Findlay v. Lewis, 1
| Citation | 831 P.2d 830,171 Ariz. 454 |
| Decision Date | 07 November 1991 |
| Docket Number | CA-HC,No. 1,1 |
| Parties | Bryan L. FINDLAY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Samuel A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; John Aventi, Warden, Respondents-Appellees. 90-004. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This case was presented to us on appeal from the superior court's dismissal of the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
By order dated August 15, 1991, this court elected to treat this proceeding as a petition for special action relief. See Brown v. State, 117 Ariz. 476, 573 P.2d 876 (1978); Goodman v. State, 96 Ariz. 139, 393 P.2d 148 (1964); see generally Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann., Vol. 17B. In the remainder of this opinion, we will refer to Mr. Findlay as the petitioner rather than as the appellant.
This court's order also accepted jurisdiction in this matter, granted the relief requested, and stated that an opinion would be issued at a later date. This is the promised opinion.
Petitioner is a prisoner incarcerated in an Arizona Prison. He was initially incarcerated in Utah but was transferred to Arizona. Petitioner alleges that the transfer was without his consent. Both petitioner and respondents agree that the transfer was on the initiative of the Utah Department of Corrections under the Western Interstate Correctional Compact. ("Compact.") The Compact is a multistate agreement adopted by Arizona and codified as A.R.S. §§ 31-471 to -475.
Petitioner filed what he denominated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona. Petitioner filed the petition on his own behalf, without the benefit of legal counsel.
The petition filed in the superior court asserted "unconstitutional confined" [sic] as one of petitioner's claims. The petition elaborated that petitioner desired to be returned to Utah to serve his term of imprisonment. For present purposes, however, the more important part of the petition was a claim that officials of the Arizona Department of Corrections had denied petitioner's constitutional right of access to the courts.
After the superior court granted the respondent officials' motion to dismiss the petition, petitioner appealed to this court. Petitioner here reasserts his constitutional right of access to the courts. He also claims that the superior court abused its discretion in denying his motion for an extension of time to file a response to the respondents' motion to dismiss.
The record reveals that the superior court did deny petitioner's motion for more time. Petitioner, who was being held in protective custody at the Florence, Arizona prison, asserted that he lacked sufficient access to the prison law library to prepare an adequate response to the motion to dismiss. The record reflects no opposition to the motion for more time.
Petitioner eventually filed a response to the motion to dismiss his petition. However, the record indicates that the superior court considered only the motion to dismiss and not petitioner's response in ruling upon this motion.
In connection with his constitutional claim, petitioner stated in an affidavit filed in the superior court that both the Arizona Department of Corrections and Utah prison officials had declined to provide him with access to any materials relating to Utah law so that he could challenge his transfer to the Arizona prison. His affidavit also revealed his desire to file other pleadings in the Utah courts, including a challenge to his conviction and to Utah's refusal to consider granting his early release.
The respondents filed no affidavits and presented no other evidence in the superior court. 1 In their motion to dismiss, respondents did not dispute that petitioner had no access to legal materials as described in his affidavit. Nor did they dispute that these materials were reasonably necessary to assert the petitioner's claims. The respondents instead asserted that petitioner could obtain legal assistance from the State of Utah but provided no details regarding available legal resources and provided no evidence to support this assertion.
Petitioner is proceeding without counsel in both the superior court and appellate proceedings. The record fails to indicate that any form of legal assistance has been made available to him by the Arizona Department of Corrections or by the State of Utah. Although the respondents vaguely assert on appeal that petitioner "has been given full access to all forms of assistance available to all other Arizona inmates," this statement is unsupported by the record. Equally important is that this statement reveals nothing about whether petitioner, a prisoner held under authority of Utah law, has available to him legal resources regarding matters of Utah law and procedure.
A prisoner has an undeniable right of access to the courts protected by the United States Constitution. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941). The right of access clearly extends to prisoners' challenges to the legality of their confinement or conditions of their confinement, the very kind of claim made here by petitioner. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827-28, 97 S.Ct. at 1497-98; Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485, 89 S.Ct. at 748.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has observed that prisoners' habeas corpus actions "are of 'fundamental importance ... in our constitutional scheme' because they directly protect our most valued rights." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 (quoting Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485, 89 S.Ct. at 748). Access to the courts is a fundamental right because without an avenue to judicial enforcement of individual rights, " '[a]ll other rights [of a prisoner] are illusory.' " See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir.1976) (quoting McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859, 96 S.Ct. 114, 46 L.Ed.2d 86 (1975)).
The right of access imposes an affirmative obligation on the state when the litigant is an indigent prisoner. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828-832, 97 S.Ct. at 1498-1500; Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485-86, 89 S.Ct. at 748-49. In this case, petitioner filed an uncontroverted affidavit of indigency which triggered the state's affirmative obligation.
At a minimum, the federal constitution requires that the states provide the litigant "an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2447, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). In more concrete terms, the right of access to the courts requires that states provide inmates with either adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from law-trained persons. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. For the literate inmate, reasonable access to a law library containing appropriately helpful materials generally suffices. However, prisoners who are illiterate, poorly educated, of limited intellectual capacity, or non-English speaking may require the assistance of a lawyer, paralegal, or "jailhouse lawyer." Johnson, 393 U.S. at 487, 89 S.Ct. at 750; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570, 94 S.Ct. at 2981.
Thus, the state is not always bound to provide a lawyer to the prisoner. However, it must provide some form of legal assistance adequate for a meaningful opportunity to be heard in court, whether through access to a law library, a lawyer, or a knowledgeable fellow prisoner.
When the prisoner asserts a prima facie claim of lack of access to the courts, the ultimate burden of proving adequate access falls to the state. Carter v. Fair, 786 F.2d 433, 436 (1st Cir.1986); Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir.1981). Petitioner made a prima facie claim when he raised claims in an Arizona court which are controlled by Utah law and which must be asserted in Utah courts, and asserted that he had been denied access to any Utah legal materials.
The respondents did not attempt to disprove petitioner's assertions in the superior court. They instead relied on a legal argument that petitioner was not entitled to the legal assistance he sought. We next consider the respondents' argument.
The respondents first argue that petitioner's claim of unconstitutional confinement has no merit on its face. They argue that petitioner has no constitutional right to be incarcerated in any particular place and that the Arizona courts have no jurisdiction over the Utah correctional authorities.
This argument places the cart before the horse. If the prisoner lacks the law books he needs and has no law-trained assistance, he cannot be expected to file a well-pleaded petition. The United States Supreme Court considered the very argument made by respondents here and rejected it in Bounds:
It would verge on incompetence for a lawyer to file an initial pleading without researching such issues as jurisdiction, venue, standing, exhaustion of remedies, proper parties plaintiff and defendant, and types of relief available. Most importantly, of course, a lawyer must know what the law is in order to determine whether a colorable claim exists, and if so, what facts are necessary to state a cause of action.
If a lawyer must perform such preliminary research, it is no less vital for a pro se prisoner. Indeed, despite the "less stringent standards" by which a pro se pleading is judged, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 [92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652] (1972), it is often more important that a prisoner complaint set forth a nonfrivolous claim meeting all...
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Findlay v. Lewis
...provide Findlay legal resources to amend his petition, defend the petition, and support the petition on the merits. Findlay v. Lewis, 171 Ariz. 454, 831 P.2d 830 (App.1991). Because of its departure from well settled law and the conflict with Salstrom, we granted the state's petition for re......