Finegan v. U.S. Bank

Decision Date03 May 2023
Docket Number2D22-1122
PartiesASHANDA FINEGAN and MARCIA HUFF, Appellants, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee on behalf of the Holders of the Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-7 Home Equity Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-7; UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF ASHANDA FINEGAN; CARROLLWOOD VILLAGE PHASE III HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA; and UNKNOWN PERSON(S) IN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Melissa M. Polo, Judge.

Ashanda Finegan and Marcia Huff, pro se.

Benjamin B. Brown, Joseph T. Kohn, and Gabriela N. Timis, of Quarles & Brady LLP, Naples, for Appellee U.S. Bank National Association.

No appearance for remaining Appellees.

LaROSE, JUDGE.

Ashanda Finegan and her mother, Marcia Huff, appeal the trial court's nonfinal order denying the "Motions to Vacate Final Judgment," filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) in a foreclosure lawsuit between Ms. Finegan and U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee on behalf of the holders of the Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-7 Home Equity Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-7.

We dismiss the appeal as to Ms. Huff. She cannot challenge the order on appeal because she was not a party in the trial court. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(g)(1) (defining "Appellant" as a "party"); Mkt. Tampa Invs., LLC v. Stobaugh, 177 So.3d 31, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("[B]ecause the trial court did not permit Market Tampa to intervene or to be substituted as a party Market Tampa was not a party to the foreclosure proceedings and does not have standing to appeal the merits of the final judgment of foreclosure." (footnote omitted)); Yankeetown Mgmt., LLC v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 164 So.3d 744, 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("We dismiss the appeal because the appellant, Yankeetown Management LLC, lacks standing to challenge the final judgment of foreclosure in this case. Yankeetown did not seek to intervene before the final judgment was rendered; therefore, it is a legal stranger to the action."); Turkell-White v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 273 So.3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (dismissing the appeal as to Turkell-White where "[t]he record below and on appeal clearly showed that neither Barbara A. Turkell-White nor her estate were named parties in the suit below").

As to Ms. Finegan,

a trial court is restricted in vacating a final judgment under [rule] 1.540 to the narrow grounds stated therein, and is not empowered to revisit a final judgment on the merits so as to correct errors of law as the trial court may do on a motion for rehearing under [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.530.

Balmoral Condo. Ass'n v. Grimaldi, 107 So.3d 1149, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Herskowitz v Herskowitz, 513 So.2d 1318, 1319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)). Thus, Ms. Finegan's claim that U.S. Bank lacked standing to seek foreclosure is not permitted under rule 1.540. See id.; see also Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 83 So.3d 893, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("Even where a judgment is entered in favor of a plaintiff that lacks standing, the judgment is merely voidable, not void. A judgment that is merely voidable cannot be set aside under rule 1.540(b)(4)." (citation omitted)). We cannot adequately review the remainder of Ms. Finegan's claims on appeal absent a transcript of the...

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