Finger v. Finger, 20613
| Decision Date | 16 February 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 20613,20613 |
| Citation | 241 S.E.2d 746,270 S.C. 244 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Elliott FINGER, Respondent, v. Charlotte B. FINGER, Appellant. |
E. N. Zeigler, Florence, for appellant.
J. M. McLendon and Cyrus T. Sloan, III, Marion, for respondent.
This action was brought by the plaintiff upon an alleged promise (in writing dated July 18, 1973) by the defendant to pay annually to the plaintiff the sum of $3,000.00 for four years, commencing April 10, 1974, for "past services rendered." The answer amounts to a general denial and asserts that the instrument was signed without the defendant's having read or understood it. It also asserts that there was no consideration, that the written instrument was a gratuity and does not constitute a promissory note or contract. The lower court granted a motion for summary judgment. The defendant has appealed.
The plaintiff, Elliott Finger, and the defendant, Charlotte B. Finger, were formerly husband and wife. Sometime after they were divorced, the plaintiff sold to the defendant a duplex, upon which there was a mortgage in favor of the Pee Dee Federal in the amount of approximately $11,000.00. The consideration recited in the deed was "$1.00 and assumption of the mortgage debt." At the time of the closing of the transaction, the defendant signed an instrument as follows:
It is the contention of the plaintiff that this agreement was in fact a part of the consideration for the plaintiff's signing of the deed. There is no evidence that the plaintiff rendered any services to defendant for which he should be paid $12,000.00. There was before the lower court: (1) the deposition of John C. Rushton, son-in-law of the plaintiff and defendant, (2) deposition of the defendant, (3) letter of attorney McLendon, and (4) letter of John C. Rushton. In Mr. McLendon's letter, he advised Mr. Rushton, who was serving as a sort of intermediary for the parties in handling the transaction: "The Tax Commission requires that the actual consideration be expressed." Notwithstanding such advice, the plaintiff's deed was executed thereafter leaving out as a part of the consideration the $12,000.00 now alleged to be due. It is inferable that the plaintiff insisted upon handling the transaction in this way in order that the record would not reflect the true consideration. This might give to him a tax advantage on capital gains.
In considering whether the court was correct in granting the ...
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Piedmont Engineers, Architects and Planners, Inc. v. First Hartford Realty Corp.
...conclusions and inferences arising from the evidence most strongly against respondent who was the moving party. Finger v. Finger, 270 S.C. 244, 241 S.E.2d 746 (1978). Summary judgment should be granted only when it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved. Vaughn v. A. E. Green ......