Findlay v. State

• Decision Date: 27 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 55879,55879
• Citation: 681 P.2d 20,235 Kan. 462
• Parties: In the Matter of Jeffrey L. FINDLAY, A Minor Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 20

681 P.2d 20

235 Kan. 462

In the Matter of Jeffrey L. FINDLAY, A Minor Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.

No. 55879.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

April 27, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. There is no federal or state constitutional right to trial by jury in proceedings under the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code (K.S.A.1983 Supp. 38-1601 et seq.).

2. Allowance of or failure to allow trial by jury in a juvenile offender proceeding pursuant to K.S.A.1983 Supp. 38-1656: (1) is entirely at the district court's option; (2) involves no rights of either the State or the respondent; and (3) is not subject to appellate review.

3. Evidence in a juvenile offender proceeding is held sufficient to support an adjudication a terroristic threat (K.S.A. 21-3419) had been uttered by the respondent.

Fred J. Logan, Jr., Prairie Village, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Bruce W. Beye, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Dennis W. Moore, Dist. Atty. and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., were with him on the brief for appellee.

McFARLAND, Justice:

Jeffrey L. Findlay appeals his juvenile offender adjudication under the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code (K.S.A.1983 Supp. 38-1601 et seq.).

For his first issue, appellant contends the district court erred in refusing to grant him a jury trial as a matter of constitutional right.

In support of his contentions herein appellant relies heavily on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). In McKeiver the United States Supreme Court held juveniles had no federal constitutional right, pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to trial by jury. The court, in so doing, stated:

"The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a unique manner. It would not remedy the defects of the system. Meager as has been the hoped-for advance in the juvenile field, the alternative would be regressive, would lose what has been gained, and would tend once again to place the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process." 403 U.S. at 547, 91 S.Ct. at 1987.

Further:

"If the jury trial were to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial." 403 U.S. at 550, 91 S.Ct. at 1988.

Concluding:

"Finally, the arguments advanced by the juveniles here are, of course, the identical arguments that underlie the demand for the jury trial for criminal proceedings. The arguments necessarily equate the juvenile proceeding--or at least the adjudicative phase of it--with the criminal trial. Whether they should be so equated is our issue. Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible awareness of the juvenile's prior record and of the contents of the social file; about repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation officers and social workers--all to the effect that this will create the likelihood of pre-judgment--chooses to ignore, it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.

"If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it." 403 U.S. at 550-51, 91 S.Ct. at 1989.

Appellant's argument on this issue rests on the tenuous proposition that district court proceedings involving acts by juveniles that would constitute felonies if committed by adults are essentially criminal trials under Kansas law. This concept is in diametric conflict with the intent of the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code as specifically expressed in K.S.A.1983 Supp. 38-1601 which provides:

"K.S.A.1982 Supp. 38-1601 through 38-1685 shall be known and may be cited as the Kansas juvenile offenders code and shall be liberally construed to the end that each juvenile coming within its provisions shall receive the care, custody, guidance, control and discipline, preferably in the juvenile's own home, as will best serve the juvenile's rehabilitation and the protection of society. In no case shall any order, judgment or decree of the district court, in any proceedings under the provisions of this code, be deemed or held to import a criminal act on the part of any juvenile; but all proceedings, orders, judgments and decrees shall be deemed to have been taken and done in the exercise of the parental power of the state." (Emphasis supplied.)

We conclude there is no federal or state constitutional right to a trial by jury in proceedings under the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code (see Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 5). This result is consistent with earlier decisions of this court decided before the 1982 adoption of the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code. See Hall v. Brown, 129 Kan. 859, 861-62, 284 P. 396 (1930); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 121-22, 145 P. 871 (1915).

For his second issue appellant contends the district court's denial of his request for a jury trial constituted an abuse of discretion.

At the heart of this issue is K.S.A.1983 Supp. 38-1656 which provides:

"In all cases involving offenses committed by a juvenile which, if done by an adult, would make the person liable to be arrested and prosecuted for the commission of a felony, the judge may order that the juvenile be afforded a trial by jury. Upon an adjudication, the court shall proceed with disposition."

Appellant interprets this statute as investing in him the right to request a jury trial. He reasons the granting or denial of the request is, therefore, a matter of judicial discretion. The argument is then made the district court was required to state its reason for denying the request in order for appellate review to be had on whether or not the court abused its discretion. Finally, appellant requests this court to set standards to be applied in determining when a jury trial should be allowed. This entire rationale is specious.

K.S.A.1983 Supp. 38-1656 does not grant to the respondent in the juvenile offender proceeding a right to request or demand a jury trial. Rather, the statute grants to the district court the option of having a jury serve as the finder of fact rather than the court. In exercising or declining to exercise the option, the district court is not required to make findings of fact or state its reasons therefor.

K.S.A.1983 Supp. 38-1656 relative to optional jury trials is in sharp contrast to K.S.A.1983 Supp. 38-1636 relative to authorization to prosecute a juvenile as an adult. The latter statute provides in part:

"(a) At any time after commencement of proceedings under this code against a respondent who was 16 or more years of age at the time of the offense alleged in the complaint and prior to entry of an adjudication or the beginning of an evidentiary hearing at which the court may enter adjudication as provided in K.S.A.1982 Supp. 38-1655, the county or district attorney may file a motion requesting that the court authorize prosecution of the respondent as an adult under the applicable criminal statute.

....

"(c) Upon receiving a motion to authorize prosecution as an adult, the court shall set a time and place for hearing on the motion. The court shall give notice of the hearing to the respondent, each parent of the respondent, if service is possible, and the attorney representing the respondent. The motion shall be heard and determined prior to any further proceedings on the complaint.

"(d) If the respondent fails to appear for hearing on a motion to authorize prosecution as an adult after having been properly served with notice of the hearing, the court may hear and determine the motion in the...