Finch v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 24 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. 08-1425.,08-1425.
• Citation: 547 F.3d 933
• Parties: Gary W. FINCH, Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

547 F.3d 933

Gary W. FINCH, Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Appellee.

No. 08-1425.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 24, 2008.

Filed: November 24, 2008.

Thad J. Murphy, argued, Davenport, IA (Michael DePree, on the brief), for appellant.

Kristin L. Everhart, Asst. Regional Counsel, argued, Office of General counsel, Kansas City, MO (Maureen McGuire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Des Moines, IA, on the brief), for appellees.

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Gary Finch appeals from the district court's¹ order affirming the Commissioner's denial of disability insurance benefits. We affirm.

I.

Finch is a sixty-three-year-old man with a high school education, two years of community college, and training in heating and refrigeration repair. For twenty years he worked for the same company as a heating and air conditioner servicer and appliance servicer. According to Finch, he was let go in 1999 because he was unable to keep up with the workload. He lives alone and is able to care for his basic needs and perform some household chores.

Finch filed for disability on June 28, 2000, basing his claim on a lack of mobility in his back, neck, and right arm, as well as vertigo. His date last insured is December 31, 2004. Following a hearing and a supplemental hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Finch's claim. After the Appeals Council denied his request for review, Finch filed a civil action in the United States District Court. On March 16, 2004, the district court remanded his case for further proceedings at the request of the Social Security Administration. On August 24, 2005, a second hearing was held before the ALJ. The ALJ concluded that the combination of Finch's impairments was severe, but that he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed or medically equal to a listed impairment. The ALJ found that although Finch was unable to perform his past relevant work, there were jobs in the national economy that he could perform and thus concluded that Finch was not disabled.

After the Appeals Council denied Finch's request for review, he again filed a complaint in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, affirming the ALJ's decision.

On appeal Finch argues that the Commissioner's decision should be reversed because the ALJ failed to properly credit Finch's subjective complaints of pain, did not properly evaluate the evidence in determining Finch's residual functional capacity, and improperly substituted his own opinion for that of a medical examiner's.

II.

We will uphold the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Harvey v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 1013, 1015 (8th Cir. 2004). "Substantial evidence is `less than a preponderance but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support' the conclusion." Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 589 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir.2002)). This standard of review requires us to consider the evidence that supports the Commissioner's decision as well as the evidence that detracts from it. Eichelberger, 390 F.3d at 589. That we would have come to a different conclusion, however, is not a sufficient basis for reversal. Id. "If, after review, we find it possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner's findings, we must affirm the denial of benefits." Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996).

A.

Finch argues that the ALJ erred in assessing his credibility. The ALJ found that Finch's complaints of pain were not entirely credible in light of the evidence as a whole. To assess a claimant's credibility, the ALJ must look to the claimant's daily activities; the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; precipitating and aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and functional restrictions. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). The claimant's work history and the absence of objective medical evidence to support the claimant's complaints are also relevant. Wheeler v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir.2000). "An ALJ may discount a claimant's subjective complaints only if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole." Porch v. Chater, 115 F.3d 567, 572 (8th Cir.1997). "[Q]uestions of credibility are for the [ALJ] in the first instance. If an ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant's testimony and gives a good reason for doing so, we will normally defer to that judgment." Karlix v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Dixon v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 237, 238 (8th Cir. 1990)).

The ALJ addressed the Polaski factors and noted inconsistencies in the record that led him to conclude that Finch was not as limited as he claimed. The ALJ noted that Finch is able to care for himself and maintain his home, including mowing the lawn, removing snow (albeit slowly), driving, and visiting friends. Finch reported falling off a ladder on two occasions. Finch was thrown from a horse on two occasions and was involved in a motorcycle accident. The ALJ recognized that Finch had been hospitalized as a result of some of these mishaps, but he found it noteworthy that Finch was able to engage in the activities that gave rise to those accidents during the time that he was allegedly unable to work.

The ALJ also concluded that Finch's complaints were not supported by objective medical evidence. The record shows that an objective medical cause has not been established for Finch's complaints of low back pain and abdominal pain. Finch's subjective complaints of pain were inconsistent with the findings of consultative examiners. In January 2005, Stanley Smith, Ph.D., described Finch as appearing to be in only mild discomfort, yet Finch described his pain level at a seven out of ten. Christine Deignan, M.D., Rodney Carlson, M.D., and Lori O'Dell McCollum, Ph.D., all concluded that Finch was less limited than he asserted. Finch's treating physician, William Davidson, M.D., described Finch as having a histrionic personality. Finch's pain clinic physician, Michael A. Swanson, M.D.— whose notes reflect repeated skepticism about the information Finch provided to him—described Finch's pain history as inconsistent.

Finch argues that he has consistently sought medical treatment and has an unbroken earnings record from 1961 to 1999. Although these two factors weigh in Finch's favor, it was for the ALJ to weigh all the evidence and make a credibility finding. After reviewing that evidence, we cannot say that the ALJ's credibility determination is not supported by the record as a whole.

B.

Finch argues that the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment is in error because it ignored Finch's treating physician's opinion and failed to take into account Finch's cognitive limitations. Although a treating physician's well-supported opinion is generally accorded substantial weight, "it is not conclusive because the record must be evaluated as a whole." Howe v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir.2007) (citing Charles v. Barnhart, 375 F.3d 777, 783 (8th Cir. 2004)); see also Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir.2000). Moreover, "[t]he ALJ may reject the conclusions of any medical expert, whether hired by the claimant or the government, if they are inconsistent with the record as a whole." Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir.2007). The ALJ is charged with the responsibility of resolving conflicts among medical opinions. Id.

1.

Finch's primary challenge to the ALJ's physical residual functional capacity determination is his contention that the ALJ dismissed the opinion of Finch's treating physician, Dr. Kurt Andersen, particularly Dr. Andersen's statement that Finch could not sit or stand for more than fifteen minutes at a time without experiencing increased pain. The ALJ found instead that Finch could sit or stand for thirty minutes at a time.

The ALJ did not dismiss Dr. Andersen's opinion, but instead detailed the ways in which it was inconsistent with other medical opinions in the record. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Dr. Carlson, a consultative physician, concluded that Finch could sit or stand for six hours with normal breaks during an eight-hour work day. Another consultative physician, George X. Trimble, M.D., confirmed this assessment. Although a third consultative physician, Dr. Newton B. White, agreed with Dr. Andersen that Finch could not sit or stand for more than fifteen or twenty minutes, the ALJ noted inaccurate statements in Dr. White's opinion that undermined his conclusion.

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