Filson v. Territory Oklahoma

• Decision Date: 06 September 1901
• Citation: 67 P. 473,11 Okla. 351,1901 OK 66
• Parties: GOLDIE FILSON v. THE TERRITORY OF OKLAHOMA.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1901 OK 66

67 P. 473

11 Okla. 351

GOLDIE FILSON v. THE TERRITORY OF OKLAHOMA.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: September 6, 1901

Error from the District Court of Canadian County; before C. F. Irwin, Trial Judge.

Syllabus

¶0 1. LARCENY--Measure of. The reasonable market value of the property stolen is the true criterion for determining the grade of larceny.

2. EVIDENCE--Market Value. Where a witness testifies generally to the value of an article in common use, it will be assumed that the market value is meant unless it appears from the testimony of the witness that he bases the value given by him, upon some other consideration.

3. WITNESS--Expert. Expert witnesses are not required to prove the reasonable market value of chattels in common use, and the reasonable market price of which is within the knowledge of persons of ordinary intelligence and experience.

4. MARKET VALUE--Proof of. It is not improper to permit proof of the purchase price of an article purchased in the usual course of trade, which has been used but a short time, as well as its condition at the time, and its salable value at a second hand dealer's, as elements for consideration of the jury in determining the reasonable market value of such article.

5. VENUE--Proof of. The venue of an offense must be proved as charged in the indictment, but direct and positive proof is not required.

6. JUDICIAL NOTICE. The courts of this territory will take judicial notice that Canadian county is in Oklahoma territory, and proof that an act was committed in Canadian county, will sustain the allegation that such an act was committed in Canadian county, Oklahoma territory.

7. LARCENY--Consent of Owner. In order to support a conviction for the crime of larceny, the proof must show that the property which is the subject of larceny, was taken without the consent of the owner, but direct and positive declarations of the owner are not required. If all the facts and circumstances in evidence connected with or surrounding the taking will warrant the reasonable and rational inference that the property was taken without such consent, then such verdict will not be disturbed for lack of direct proof.

8. VERDICT--Assumption. This court will not assume that the verdict of a jury as to value is the result of improper mathematical calculations, where the evidence is ample to warrant their finding, and there is no evidence of misconduct.

9. SAME-Not Disturbed, When. Where there is competent evidence reasonably tending to support every material averment in an indictment, this court will not disturb a verdict of guilty upon the weight of the testimony.

D. C. Lewis, W. K. Snyder and Baldwin & Phelps, for plaintiff in error.

J. C. Strang, Attorney General, for defendant in error.

BURFORD, C. J.:

¶1 The plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the district court of Canadian county for the larceny of a set of double harness. The jury found the value of the property to be $ 21, and returned a verdict finding the prisoner guilty of grand larceny, and judgment was rendered on the verdict. From this judgment the prisoner appeals.

¶2 It is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error, that the true rule for determining value of stolen property is the market value of the goods taken at the time, and place of the alleged larceny. There is no room for argument on this question, and the prosecution does not contend for any different rule. The trial court instructed the jury that they must find the fair cost value of the harness on the market was more than twenty dollars before they could find the prisoner guilty of grand larceny. Conceding this to be the correct rule, was it violated in this case? It is claimed that the witnesses for the prosecution were not qualified to testify upon the subject of value. The owner of the harness testified that he purchased the harness new and paid $ 34 for them, without collars, and that they were worth $ 27 or $ 28 at the time of the larceny. The witness was a farmer who had used the harness for about six months. Other witnesses were permitted to testify as to the value of the harness. We do not think this a question calling for expert testimony. Farmers who buy and use property are generally competent to testify as to its value, and when values are spoken of in a general way, market values are generally meant.

¶3 This court said in the case of Coyle, et al. v. Baum, 3 Okla. 695, 41 P. 389:

"When one speaks generally of values of chattels, it means their value in the market. This is inferred, unless a different basis of value is fixed by the witness, or it is apparent that the witness bases his value on a different foundation."

¶4 It was not error for the trial court to permit the owner of the property to testify what the harness cost new. It was shown that the harness had only been used for a short time and had been well cared for. The jury might properly consider their cost new, and their use, and decrease in value by their use, in determining their reasonable value at the time of taking. While the reasonable market value of the property at the time of the larceny was the question to be determined by the jury, any facts which would reasonably tend to enable them to intelligently determine such question, was competent and proper. The first cost of the harness when new, what they sold for at the store, what they sold for after being used a short time, what a second-hand dealer would pay for them, and what...