Fijnje v. State, s. 92-991

Decision Date24 November 1992
Docket Number92-1146,Nos. 92-991,s. 92-991
Citation609 So.2d 672
Parties17 Fla. L. Week. D2646 Bobby FIJNJE, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Mel Black, Miller, Selig & Kelley, Baker and Moscowitz, Miami, Elizabeth Russo and Robert S. Glazier and Jeanne Baker, Coconut Grove, for petitioner.

Robert A. Ginsburg, County Atty., and Eric K. Gressman and Warren F.X. Smith and Abbe S. Rifkin, Asst. County Attys., for respondent.

Before NESBITT, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

After a lengthy criminal trial, petitioner, a minor, was acquitted of all charges in an eight count indictment which included seven counts of sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious assault on three separate minors. He filed a motion to tax costs in the trial court pursuant to section 939.06, Florida Statutes (1991), seeking costs in the amount of $692,822.50. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, refusing to certify the costs until it had determined "whether or not the costs incurred were reasonable and necessary for the proper defense of the former defendant." Petitioner now seeks a writ of mandamus from this court requiring the trial court to certify that the costs had been paid. For the following reasons we grant the petition and issue the writ.

Section 939.06, Florida Statutes provides:

No defendant in a criminal prosecution who is acquitted or discharged shall be liable for any costs or fees of the court or any ministerial office, or for any charge of subsistence while detained in custody. If he shall have paid any taxable costs in the case, the clerk or judge shall give him a certificate of the payment of such costs, with the items thereof, which, when audited and approved according to law, shall be refunded to him by the county.

The Legislature has thus set forth the proper procedure for an acquitted or discharged defendant to obtain reimbursement for costs expended in his criminal defense and trial. As stated in Clark v. State, 570 So.2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990):

The statute [section 939.06] mandates that the defendants must either have the court or the clerk of the court certify that the defendants have paid taxable costs in their defense before their case is discharged. Then the defendants should present such certification to the county pursuant to section 939.08, Florida Statutes (1989), for reimbursement.

If the county refuses to reimburse the costs, the defendants could file a civil suit against the county for a determination of reimbursable costs. "The appropriateness of reimbursement for any particular item is not truly put in issue until the county commission denies payment and a civil suit is brought...." Orange County v. Davis, 414 So.2d 278, 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). If the trial court, during the course of the action against the county, rules that the costs are not reimbursable, the defendants can then appeal that decision.

Id. at 410 (footnote omitted); see also Sawyer v. State, 570 So.2d 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Pfeifer v. Powell, 498 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).

In the instant case, petitioner presented the trial court with invoices and corresponding cancelled checks for each item listed in his motion for certification of costs. Thereafter, the court's only remaining function was to ministerially certify that the costs had been paid. Pfeifer, 498 So.2d at 615; Orange County v. Davis, 414 So.2d 278, 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). When it refused to certify the costs until it had determined "whether or not the costs incurred were reasonable and necessary for the proper defense of the former defendant," the court erroneously allowed discretion to play a part in the ministerial function of certifying costs.

Accordingly, the order under review is reversed, the petition for writ of mandamus is granted, and the trial court is...

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