Figley v. W.S. Indus.
| Decision Date | 25 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10–1271.,10–1271. |
| Citation | 801 N.W.2d 602 |
| Parties | Daniel FIGLEY, Plaintiff–Appellant/Cross–Appellee,v.W.S. INDUSTRIAL, Defendant–Appellee/Cross–Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Dorothy A. O'Brien of Brooke & O'Brien, Davenport, for appellant.Thomas R. Current, Clinton, and Jeffrey Craig Miller and Duncan Alexander Young, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellee.Heard by EISENHAUER, P.J., and POTTERFIELD and TABOR, JJ.TABOR, J.
In this case, we must determine whether a company's counterclaim against its former employee qualifies as an adverse action for purposes of stating a claim for retaliatory litigation under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Act (IWPCA). Because the employee failed to show that the company's counterclaim against him was baseless, the counterclaim did not amount to an adverse action for purposes of stating a retaliation claim and the district court correctly granted a directed verdict in favor of the company on that issue.
Although the employee appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment, we decline to address that argument because his appeal follows a full trial on the merits of those issues. We also decline to reach the question regarding the correct method of computing his overtime because it is moot.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Defendant W.S. Industrial Services, Inc. (WSI), an industrial cleaning business, employed plaintiff Daniel Figley from July 2006 through April 15, 2008. Figley initially worked for the company as a mechanic and later as an “operator/laborer in the field on various company projects.” In these positions, he was paid by the hour. In August 2007, WSI promoted Figley to a “foreman apprentice,” a managerial training position. His compensation structure changed: “foreman apprentice” was a salaried position and he earned approximately $43,000 per year. WSI terminated Figley's employment in April 2008 after Figley and other WSI employees used a company van to go “bar-hopping” and another employee crashed the vehicle into four parked cars and a utility pole.
On September 17, 2008, Figley filed a petition at law claiming WSI violated both the FLSA and the IWPCA. His amended complaint ultimately alleged three counts: (1) he was entitled to unpaid overtime compensation; (2) he was entitled to payment of a discretionary bonus available to WSI management employees; and (3) WSI unlawfully retaliated against him in violation of the FLSA and IWPCA by filing a counterclaim.
WSI defended, arguing Figley was not entitled to overtime pay because he qualified for the executive exemption under the FLSA based on his management and supervisory duties as a foreman apprentice. It argued that because Figley was a foreman apprentice, he was rightly paid on a salaried basis and his overtime eligibility ceased. WSI argued in the alternative, that the Fluctuating Work Week rule provided the appropriate method of computing his overtime wages.
WSI also filed a counterclaim against Figley, asserting breach-of-contract and negligence theories, seeking recovery for approximately $45,000 in damages the company sustained due to the motor-vehicle accident that occurred while Figley and other WSI employees were out in a company van. The counterclaim alleged (1) Figley breached his at-will employment contract by violating WSI policies and failing to protect company property; or (2) breached his duty of care and was negligent by violating WSI policies and failing to protect company property.
With respect to the van accident, Figley testified that he was assigned to the night crew for a particular job and after his crew had “set up for the job” at the plant, members from both the night crew and the day crew decided to go out for the evening. He testified that Paul Schreiber was the designated driver; the group “went from one establishment to another” and drank for several hours. He further stated that eventually, Alberto Velasco, another WSI employee who was out with them that evening, became upset with Schreiber, who had just parked the van. Figley stated that “everybody was out of the van” when Velasco, who was intoxicated, “went around to the driver's seat, grabbed Paul Schreiber, removed him from the driver's seat, got in the driver's seat, and put it in reverse ... and [Velasco] drove backwards down the street and struck four cars and a light pole.” Figley further testified that he was designated as an “operator” rather than as a “foreman” on that assignment. Figley also stated that WSI's counterclaim for damages resulting from the accident caused him “nonstop worry,” “restless nights,” a “three-day migraine,” and attorney fees.
After WSI filed the counterclaim, Figley amended his complaint to allege his former employer filed the counterclaim in retaliation for his original complaint to recover overtime wages.
Before trial, Figley moved for summary judgment arguing that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the following three claims and urging the court to decide, as a matter of law, that (1) Figley was a non-exempt employee and was entitled to overtime payment; (2) the Fluctuating Work Week method of calculating overtime payment did not apply because WSI did not establish the elements required before applying that calculation; and (3) with respect to WSI's counterclaim, Figley was not legally responsible for the damages resulting from the accident.1
On May 26, 2010, the district court denied summary judgment on the first claim, concluding material issues of fact existed regarding Figley's duties and whether he was an exempt employee. The court declined to address the applicability of the Fluctuating Work Week method for calculating overtime pay, and further concluded Figley violated company policy and material issues of fact existed regarding Figley's potential liability under WSI's counterclaim.
A jury heard the case from June 28 to July 2, 2010. At the close of all evidence, WSI moved for a directed verdict on each of Figley's claims. WSI asked the court to dismiss Figley's claims for overtime compensation, the discretionary bonus, and retaliation. WSI argued that Figley failed to satisfy his burden of proof with respect to all claims and that the company's counterclaim was permissible under Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. Figley resisted and moved for a directed verdict on WSI's counterclaim. He asserted the district court should dismiss WSI's counterclaim “because of the complete lack of proximate cause ... on the tort claim and on the contract claim because there is no demonstration that a contract actually did exist.”
The district court declined to direct a verdict in favor of WSI on Figley's claim for unpaid overtime compensation, explaining that “there is substantial evidence creating a question of fact for the jury to decide whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to overtime compensation and the amount of that compensation and how that compensation should be computed.” The court granted WSI's motion for a directed verdict with respect to the discretionary-bonus claim and dismissed that issue. The district court also granted WSI's motion for a directed verdict on Figley's retaliation claim, noting that “there [was] no showing of any adverse employment consequence to the Plaintiff as a result of the filing of the counterclaim,” and that Figley had “shown no damages that [were] a proximate result of the filing of the counterclaim.” The court also stated that “[d]enying the Defendant the opportunity to present its counterclaim in this instance would be denying Defendant the access to the court system to present that claim” and worried that if WSI “filed the counterclaim as a cause of action after the conclusion of this litigation ... it would be subject to ... claim preclusion and, perhaps, res judicata on issues that arose in this litigation.”
The court denied Figley's motion to dismiss WSI's counterclaim, concluding sufficient evidence of proximate cause existed. At that point, Figley requested that the court reconsider its ruling on the retaliation claim. The district court declined to do so.
The issues of overtime-compensation and Figley's liability for damages sustained in the van accident were submitted to the jury. On July 2, 2010, the jury returned a verdict in favor of WSI on the overtime-pay claim, concluding that WSI failed to pay Figley “overtime pay for hours he worked over 40 per week,” but that Figley was an exempt employee who was not entitled to overtime payment. The jury found in favor of Figley on WSI's counterclaim, concluding Figley was not liable for the damages that resulted from the car accident involving the company van. The verdict form indicated that WSI failed to prove that Figley breached an employment contract and also failed to prove that Figley was “negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care while in the custody and control of company property.”
Figley appeals.2
II. AnalysisA. The District Court's Denial of Figley's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding his Non–Exempt Status and Entitlement to Overtime Wages
Figley appeals the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on his unpaid overtime-compensation claim. He asserts the district court should have granted him summary judgment and concluded he was a non-exempt employee entitled to overtime payment for nineteen weeks when he worked as a machine operator, laborer, or mechanic. Figley asks us to conclude as a matter of law that he was entitled to overtime wages. He asserts that he preserved error on this issue by moving for summary judgment, and that if moving for summary judgment did not preserve error, “the rule should be changed.”
WSI resists, asserting the district court's denial of Figley's motion for summary judgment is not appealable after a full trial on the merits. The company also argues that Figley failed to preserve error on the issue of whether the court...
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