Johnson v. Bredesen

• Citation: 579 F.Supp.2d 1044
• Decision Date: 22 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. 3:08cv0187.,3:08cv0187.
• Parties: Terrence JOHNSON, Jim Harris, Alexander Friedmann, and Joshua Roberts, Plaintiffs, v. Phil BREDESEN, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Brook Thompson, Coordinator of Elections, Riley Darnell, Secretary of State of Tennessee, James Johnson, Administrator of Elections for Shelby County, Kim Buckley, Administrator of Elections for Madison County, and Ray Barrett, Administrator of Elections for Davidson County, in their official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

579 F.Supp.2d 1044

Terrence JOHNSON, Jim Harris, Alexander Friedmann, and Joshua Roberts, Plaintiffs, v. Phil BREDESEN, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Brook Thompson, Coordinator of Elections, Riley Darnell, Secretary of State of Tennessee, James Johnson, Administrator of Elections for Shelby County, Kim Buckley, Administrator of Elections for Madison County, and Ray Barrett, Administrator of Elections for Davidson County, in their official capacities, Defendants.

No. 3:08cv0187.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

September 22, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., Atlanta, GA, Nancy G. Abudu, Tricia Herzfeld, American General Life Insurance Company, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.

William N. Helou Tennessee Attorney General's Office Allison L. Bussell, Keli J. Oliver, Metropolitan Legal Department, Nashville, TN, John L. Ryder, Harris, Shelton, Hanover & Walsh, PLLC, Danny Presley Memphis, TN, James I. Pentecost, Jon A. York, Pentecost & Glenn, PLLC, Jackson, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THOMAS A. WISEMAN, JR., Senior District Judge.

Before the Court are (1) a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Constitutional Challenges Contained in the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 58) filed by defendants Phil Bredesen, Brook Thompson and Riley Darnell (collectively, the "State Officials"), and (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 68). The motions have been fully briefed and the parties presented oral argument on their motions at a hearing conducted on September 15, 2008.

For the reasons set forth below the Court finds that the State Officials' motion is meritorious and that they are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law as to Counts One through Five of the Amended Complaint. Those Counts will be dismissed, leaving for adjudication only plaintiff Alexander Friedmann's due-process claims under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, set forth in Count Six of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' motion for judgment will be denied.

I. INTRODUCTION

After this Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. Nos. 44 and 45) denying the County Official defendants' motions to dismiss, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 57) in which they joined a new plaintiff, Joshua Roberts. In the Amended Complaint as in the original Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to invalidate those portions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-29-202 that condition the restoration of voting rights for people previously convicted of a felony upon their payment of certain legal financial obligations, namely restitution and child support. Plaintiffs assert that this statute, by denying the vote to those who have not satisfied certain legal financial obligations, violates their fundamental right to vote and discriminates among citizens on the basis of wealth. More specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the statutory provisions at issue violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Counts One and Two), the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("Count Three"), the Ex Post-Facto Clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions ("Count Four"), and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions ("Count Five"). Count Six of the Amended Complaint asserts that the State of Tennessee has refused to restore plaintiff Alexander Friedmann's voting rights despite the State's failure to produce any documentation showing Mr. Friedmann owes outstanding restitution, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Plaintiffs name as defendants those state and county officials, in their official capacity, they allege are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the state statutory scheme as it pertains to voter eligibility and registration. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, attorney's fees and costs.

The State Officials have now filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that, even assuming the Plaintiffs' factual allegations are true, they are not entitled to any relief on Counts One through Five of the Amended Complaint.¹ Plaintiffs oppose the State Officials' motion, but they have also filed their own motion for judgment on the pleadings and alternative motion for partial summary judgment as to Counts One through Five.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are undisputed for purposes of the parties' motions. Under current Tennessee law, a citizen convicted of a felony and thereby deprived of the right to vote can apply for a voter registration card and seek to regain the right of suffrage upon:

(1) Receiving a pardon, except where the pardon contains special conditions pertaining to the right of suffrage;

(2) The discharge from custody by reason of service or expiration of the maximum sentence imposed by the court for the infamous crime; or (3) Being granted a certificate of final discharge from supervision by the board of probation and parole pursuant to § 40-28-105, or any equivalent discharge by another state, the federal government, or county correction authority.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-29-202(a) (2006). Notwithstanding this provision, convicted felons remain ineligible to apply for a voter registration card or to have the right to suffrage restored unless they have "paid all restitution to the victim or victims of the offense ordered by the court as part of the sentence," Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-29-202(b), and unless they are "current in all child support obligations." Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-29-202(c).

Plaintiffs Terrence Johnson, Jim Harris and Joshua Roberts are all convicted felons and residents of Tennessee who have served their prison sentences and satisfied the conditions of supervised release, and wish to vote in upcoming elections. They are ineligible under § 40-29-202 to apply for restoration of their voting rights, however, because they owe past-due child support payments and/or restitution to the victims of the crimes for which they were convicted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir.2007); Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir.2006). Under the applicable standard, the court reviews the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accepting as true all well pleaded factual allegations. Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Moriarty, 8 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir.1993)). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences contained in the pleadings. Id. (citing Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir.2000)). To survive the motion, "the complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory." Id. (citing Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)). See also Shuptrine v. McDougal Littell, No. 1:07-cv-181, 2008 WL 400453, at * 1 (E.D.Tenn. Feb.12, 2008) (ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion and identifying the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), in light of Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), as whether the complaint pleads enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face).

Although Plaintiffs' motion, like the State Officials', is characterized first as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the only pleading the Court can consider is the Amended Complaint, as the State Officials have not filed an answer to the Amended Complaint. They did file an answer to the original complaint in which they denied or were without sufficient information to admit or deny most of the factual allegations in the complaint. Regardless, there is no dispute regarding the import and effect of the statutes at issue, and the State Officials, for purposes of the Plaintiffs' motion, do not dispute those facts set forth in the Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts. It appears that the issues presented are strictly legal in nature and do not require the resolution of any factual issues in any party's favor.²

III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. Whether § 40-29-202 Violates the Equal Protection Clause

The State Officials argue that subsections (b) and (c) of § 40-29-202 do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because: (1) felons do not have a fundamental right to vote; (2) wealth qualifications do not discriminate against a suspect class; and (3) because felons do not have a fundamental right to vote, the statutory limitations on restoration of felon voting rights are subject to a rational-basis analysis, which the State meets. In response, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the State may disenfranchise convicted felons, but essentially argues that once the right to vote is restored, any restrictions on that right should be subject to strict scrutiny. They also argue that § 40-29-202 has a disparate impact on the indigent. Finally, they argue that the distinction made by the statute between those ex-felons who can and cannot pay restitution and past-due child support is not rationally related to any legitimate government purpose and, alternatively, that they should be able to conduct discovery in order to present evidence invalidating Defendants' asserted rational basis for the statute. The law simply does not support the Plaintiffs' arguments.

(1) Convicted Felons Do Not Have Fundamental Right to Vote

The Supreme Court has expressly...