Finizie v. City of Bridgeport

• Decision Date: 29 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 3:95CV00308 (RNC).,3:95CV00308 (RNC).
• Citation: 880 F. Supp. 89
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Rona V. FINIZIE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT, Defendant.

880 F. Supp. 89

Rona V. FINIZIE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT, Defendant.

No. 3:95CV00308 (RNC).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 29, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Rona V. Finizie, pro se, Bridgeport, CT.

Richard S. Scalo, Ronald D. Japha, Gordon & Scalo, Bridgeport, CT, for defendants except Ira B. Charmoy.

James M. Nugent, Charmoy & Nugent, Bridgeport, CT, for defendant Ira B. Charmoy.

CHATIGNY, District Judge.

Upon review and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrates (D.Conn.1995), this recommended ruling is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the ruling of this court over Plaintiff's objection.

It is so ordered.

RECOMMENDED RULING ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

MARTINEZ, United States Magistrate Judge.

Rona Finizie, a pro se plaintiff, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the City of Bridgeport ("the City") and others violated her rights under the Connecticut constitution, the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in connection with the City's efforts to collect property taxes from her over a seventeen year period of time. Compl. at 3A.

The City obtained a judgment of foreclosure against the plaintiff's two contiguous parcels of property in March of 1987. After eight years of litigation and numerous postponements of the foreclosure, a law day, that is, the last day by which the plaintiff may redeem her property, was set by the superior court for Tuesday, March 7, 1995. The plaintiff now moves this court for a preliminary injunction to bar the city and other defendants from honoring or enforcing the law day.

The plaintiff filed this action on February 17, 1995. On February 23, 1995, she moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a) for the preliminary injunction. The motion was referred to the undersigned on February 28, 1995. At a March 2, 1995 status conference the issue was raised as to whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin the law day in light of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, which prohibits a federal court from enjoining, suspending or restraining the "assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341. See also California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408, 102 S.Ct. 2498, 2507, 73 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982) (act prohibits district courts from issuing declaratory relief as well as injunctive relief).

Accordingly, before proceeding on the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, the court must determine whether it has the authority to grant the requested relief. Because there is no question that the state foreclosure action constitutes the collection of a state tax, Wells v. Malloy, 510 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.1975); cf. Group Assisting Sewer Proposal-Ansonia v. City of Ansonia, 448 F.Supp. 45, 46 (D.Conn.1978); see also Fried v. Carey, 620 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.1978), the issue for the court to decide is whether there is a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" available in state court for the plaintiff's federal constitutional claims.

I. Procedural History Of The Foreclosure¹

In 1984 the City instituted foreclosure actions in the Superior Court against the plaintiff for unpaid taxes on her property in Bridgeport. The plaintiff was represented by counsel in these actions. Initially the plaintiff contested the foreclosures. Later, however, a stipulated judgment of foreclosure was entered on the record in open court on March 25, 1987.² To give the plaintiff time to arrange either a private sale or financing to satisfy the judgment, the foreclosure sale was put off for one year, until March 26, 1988.

Shortly before the sale day the plaintiff, still represented by counsel, moved to open the judgments to extend the date of the sale. The motion was granted and a new sale date was set for May 21, 1988. The sale, however, was stayed when the plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 petition in bankruptcy court on May 20, 1988. A Chapter 13 plan was confirmed on December 28, 1988.³ The plan provided for a private sale of the plaintiff's property and payment of the foreclosure judgment by December 31, 1989. The plaintiff did not sell the property or satisfy the foreclosure judgment. The bankruptcy action was subsequently dismissed on the City's motion on September 2, 1992.

The City then returned to superior court to reopen the foreclosure judgments and to set a new sale date. The plaintiff objected to the motion to reopen and filed a motion to amend her answer to the foreclosure complaint to add special defenses alleging that the City's actions deprived her of equal protection under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions. A hearing on the plaintiff's motion was held on January 4, 1993. The plaintiff was present and represented by counsel.⁴ Her motion to amend was denied on March 31, 1993. Thereafter, the court granted the City's April 30, 1993 motion for judgment and ordered the property to be sold on June 19, 1993.

Two days before the sale date the plaintiff filed another petition in bankruptcy. The filing of the petition resulted in another automatic stay of the foreclosure. Because the debt owed to the City by the plaintiff exceeded the value of her property, the bankruptcy court granted the City's motion for relief from the automatic stay on July 20, 1993 to allow it to proceed with the foreclosure. The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed her bankruptcy petition, but on August 2, 1993 she moved to vacate the voluntary dismissal and to reargue the City's motion for relief from stay. The matter was scheduled for hearing on October 6, 1993.

In the meantime, the superior court granted the City's motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and set a law day of September 14, 1993. The plaintiff moved to open this judgment to allow her time to pursue her motions in bankruptcy court. Her motion was denied on September 9, 1993. The plaintiff appealed this denial to the Connecticut Appellate Court on September 13, 1993. A stay of the foreclosure was entered by the superior court pending the appeal. On October 6, 1993 the bankruptcy court denied the plaintiff's motion to reopen the voluntary dismissal and to reargue.

On November 18, 1993, on motion of the City, the superior court terminated the stay pending appeal and entered a new judgment of strict foreclosure. The plaintiff sought the superior court's review of its decision to terminate the stay pending appeal. The relief she sought was denied on December 22, 1993.

On January 5, 1994 the appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot. The plaintiff then petitioned the Connecticut Supreme Court for certification. The petition was denied on February 24, 1994 but the court granted the plaintiff a further stay pending certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari was denied on December 5, 1994. Because the stay pending certiorari had been terminated on July 28, 1994 and had not been extended despite the plaintiff's request of September 23, 1994, the superior court again entered a judgment of strict foreclosure. The law day was set for March 7, 1995.

II. The Tax Injunction Act And Comity

The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, was designed to limit drastically the power of federal courts to interfere with the important local concern of collecting taxes. Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522, 101 S.Ct. 1221, 1233-34, 67 L.Ed.2d 464 (citing 81 Cong.Rec. 1415 (1937)) (remarks of Sen. Bone), reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 1011, 101 S.Ct. 2349, 68 L.Ed.2d 864 (1981). The act expressly prevents federal courts from giving injunctive relief as long as there is a plain, speedy and efficient remedy in state court.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" exception to the act was designed only to require that the state remedy satisfy certain minimal procedural criteria. Id., at 512, 101 S.Ct. at 1228-29 (emphasis in original). Thus, the state remedy is measured according to procedural rather than substantive criteria, id., and the criteria are to be construed narrowly. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 102 S.Ct. 2498, 73 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982). The state need only provide an opportunity for a full hearing and judicial determination in which the taxpayer may raise constitutional claims. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven, 889 F.2d 428, 433 (2d Cir.1989). The opportunity need not be the best or most convenient one, Behe v. Chester County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 952 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir.1991), and the taxpayer's failure to take advantage of the available state procedures does not mean that the state remedy is insufficient. Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717, 721 n. 4 (8th Cir.1991). "The relevant question is whether the remedy was available originally." Id.

In addition to the prohibitions of the Tax Injunction Act, the Supreme Court has held that principles of comity prohibit federal courts from hearing § 1983 damages actions which challenge the constitutionality of state tax collection. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S.Ct. 177, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981). The Court observed that federal court actions for damages under § 1983, which do not require exhaustion of state remedies, are as disruptive of a state tax system as an action to enjoin the collection of taxes. Allowing federal courts to entertain § 1983 claims challenging state taxes, the Court said, would intrude on the state's administration of its fiscal operations to such a degree that it would, in every practical sense, operate to suspend collection of state taxes, id., at 115, 102 S.Ct. at 185-86 (quoting Great Lakes, 319 U.S. at 299, 63 S.Ct. at 1073-74), and would be contrary to the "scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments...