended, that if it was a direct tax, it was unconstitutionally laid, as another clause of the same section provides, 'that no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census, or enumeration, of the inhabitants of the United States.'
The Court delivered their opinions seriatim in the following terms.(a)
By the case stated, only one question is submitted to the opinion of this court; whether the law of Congress, of the 5th of June, 1794, entitled, 'An act to lay duties upon carriages, for the conveyance of persons,' is unconstitutional and void?
The principles laid down, to prove the above law void, are these: That a tax on carriages, is a direct tax, and, therefore, by the constitution, must be laid according to the census, directed by the constitution to be taken, to ascertain the number of Representatives from each State: And that the tax in question, on carriages, is not laid by that rule of apportionment, but by the rule of uniformity, prescribed by the constitution, in the case of duties, imposts, and excises; and a tax on carriages, is not within either of those descriptions.
By the second section of the first article of the Constitution, it is provided, that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, according to their numbers, to be determined by the rule prescribed.
By the ninth section of the same article, it is further provided, That no capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census, or enumeration, before directed.
By the eighth section of the same article, it was declared, that Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; but all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States.
As it was incumbent on the Plaintiff's Council in Error, so they took great pains to prove, that the tax on carriages was a direct tax; but they did not satisfy my mind. I think, at least, it may be doubted; and if I only doubted, I should affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. The deliberate decision of the National Legislature, (who did not consider a tax on carriages a direct tax, but thought it was within the description of a duty) would determine me, if the case was doubtful, to receive the construction of the Legislature: But I am inclined to think, that a tax on carriages is not a direct tax, within the letter, or meaning, of the Constitution.
The great object of the Constitution was, to give Congress a power to lay taxes, adequate to the exigencies of government; but they were to observe two rules in imposing them, namely, the rule of uniformity, when they laid duties, imposts, or excises; and the rule of apportionment, according to the census, when they laid any direct tax.
If there are any other species of taxes that are not direct, and not included within the words duties, imposts, or excises, they may be laid by the rule of uniformity, or not; as Congress shall think proper and reasonable. If the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate other taxes than direct taxes, and duties, imposts, and excises, there is great inaccuracy in their language. If these four species of taxes were all that were meditated, the general power to lay taxes was unnecessary. If it was intended, that Congress should have authority to lay only one of the four above enumerated, to wit, direct taxes, by the rule of apportionment, and the other three by the rule of uniformity, the expressions would have run thus: 'Congress shall have power to lay and collect direct taxes, and duties, imposts and excises; the first shall be laid according to the census; and the three last shall be uniform throughout the United States.' The power, in the eighth section of the first article, to lay and collect taxes, included a power to lay direct taxes, (whether capitation, or any other) and also duties, imposts, and excises; and every other species or kind of tax whatsoever, and called by any other name. Duties, imposts, and excises, were enumerated, after the general term taxes, only for the purpose of declaring, that they were to be laid by the rule of uniformity. I consider the Constitution to stand in this manner. A general power is given to Congress, to lay and collect taxes, of every kind or nature, without any restraint, except only on exports; but two rules are prescribed for their government, namely, uniformity and apportionment: Three kinds of taxes, to wit, duties, imposts, and excises by the first rule, and capitation, or other direct taxes, by the second rule.
I believe some taxes may be both direct and indirect at the same time. If so, would Congress be prohibited from laying such a tax, because it is partly a direct tax?
The Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only such as Congress could lay in proportion to the census. The rule of apportionment is only to be adopted in such cases where it can reasonably apply; and the subject taxed, must ever determine the application of the rule.
If it is proposed to tax any specific article by the rule of apportionment, and it would evidently create great inequality and injustice, it is unreasonable to say, that the Constitution intended such tax should be laid by that rule.
It appears to me, that a tax on carriages cannot be laid by the rule of apportionment, without very great inequality and injustice. For example: Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000 dollars each, by a tax on carriages, of 8 dollars on every carriage; and in one State there are 100 carriages, and in the other 1000. The owners of carriages in one State, would pay ten times the tax of owners in the other. A. in one State, would pay for his carriage 8 dollars, but B. in the other state, would pay for his carriage, 80 dollars.
It was argued, that a tax on carriages was a direct tax, and might be laid according to the rule of apportionment, and (as I understood) in this manner: Congress, after determining on the gross sum to be raised was to apportion it, according to the census, and then lay it in one State on carriages, in another on horses, in a third on tobacco, in a fourth on rice; and so on. I admit that this mode might be adopted, to raise a certain sum in each State, according to the census, but it would not be a tax on carriages, but on a number of specific articles; and it seems to me, that it would be liable to the same objection of abuse and oppression, as a selection of any one article in all the States.
I think, an annual...
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