Figueroa v. Sec'y of Health

Decision Date01 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 2012–5064.,2012–5064.
Citation715 F.3d 1314
PartiesStephanie Vino FIGUEROA, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Manny Figueroa, deceased, Petitioners–Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Martin E. Leach, Feiler & Leach, P.L., of Coral Gables, FL, argued for petitioners-appellants.

Melonie J. McCall, Trial Attorney, Torts Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. With her on the brief were Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Rupa Bhattacharyya, Director, Mark W. Rogers, Deputy Director, and Gabrielle M. Fielding, Assistant Director.

Before DYK, PROST, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Stephanie Vino Figueroa, widow of Manny Figueroa and personal representative of his estate, filed a petition under the Vaccine Act seeking compensation for vaccine-related injuries suffered by Mr. Figueroa. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–660, 100 Stat. 3755,codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa–1 to –34 (“Vaccine Act). The special master dismissed Ms. Figueroa's petition, reasoning that because Mr. Figueroa had died of pancreatic cancer, a non-vaccine-related cause, Ms. Figueroa lacked standing to file a petition for injury compensation. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. Ms. Figueroa appeals, arguing that Mr. Figueroa's claim for vaccine-related injury compensation survived his death, and that the Act does not bar his personal representative from pursuing that claim on behalf of his estate. We agree that Mr. Figueroa's injury claim survived his death and that Ms. Figueroa, the personal representative of his estate, has standing to file a petition. We therefore reverse.

Background

Mr. Figueroa received the flu vaccine on October 28, 2008. Within twenty days of the vaccination, Mr. Figueroa developed numbness in his face, impaired speech, and weakness. He was hospitalized and diagnosed with Guillain–Barré Syndrome (“GBS”), a debilitating and sometimes fatal nervous system disorder.

Because GBS is not listed on the Vaccine Injury Table, see42 U.S.C. § 300aa–14(a), it is considered an off-Table injury, and requires proof that the vaccine caused the injury. See generally Althen v. Sec'y of HHS, 418 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed.Cir.2005). Nonetheless, “many flu [vaccine] causing GBS cases have been compensated under the Program.” Torday v. Sec'y of HHS, No. 07–372V, 2009 WL 5196163, at *3, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 745, at *10 (Fed.Cl.Sp.Mstr. Dec. 10, 2009) (observing that “there is clearly a medical theory connecting the flu vaccine to GBS”); see also, e.g., Griglock v. Sec'y of HHS, 99 Fed.Cl. 373, 374 (2011) (noting that government did not contest that GBS resulted from influenza vaccination), aff'd,687 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir.2012); Stewart v. Sec'y of HHS, No. 06–777, 2011 WL 3241585 (Fed.Cl.Sp.Mstr. July 8, 2011) (finding that petitioner successfully showed GBS resulted from influenza vaccine).

Mr. Figueroa had 36 months from the onset of his symptoms to file a petition under the Vaccine Act, that is, until approximately mid-November, 2011. See42 U.S.C. § 300aa–16(a)(2). However, in February of 2010, Mr. Figueroa was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer; he died of pancreatic cancer in April of 2010. His widow, Stephanie Vino Figueroa, was named the personal representative of his estate. On November 1, 2010, Ms. Figueroa filed a petition seeking compensation for the vaccine-related neurological injuries Mr. Figueroa suffered prior to his death. Since the pancreatic cancer which caused Mr. Figueroa's death was not vaccine-related, the petition did not seek a death benefit.

It is not disputed that the estate satisfied the requirements for a timely petition under section 300aa–16(a)(2), because the petition was filed less than thirty-six months after the onset of Mr. Figueroa's GBS. Nor is it disputed that Mr. Figueroa could have filed the petition while alive (or that his representative could have filed it for him, had he been alive but disabled). However, the Secretary filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Ms. Figueroa “is not a proper petitioner under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–11(b)(1)(A).” Figueroa ex rel. Figueroa v. Sec'y of HHS, No. 10–750V, 2011 WL 2784586 at *1 (Fed.Cl.Sp.Mstr. June 22, 2011). The government argued that section 300aa–11(b)(1)(A) provides an exclusive list of individuals who may file a petition, and that the personal representative of an individual who dies of non-vaccine-related causes is not among them.

That section provides:

any person who has sustained a vaccine-related injury, the legal representative of such person if such person is a minor or is disabled, or the legal representative of any person who died as the result of the administration of a vaccine ... may, if the person meets the requirements of subsection (c)(1) of this section, file a petition for compensation under the Program.

42 U.S.C. § 300aa–11(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The special master agreed, concluding that “even though if Mr. Figueroa had filed his own action when he was alive, his estate may have received some amount of compensation,” Ms. Figueroa lacked standing to file a petition on his behalf, because she was not among the individuals listed in section 300aa–11(b)(1)(A). Figueroa, 2011 WL 2784586, at *3–4.

Ms. Figueroa sought review of the special master's decision, and the Court of Federal Claims affirmed. Figueroa v. Sec'y of HHS, 101 Fed.Cl. 696 (2011). The court acknowledged that the most relevant precedent, Zatuchni v. Sec'y of HHS, 516 F.3d 1312 (Fed.Cir.2008), had “express[ed] no view” on whether a petitioner in Ms. Figueroa's situation would have standing. Figueroa, 101 Fed.Cl. at 697 (quoting Zatuchni, 516 F.3d at 1321). However, the court reasoned that section 300aa–11(b)(1)(A) permitted only three categories of claimants to file a petition in the first instance: (1) vaccine-injured persons themselves, (2) the legal representatives of minors or disabled persons, and (3) the legal representatives of the estates of persons who died of vaccine related causes. Id. at 697–98. Because Mr. Figueroa had died, the petition did not fall under category (1); because the cancer was fatal, rather than merely disabling him, the petition did not fall under category (2); and because the cancer was not vaccine-related, the petition did not fall under category (3). Id. at 698. The court concluded that section 300aa–11(b)(1)(A) did not allow a petition seeking compensation for Mr. Figueroa's vaccine-related injuries to be filed. Id.

Ms. Figueroa timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–12(f). Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and we review the Court of Federal Claims' interpretation of the Vaccine Act de novo. Whitecotton v. Sec'y of HHS, 17 F.3d 374, 376 (Fed.Cir.1994), rev'd on other grounds,514 U.S. 268, 115 S.Ct. 1477, 131 L.Ed.2d 374 (1995).

Discussion
I

This case requires us to address two questions reserved by this court in Zatuchni: whether the personal injury claim of a vaccine-injured individual who died from causes unrelated to the vaccine survives his or her death, and whether the personal representative of the estate has standing to file a petition under the Vaccine Act. See516 F.3d at 1320–21.

In 1986, Congress enacted the Vaccine Act to address two primary concerns: first, “that the tort system was failing to adequately compensate persons injured from vaccinations,” and second, that there was too much vaccine-related tort litigation. Cloer v. Sec'y of HHS ( Cloer I ), 654 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2011) (en banc). Congress recognized that “a small but significant number” of people “ha[d] been gravely injured” by vaccines, “and they and their families have resorted ... to the tort system for some form of financial relief.” H.R.Rep. No. 99–908, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345. Relief, however, was often unobtainable:

For the relatively few who are injured by vaccines—through no fault of their own—the opportunities for redress and restitution are limited, time-consuming, expensive, and often unanswered.... [I]n the end, no recovery may be available. Yet futures have been destroyed and mounting expenses must be met.

Id. at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347; see also Lowry ex rel. Lowry v. Sec'y of HHS, 189 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed.Cir.1999).

In response, Congress established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, see42 U.S.C. § 300aa–10(a), “a no-fault compensation program ‘designed to work faster and with greater ease than the civil tort system,’ Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 179 L.Ed.2d 1 (2011) (quoting Whitecotton, 514 U.S. at 269, 115 S.Ct. 1477). The Program provides compensation for vaccine-related injuries, see42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa–15(a)(1), (3),(4), and, “in the event of a vaccine-related death, an award of $250,000 for the estate of the deceased,” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(a)(2). “Any person” injured by a vaccine may petition for compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–11(b)(1)(A).1

It is not disputed that a claim for injury compensation under the Vaccine Act survives the injured person's death and may be asserted by the personal representative of the estate in most situations, including (1) when the petition is filed before death by an injured individual who subsequently dies from non-vaccine-related causes; (2) when the petition is filed before death by a vaccine-injured individual who subsequently dies from vaccine-related causes, see Zatuchni, 516 F.3d at 1323; and (3) when the petition is filed after death by the estate of a vaccine-injured individual who dies of vaccine-related causes, see Griglock, 687 F.3d at 1374–75;Zatuchni, 516 F.3d at 1321. The only dispute is with respect to the situation here, when the petition is filed after the death of a vaccine-injured individual who died of non-vaccine...

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