Finch v. State

• Decision Date: 10 September 1934
• Citation: 156 So. 489,116 Fla. 437
• Parties: FINCH et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

156 So. 489

116 Fla. 437

FINCH et al. v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

September 10, 1934

En Banc.

Mosby Finch and Ralph Stokes were convicted of forcibly and secretly confining, imprisoning, inveigling, and kidnapping a person named, with intent to hold him for ransom, and they bring error.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial. Appeal from Circuit Court, Putnam County George William Jackson, judge.

COUNSEL

Wm. C Hodges, of Jacksonville, O. L. Dayton, of Dade City, Zach H Douglas, of Gainesville, and Thos. B. Dowda, of Palatka, for plaintiffs in error.

Cary D. Landis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

DAVIS Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs in error were indicted and convicted in the circuit court of Putnam county and sentenced to life imprisonment for the offense denounced by chapter 16063, Acts of 1933, Laws of Florida. From the sentences imposed; this writ of error has been taken.

The count of the indictment upon which the conviction was entered charges that 'one Mosby Finch and one Ralph Stokes--did forcibly and secretly confine, imprison, inveigle, and kidnap a person, to-wit: One Adam Sikes, with intent him the said Adam Sikes, to hold for ransom to be paid for the release of him, the said Adam Sikes, the said Mosby Finch and the said Ralph Stokes then and there being without lawful authority him, the said Adam Sikes, so to forcibly or secretly confine, imprison, inveigle or kidnap' contrary to the statute of the state of Florida in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state of Florida.

Chapter 16063, Acts of 1933, is entitled as follows:

'An Act to Amend Section 5058, Revised General Statutes, Being Section 7160, Compiled General Laws of Florida, 1927, Relating to Kidnapping and Punishment Therefor.'

The body of the act provides that: 'Whoever, without lawful authority, forcibly or secretly confines, imprisons, inveigles or kidnaps any person, with intent to hold such person for a ransom to be paid for the release of such person, or any person or persons who aids, abets or in any manner assists such person or persons in such confining, imprisoning, inveigling or kidnapping such person, shall be guilty of kidnapping a person and shall be punished by death, unless a majority of the jury shall recommend the defendant to the mercy of the Court, in which event the punishment shall be by imprisonment for life in the State prison.' Section 5058, Rev. Gen. St., section 7160 Comp. Gen. Laws which was thus amended and broadened, originally denounced only the confining, imprisoning, inveigling, and kidnapping of any child under the age of fifteen years, with intent to hold such child for ransom to be paid for the release of such child, and made the maximum penalty that might be imposed, life imprisonment.

When viewed in the light of the constitutional requirement that the subject of a legislative act must be briefly expressed in the title, and must not be misleading, it appears that the title of chapter 16063, Acts of 1933, which expressly gives notice of an intent to amend a stated section of the Revised General Statutes of Florida appearing in the books under the general heading: 'False Imprisonment and Kidnapping' and itself incorporating the term 'kidnapping' as a part of the law prior to its amendment, violates no principle of the Constitution, and is therefore not an invalid act of the Legislature as contended by plaintiffs in error in this case. State v. Bethea, 61 Fla. 60, 55 So. 550; Thompson v. State, 66 Fla. 206, 63 So. 423; Ex parte Pricha, 70 Fla. 265, 70 So. 406; Gray v. Central Florida Lumber Company, 104 Fla. 446, 140 So. 320, 141 So. 604.

We hold therefore that the title to chapter 16063, Acts of 1933, amending section 7160, Comp. Gen. Laws, section 5058, Rev. Gen. St., relating to the felony of statutory kidnapping, sufficiently complies with section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution of Florida, to support the constitutionality of the act as to its title. See Sheip & Co. v. Amos, 100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699.

It is next argued on behalf of the plaintiffs in error that the trial court committed reversible error in overruling their motion to quash the indictment on the ground that the allegations thereof are inconsistent and repugnant, and do not set forth a particular statement of facts and circumstances constituting an offense within the terms of the legislative enactment.

An indictment charging a crime substantially as defined by the statute denouncing it, is sufficient, where by employing the language of the statute, coupled with descriptive details, the nature and the cause of the accusation as stated could not reasonably mislead or embarrass the accused in concerting his defense. Habersham v. State, 80 Fla. 240, 85 So. 655; Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157, 27 A. L. R. 1291. The criticism of the indictment in the present case is based on the contention that inasmuch as the statute does not define 'ransom' or 'kidnapping,' that the facts and circumstances or acts constituting the alleged 'ransom' or 'kidnapping' should have been set forth. Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 51 So. 278; Reyes v. State, 34 Fla. 181, 15 So. 875. We agree with the view that good pleading dictates the charging of a crime with more particularity than was used in the indictment in this case. But in view of our statute permitting an indictment to charge an offense in the language of the statute, and forbidding the quashing of indictments unless the court shall be of the opinion that the formal charge is so vague, indistinct, and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense, or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense (sections 8368, 8369, Comp. Gen. Laws, sections 6063, 6064, Rev. Gen. St.). We cannot say that the trial court erred in refusing to quash the indictment merely because it omitted to aver descriptive details of the charge that were necessary to be proved in order to secure a conviction, the omission of which, however, does not bring the indictment within the purview of section 8369, Comp. Gen. Laws, section 6064, Rev. Gen. St., supra. See Doss v. State, 220 Ala. 30, 123 So. 231, 68 A. L. R. 712.

By chapter 16063, Acts of 1933, the kidnapping of a person to hold for ransom is made a capital felony. And under that statute the specific intent to hold for a ransom to be paid for the release of the victim is the gist of the offense. It is clear that in raising the nature of the crime denounced to one of a capital character, the Legislature did not intend to punish with death every unlawful restraint or imprisonment of another, however revolting the circumstances of the unlawful restraint or imprisonment might be, but only that particular kind of secret confinement imprisonment, inveiglement, or kidnapping which should be done 'with intent to hold such person for a ransom to be paid for the release of such person.' Ross v. State, 15 Fla. 55...