Fifth Third Bank v. Monet
| Decision Date | 23 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:12-cv-01074 |
| Parties | FIFTH THIRD BANK, Plaintiff, v. MONET, a Tennessee general partnership; MICHAEL P. DOLAN, individually; and WILLIAM E. PITTS, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Fifth Third Bank ("Fifth Third") has filed a Motion for Default Judgment against defendant William Pitts (Docket No. 18). Fifth Third has also filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings against defendants Monet and Michael Dolan (Docket No. 20), to which defendants Monet and Dolan filed a Response in opposition (Docket No. 26), and Fifth Third filed a Reply (Docket No. 27). For the reasons stated herein, both motions will be granted and judgment will enter in favor of Fifth Third.
On September 6, 2012, a Florida state circuit court in Fifth Third Bank v. Monet, Case No. 09-CA-002262 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (hereinafter "Fifth Third"), issued an order holding defendants Monet, Dolan, and Pitts jointly and severally liable to Fifth Third for approximately $2.8 million,plus interest. On October 18, 2012, the defendants appealed that judgment (and the circuit court's refusal to reconsider it) to Florida's intermediate appellate court, arguing that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
On October 19, 2012, Fifth Third filed this action, in which it seeks to domesticate the Fifth Third judgment against Monet, Dolan, and Pitts.2 On November 21, 2012, Monet and Dolan filed a Motion to Stay or Dismiss the Complaint (Docket No. 6), arguing that, under Tennessee law, this court was obligated to await the disposition of the Fifth Third appeal before enforcing the circuit court judgment. On December 21, 2012, this court denied the defendants' motion. The court found that, under applicable federal law, the court was obligated to give the Fifth Third judgment the same effect it would have in a Florida state court. Because the defendants had failed to obtain a stay from the circuit court or to post a sufficient bond in compliance with Fla. R. App. P. 9.310, the judgment was final and enforceable in Florida (and therefore in this court), notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal. Monet, 2012 WL 6700569, at *2-*4. Fifth Third now moves for judgment on the pleadings against Monet and Dolan.
Unlike Monet and Dolan, Pitts never responded to the Complaint. On January 30, 2013,upon Fifth Third's motion, the clerk issued an Entry of Default under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) against Pitts. (Docket No. 16.) Fifth Third now moves for default judgment against him.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) applies the same standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Johnson v. Bredesen, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (citing Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2007)). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court will "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007); Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2002). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a plaintiff provide "'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The court must determine whether "the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims," not whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove the facts alleged. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974)).
The complaint's allegations, however, "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007). To establish the "facial plausibility" required to "unlock the doors of discovery," the plaintiff cannot rely on "legal conclusions" or "[threadbare] recitals of the elements of a cause of action," but, instead, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
The court incorporates the reasoning of its previous opinion concerning the Motion to Stay or Dismiss. See generally Monet, 2012 WL 6700659. Briefly, as the court previously explained in Monet, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal district court must give a state court judgment the same effect it would have in the jurisdiction in which it was rendered. See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 550-551, 67 S. Ct. 451, 91 L. Ed. 488 (1947)); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482, 102 S. Ct. 1883, 72 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1982); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 947 (6th Cir. 1985). This principle extends to state court determinations regarding personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, provided that those issues were "fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment." Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111, 84 S. Ct. 242, 245, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1963); see also Hooks, 771 F.2d at 949 (subject matter jurisdiction); Lexus Real Estate Grp., Inc. v. Bullitt Cnty. Bank, 300 F. App'x 351, 356-67 (6th Cir. 2008) (personal jurisdiction).
As explained in Monet, 2012 WL 6700569, at *4, under Florida law, Florida trial court judgments are final and enforceable for purposes of full faith and credit, unless the party subject to the judgment obtains a stay pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.310 by either (a) obtaining a stay from the circuit court upon motion, or (b) posting a "good and sufficient bond" (see Fla. R. App.P. 9.310(b)(1) and 9.310(c).) See Maner v. Maner, 412 F.2d 449, 450-51 (5th Cir. 1969); Tarr v. Tarr, 391 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Int'l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Capital Truck, 872 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). Monet and Dolan do not dispute that they declined to obtain a stay of the Florida circuit court judgment as required by Fla. R. App. P. 3.910.
To the extent Monet and Dolan are simply re-arguing positions that this court considered and rejected in Monet, the court rejects them here for the same reasons previously articulated. However, for the first time, Monet and Dolan now argue that they were denied the opportunity to "fully litigate" their personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction challenges before the Florida circuit court, and, therefore, were denied their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In support of their position, they have attached an affidavit from Dolan in which he avers that he has "never been a resident of Florida or operated, conducted, engaged in, transacted or carried on any business there." (Dolan Aff. ¶ 2.) Dolan also avers that he never signed any documents at issue in Fifth Third that "would have required me to perform any acts in the State of Florida." (Id. ¶ 3.)
The Supreme Court has held that, to provide a "a full and fair opportunity to litigate" for § 1738 purposes, the Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481. Thus, as discussed in Monet, 2012 WL 6700569, at *3, only in exceptional circumstances will federal courts consider a collateral challenge to the merits of an originating court's exercise of jurisdiction.
Here, the defendants litigated the issue of personal jurisdiction before the Florida circuitcourt multiple times, both before and after judgment. Initially, the Florida circuit court considered the defendants' motion to dismiss the case on multiple grounds, including the defendants' arguments that the court lacked personal jurisdiction and that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After "reviewing the Motion and pleadings in this matter, hearing the arguments of counsel, and being otherwise duly advised of the premises," , the circuit court summarily denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants then filed an Answer that included affirmative defenses re-asserting the defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which Fifth Third moved to strike. After "having reviewed the file, heard arguments of counsel and being otherwise duly advised in the premises," the circuit court summarily granted Fifth Third's Motion to Strike those defenses. (Id., Ex. B.) The defendants do not dispute Fifth Third's contention that the defendants again raised the jurisdictional issues in a "motion for summary judgment," as well as at trial. (Docket No. 21 at p. 7.) Furthermore, after the circuit court entered its September 6, 2012 judgment in favor of Fifth Third, the defendants filed a Motion for Rehearing and Relief from Judgment (Docket No. 26, Ex. 1), which again argued that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants.3 The circuit court denied that motion as well.
Certainly, the Florida circuit court's apparent failure to issue written findings is a disfavored practice that may support the defendants' position on appeal in Florida. Furthermore, if the self-serving averments in the Dolan Affidavit (filed in this case) are true, those facts could, depending on the other relevant jurisdictional...
To continue reading
Request your trial