Whitfield v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–1876.,13–1876.
• Citation: 755 F.3d 438
• Parties: Matthew WHITFIELD, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE CORPORATION, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

755 F.3d 438

Matthew WHITFIELD, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE CORPORATION, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 13–1876.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 14, 2013.

Decided June 6, 2014.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 15, 2014.^*

Fay Clayton, Laura Kleinman, Robinson, Curley & Clayton, P.C., Chicago, IL, Samuel Fisher, Sr., Wiggins Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Harold R. Bickham, John Robert Maley, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

This rather complex matter involves a failure to hire claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. At the heart of this case is plaintiff-appellant Matthew Whitfield's application for an electrician position at one of defendant-appellee Navistar's engine manufacturing plants. Whitfield is African–American, and prior to applying with Navistar, he worked as an electrician for various employers, including four years with the U.S. Navy. Navistar is a manufacturer of engines, among other equipment, and employed a number of electricians at the time of Whitfield's application.

In 1996, Whitfield applied for an open electrician position at Navistar's plant in Indianapolis, Indiana (the Plant). At the time, Navistar had a significant need for electricians and hired sixteen electricians at the Plant while Whitfield's application was pending, and eleven during the relevantlimitations period. The written job description for electricians, as negotiated with the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the Union) required that an applicant have either eight years experience as an electrician or a journeyman card, which was considered presumptive proof of the experience requirement. The journeyman card could be issued by the Union or any other union with comparable apprenticeship standards. Navistar delegated the responsibility of evaluating and confirming an applicant's experience to the Union.

When Whitfield first applied for a job in 1996 he alleged he had approximately nine and a half years of experience as an electrician, including four years in the U.S. Navy. The Plant's general foreman, Daniel McDonald, interviewed Whitfield and stated he would hire him if the Union verified the required eight years of experience. However, when the Union attempted to verify Whitfield's numerous employers it was unable to determine he had the requisite eight years experience. Navistar asserted the difficulty in verifying Whitfield's experience was due to errors on his application, but the Union did not consider Whitfield's four years of experience as an electrician in the Navy, which it conceded should have been considered. Whitfield was never rejected by Navistar; instead he was told that the Union could not verify his experience. At the suggestion of Navistar's electrical foreman, Willie Jones, Whitfield continued to work elsewhere as an electrician and to supplement his Navistar application with additional references.

In September 1998, Whitfield obtained his International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) card, and submitted proof of it to Navistar. At this point there is no doubt that Whitfield met the minimum requirements for hire. Union Committeeman George Bunton then cleared Whitfield for hire, and returned Whitfield's file to Jones. While returning the file to Navistar with notice of Whitfield's clearance, Jones opened Whitfield's folder and saw that the word “black” was written on the application's cover sheet. Surprised, Jones asked Navistar's Human Resources manager, Jeff Thatcher, why the word appeared on the file. Thatcher could not explain why the cover sheet was there and said it must have been a mistake.

Whitfield continued his quest to gain employment at Navistar. In March 1999, Whitfield gave the Union an updated copy of his IBEW card and an updated application. While Whitfield's resubmitted application was pending, Navistar hired at least five more white electricians. Whitfield was never formally rejected but in December 1999 Jones unofficially told Whitfield that although he wished to hire Whitfield, Navistar would not allow it. At trial Navistar asserted various reasons for not hiring Whitfield, including the “errors” in his resume and his purported lack of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) experience, which Navistar contended was an important, but unstated, qualification for the electricians they hire. No final decision maker has ever been identified by Navistar.

In October 2001 Whitfield, along with 26 other Plaintiffs, sued Navistar under Title VII, alleging Navistar discriminated in hiring and maintained a racially hostile work environment in the Plant. The district court certified the other Plaintiffs' hostile work environment class and ordered that Whitfield's hiring discrimination claim remain part of the underlying case for discovery and all other pretrial proceedings, but separated his claim from that class action for trial. The hostile work environment class action went to trial in 2006 but was settled with most of the class action members before conclusion of trial.

During joint discovery for the class action and Whitfield's claim, extensive amounts of evidence and testimony showing extreme racial hostility at the Plant were presented. Evidence showing racial hostility at the Plant included symbols of racial hatred (including nooses), photos of racially hostile graffiti and racially offensive slogans scrawled around the Plant. The evidence also showed that Navistar refused to discipline white employees, including supervisors, for such racially charged behavior. There was also evidence that the Plant systematically excluded blacks from the skilled trades.

Whitfield's claim finally proceeded to a bench trial in June 2012. After the first day, Whitfield filed a submission regarding evidence from the earlier class trial, Allen, et al. v. International Trucking, in an attempt to introduce 59 exhibits and testimony from 19 trial exhibits. Navistar objected, and the district court took the issue under advisement, and the trial proceeded until completion. On July 31, 2013, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as an entry of final judgment. The court rejected Whitfield's submission regarding evidence from the class trial, stating that Whitfield gave the court no authority to support admission of evidence from the class action. Further, the court found that Whitfield's submission, proffered one day into trial, was untimely. The court then concluded that Whitfield's evidence was insufficient to directly or indirectly prove discrimination. Specifically, the court determined that Whitfield's evidence did not imply any discrimination, that Whitfield did not meet Navistar's unstated qualifications for the job, and that he did not offer any compelling comparator evidence. Because we find the district court made several errors in analyzing Whitfield's evidence, we now reverse.

I.

Under Title VII, employers may not “discriminate against any individual with respect to his ... privileges of employment, because of such individual's race[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Title VII claims and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims incorporate the same liability standard. Walker v. Abbott Laboratories, 340 F.3d 471, 474 (7th Cir.2003). Once Whitfield shows he was subjected to an adverse employment action, here Navistar's failure to hire him, he can prevail on his discrimination claim by submitting direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under the relevant statutes of limitations, only Whitfield's claims from May 16, 1998 and onward are timely.

Direct Method

We begin with the direct method of proof. In analyzing Whitfield's evidence, the district court makes two significant errors, which ultimately doomed its analysis. The court first erred by discrediting evidence of Whitfield's personnel file containing a cover page with the word “black” on it. Despite our skepticism concerning the district court's negative credibility assessment ¹ of Jones' testimony we do give the court deference in its credibility determinations. See E.C. Styberg Eng'g Co. v. Eaton Corp., 492 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir.2007). However, the court did not have discretion to create an explanation out of thin air as to why the word “black” was on the file, nor should it have ignored substantial evidence of a racially hostile environment.

Despite being called the “direct method” of proof, outright admissions of discriminatory intent are rare, so plaintiffs usually use circumstantial evidence of discrimination to support their claims. Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir.2006). A plaintiff may prevail by “constructing a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that allows a [factfinder] to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. For this mosaic to be convincing, it must directly point to a discriminatory reason for the employer's action and also be directly related to the employment decision. Dass v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 675 F.3d 1060, 1071 (7th Cir.2012). It will not do for plaintiff to assemble an “amorphous litany of complaints about a myriad of workplace decisions.” Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir.2001). But, “[r]emarks and other evidence that reflect a propensity by the decisionmaker to evaluate employees based on illegal criteria will suffice as direct evidence of discrimination even if the evidence stops short of a virtual admission of illegality.” Miller v. Borden, Inc., 168 F.3d 308, 312 (7th Cir.1999), quoting Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir.1997) (quotations omitted from original). Whitfield attempted to create this mosaic with evidence of...