Figueroa v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 24 December 1974 |
| Docket Number | CA-IC,Nos. 1,s. 1 |
| Parties | Jesus FIGUEROA, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, New Pueblo Construction Co., Respondent Employer, Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Respondent Carrier. 1019, 1 1020. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This is a review of the Industrial Commission's award on the consolidated claims of the petitioner. The Commission denied petitioner's petition to reopen one claim because he failed to show any new, additional, or previously undiscovered disability. A.R.S. § 23--1061H. The Commission also denied petitioner's other claim for continuing compensation benefits for an unscheduled disability pursuant to its finding that petitioner had suffered a scheduled disability. We granted petitioner's application for a Writ of Certiorari, and upon review of the matter we affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission.
The petitioner, Jesus Figueroa (Figueroa), suffered an industrial injury on 6 January 1971 while lifting heavy materials on the job which resulted in a left inguinal hernia. Figueroa's claim was accepted by respondent carrier and a herniorraphy was performed on 30 January 1971. Temporary compensation and medical benefits were terminated on 20 May 1971. Figueroa did not protest this termination of benefits.
On 21 January 1972 Figueroa sustained another left inguinal hernia, again as the result of lifting heavy materials on the job. Figueroa's claim for this injury was accepted by respondent carrier and another herniorraphy was performed on 17 March 1972. Compensation benefits were terminated by a Notice of Claim Status issued 6 October 1972, and medical benefits were terminated by a Notice of Claim Status issued 15 January 1973. Figueroa filed a Request for Hearing to protest the termination of compensation benefits.
On 7 February 1973 Figueroa filed a Petition to Reopen his claim on the 1971 hernia. This Petition was denied by a Notice of Claim Status issued 22 February 1973. Figueroa thereafter filed a Request for Hearing to protest the denial of his Petition to Reopen.
Upon a consolidated hearing on both claims, the Industrial Commission denied Figueroa's Petition to Reopen the 1971 hernia claim, and similarly denied his claim for continuing compensation benefits under the 1972 hernia claim. Timely Petitions for Writ of Certiorari were filed and this Court ordered the two matters to be consolidated.
The parties agree that A.R.S. § 23--1043 1 governs the compensation issue presented herein.
Figueroa initially contends that the injury suffered on 21 January 1972 was a 'real traumatic hernia' within the scope of A.R.S. § 23--1043(1) and that he is entitled to continued compensation for an unscheduled disability. In support of his contention that he suffered a real traumatic hernia Figueroa cites the following exchange between his counsel and the treating physician, Dr. Gonzales, at the hearing:
'Q In reference to your second operation; that is, the one you have described of March 17, 1972, would you state with a reasonable medical probability that you would describe the injury you observed as An injury to the adominal wall of sufficient severity to puncture or tear asunder the wall and permit the exposure or protrusion of the abdominal viscera or some part thereof?
'A Yes.' (Emphasis added)
On cross-examination by respondents' attorney, the following transpired:
'Q (By Mr. Marks) Doctor, a while ago Mr. Gonzalez asked you with respect to both the 1971 and 1972 hernias whether these were the result of injuries to the abdominal wall of sufficient severity to puncture or tear asunder the wall and permit the exposure of protrusion of the abdominal viscera or some part thereof and you said yes.
'A Yes.
'Q That is true of every inguinal hernia; isn't it?
'A That's correct.
'Q And confining ourselves in a general sense to those left inguinal hernias which arise because of a strain either a lifting, a pulling or pushing strain that would be true in every such type of hernia; wouldn't it?
'A That's correct.' (Emphasis added)
Figueroa maintains that the above testimony of Dr. Gonzalez on cross-examination does not controvert the doctor's prior conclusion on direct examination that Figueroa suffered a real traumatic hernia on 21 January 1972. He submits that the doctor was testifying on the basis of his medical knowledge and not on the basis of statutory definitions and legal distinctions.
In conjunction with his initial contention Figueroa asserts that the distinction between 'real traumatic hernias' and 'all other hernias' as defined in A.R.S. § 23--1043, must be established by expert medical testimony. Figueroa observes that when the issue before the Commission is within the exclusive knowledge of a medical expert, and only one expert appears befor the Commission, then the findings of that expert are conclusive on the Commission. See Jones v. Industrial Commission, 81 Ariz. 352, at 358, 306 P.2d 277 (1957). While this proposition is basically true, it may be more accurately observed that uncontroverted medical testimony as to matters solely within the medical province cannot be arbitrarily rejected by the Industrial Commission. Benavides v. Industrial Commission, 19 Ariz.App. 467, 508 P.2d 354 (1973). The Commission was certainly entitled to determine from the foregoing testimony that Dr. Gonzalez was attempting to state a legal conclusion rather than simply offer his medical opinion. Consequently, any suggestion that the Commission acted arbitrarily in rejecting Dr. Gonzalez's testimony is groundless in light of its inherent need for further interpretation and analysis.
The question remains whether the evidence reasonably supports the Commission's conclusion that Figueroa did not suffer a 'real traumatic hernia' on 21 January 1972 within the meaning of A.R.S. § 23--1043(1). We believe that it does.
Figueroa submits that the facts in the instant case are identical to those in Wynn v. Industrial Commission, 14 Ariz.App. 424, 484 P.2d 36 (1971), and our decision should be controlled by the result reached therein. We agree that the facts here are very similar to those in the Wynn case, supra, but we note that the decision in Wynn is unclear as to the origin of and full extent of the injury to the applicant's abdominal wall. This factor is particularly crucial in determining which of the subsections of A.R.S. § 23--1043 will control the compensation for a particular hernia injury.
Subsection 1 of A.R.S. § 23--1043 distinguishes 'real traumatic hernias' from 'all other hernias' characterized in subsection 2 of that statute. This distinction manifests the Legislature's intent to provide different compensation for hernias which result in an injury to the abdominal wall permitting the abdominal viscera to actually protrude or escape from the body. We predicate this observation on our interpretation of the language of subsection 1 and the case law of other jurisdictions who have similar statutes.
A resort to the definition of terms in interpreting statutory enactments is often beneficial. State v. Harpham, 2 Ariz.App. 478, 410 P.2d 100 (1966). The Legislature's use of the word 'traumatic' in subsection 1 is most significant. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition Rev., defines 'traumatic' as an adjective meaning 'caused by or resulting from a wound or any external injury. . . .' The term has received similar definition in workmen's compensation cases. In Smith v Garside, 76 Nev. 377, 355 P.2d 849, 852 (1960), the Nevada Supreme Court said:
See also Straight Creek Fuel Co. v. Hunt, 221 Ky. 265, 298 S.W. 686 (1927).
Words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended. A.R.S. § 1--213. See also Huerta v. Flood, 103 Ariz. 608, 447 P.2d 866 (1968); State v. Miller, 100 Ariz. 288, 413 P.2d 757 (1966). Our purpose is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature in enacting our statutes and wherever possible this purpose is best served by giving words the meaning ordinarily ascribed to them. Brown v. Superior Court In and For Pima County, 2 Ariz.App. 434, 409 P.2d 593 (1966). The use of the word 'traumatic' as defined above is not ambiguous. The inescapable conclusion is that the Legislature intended to differentiate those hernias resulting from a traumatic puncture or tear of the external abdominal wall from those which more typically result from a combination of a less severe injury or strain, and a congenital weakness of body tissue.
Subsection 2 of A.R.S. § 23--1043 speaks of all other compensable hernias as those resulting from 'a sudden effort or severe strain or blow received while in the course of employment.' A.R.S. § 23--1043(2)(a). The inclusion of the word 'blow' in subsection 2 does not defeat the distinction between 'real traumatic hernias' and 'all other hernias.' A statute must be construed as a whole with effect being given to all of its provisions if possible. Adams Tree Service Inc. v. Trans-America Title Ins. Co., 20 Ariz.App. 214, 511 P.2d 658 (1973). Where part of a statute is susceptible to two constructions, that construction should be adopted which...
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