Figueroa v. Vill. of Melrose Park
| Decision Date | 31 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–cv–03026,13–cv–03026 |
| Parties | Blanca N. Figueroa, Plaintiff, v. Village of Melrose Park, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Steven T. Mann, Law Office of Steven T. Mann, Naperville, IL, John Patrick Milroy, John Patrick Milroy, Warrenville, IL, for Plaintiff.
Michael D. Bersani, Anthony George Becknek, Hervas, Condon & Bersani, P.C., Itasca, IL, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Blanca Figueroa claims that her former employer, the Village of Melrose Park ("Village"), and its Chief of Police, Sam Pitassi, refused to allow her to join the Village's police force because of her gender and race. Figueroa has sued the Village and Pitassi for this alleged discrimination and those defendants have now moved for summary judgment on all of the claims against them. (Dkt. No. 43.) For the reasons detailed below, the defendants' motion is denied.
Figueroa, who is a Hispanic woman, was employed by the Village from March 2011 until September 2011. Figueroa was originally hired as a probationary police officer. (Id. ¶ 4.) Then, on May 11, 2011, Figueroa and another police officer candidate, Aldo Scudiero, were enrolled by the Village in the training academy for the police department of the City of Chicago. (Pl.'s Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. of Additional Facts ("PSAF") Ex. P at 13–14, Dkt. No. 46–6.) The City of Chicago's academy trained recruits for suburban police departments on a contract basis. (PSAF Ex. N at 6–7, Dkt. No. 46–4.) Figueroa claims that she successfully completed her basic training and, as a result, she was certified by the State of Illinois as a qualified law enforcement officer in August 2011. (PSAF ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 46.)
Despite what Figueroa describes as her successful completion of the academy basic training course, she was not given an assignment as a police officer. (Id. ¶¶ 2–4.) Moreover, she was asked to resign and ultimately terminated without ever receiving an assignment. (Id. ) Figueroa claims that the Village's decision not to give her an assignment but instead to terminate her was motivated by prejudice against her gender and Hispanic heritage. She seeks relief from the Village and Pitassi for the alleged gender and race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). She also seeks relief from the Village and Pitassi for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; Davis v. Time Warner Cable of S.E. Wisc., 651 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir.2011). At the summary judgment stage, a district court may not assess the credibility of witnesses, choose between competing inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir.2005). The court must view all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
Because the elements and methods of proof are the same regardless of whether a discrimination claim is brought under Title VII or § 1981, the summary judgment analysis is also the same for claims under both statutes. McGowan v. Deere & Co., 581 F.3d 575, 579 (7th Cir.2009). The "fundamental question" for discrimination claims under either statute "is simply whether a reasonable jury could find prohibited discrimination."
Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 840 (7th Cir.2014).
A plaintiff may establish the existence of evidence of discrimination sufficient to reach a jury by either "direct" or "indirect" methods. Orton–Bell v. State of Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir.2014). "Direct" proof includes both evidence explicitly linking an adverse employment action to an employer's discriminatory animus and circumstantial evidence that would permit a trier of fact to infer that discrimination motivated the adverse action. Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2011). In responding to a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff must identify the method of proof that supports an inference of discrimination in her case. Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir.2013). Here, Figueroa contends that there is sufficient evidence of gender and racial discrimination under both methods.
Under the direct proof approach, remarks and other evidence that reflect a propensity by the decision maker to evaluate employees based on illegal criteria will suffice as evidence of discrimination even if the evidence stops short of a virtual admission of illegality. Whitfield v. Int'l Truck and Engine Corp., 755 F.3d 438, 443 (7th Cir.2014) (quoting Miller v. Borden, Inc., 168 F.3d 308, 312 (7th Cir.1999) ; Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir.1997) ).
At her deposition, Figueroa testified that on multiple occasions over the course of her basic training at the Chicago police academy, Pitassi told her that she would be a liability to the Village police department and that she would not be hired as an officer. (PSAF Ex. L at 213–14, 223, 240, Dkt. No. 46–2.) On at least one such occasion, Pitassi told her that she would not be able to defend herself in a confrontation with a 200–pound man. (Id. at 225.) Figueroa's brother Anthony, a member of the Village's fire department, was present at one such meeting and countered Pitassi's comments by pointing out that the City of Chicago had many female police officers. (Id. at 226.) Pitassi responded by stating that that the City of Chicago's much larger number of police officers would allow backup officers to arrive more quickly. (Id. )
Although Pitassi did not explicitly admit that his aversion to hiring Figueroa was because of her gender, his comments do suggest a presumption that she would be physically unable to perform as a police officer. Yet no evidence supports that presumption. In contrast, Figueroa has presented evidence that to enter the police academy she was required to pass a "power test" that included strength, stamina, and flexibility requirements. (PSAF Ex. L at 35, Dkt. No. 46–2; PSAF Ex. N. at 207, 233, Dkt. No. 46–4.) She also has presented evidence that, although she struggled to complete training runs during one period of her police academy course, she had no other physical difficulties at the academy and passed the tests—including physical tests—that were requirements for successful completion of the academy program. (PSAF Ex. L at 41–43, Dkt. No. 46–2; PSAF Ex. N at 207, 233, Dkt. No. 46–4.) Pitassi's speculation that Figueroa would be unable to defend herself against a man, in the absence of proof that she was unable to perform at the physical level required by the academy, supports an inference that his presumption was related to her gender.
Such presumptions are unlawful. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). Thus, the Court concludes that Pitassi's comments provide sufficient direct evidence to support an inference that his assessment of her employment prospects was motivated by gender discrimination.
The defendants contend that Pitassi's motives provide insufficient evidence to permit Figueroa to present her case to a jury because the ultimate decision to terminate her was made by the Village Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. But evidence of discrimination by an individual who provides input into the ultimate employment decision, when it occurs around the time of, and in reference to, the adverse employment action complained of, is sufficient to show that the decision was motivated by discriminatory intent. Hunt v. City of Markham, Ill., 219 F.3d 649, 652–53 (7th Cir.2000). In this case, it is undisputed that Pitassi recommended to the commissioners that Figueroa's employment be terminated. It is also undisputed that the commissioners followed his recommendation. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Stmt. of Material Facts, ("DSOF") Exs. W, X, Dkt. No. 45–4.) Pitassi's discriminatory motive would thus be sufficient to support a determination that the commissioners' ultimate decision was improperly motivated.
The record does not contain similar direct evidence of race discrimination, however. Figueroa asserts that Pitassi, when suggesting that she resign, offered to place her in a job at a 911 call dispatch center and remarked that the center was looking for bilingual employees. (PSAF Ex. M at 69, Dkt. No. 46–3; PSAF Ex. L at 240, 260, 302, Dkt. No. 46–2.) Although the alleged remark and its context indicate that Pitassi was expressing an unwillingness to allow Figueroa to join the police force, the comment does not suggest that his unwillingness was related to his view of her bilingual abilities. Pitassi's remark thus fails to raise a direct inference of racially discriminatory motive.
A plaintiff may also survive summary judgment by raising a sufficient inference of discriminatory action through the "indirect" method of proof. Under this method, a plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she met her employer's legitimate job expectations, (3) she suffered...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Barnes v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill.
...under Title VII or § 1981, the summary judgment analysis is also the same for claims under both statutes." Figueroa v. Village of Melrose Park, 127 F.Supp.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2015). Sincethe operative facts and law are the same here, the Court addresses the Board's Motion for Summary Judg......
-
Jones v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. & Mark Donovan
...VII or Section 1983, the summary judgment analysis is also the same for claims under both statutes." Figueroa v. Village of Melrose Park, 127 F. Supp. 3d 905, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2009). In Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F. 3d. 762, the Seventh Circuit changed the nomenclature involved in......