Finlayson v. Crooks

• Decision Date: 30 July 1891
• Citation: 47 Minn. 74
• Parties: DAVID M. FINLAYSON and others <I>vs.</I> ABRAM CROOKS, impleaded, etc.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

47 Minn. 74

DAVID M. FINLAYSON and othersvs.

ABRAM CROOKS, impleaded, etc.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 30, 1891.

On motion for reargument, August 27, 1891.

Action to enforce a mechanic's lien for $480.75, brought in the district court for Ramsey county against Hans E. Larson and August Christianson, owners of the land; Louis L. Bondelli, a former owner, who conveyed to Larson and Christianson on February 13, 1890, in

pursuance of an agreement made prior to December 6, 1889; Julius Bjornstad and Peter Omdahl, partners as Bjornstad & Omdahl, and others, claiming mechanics' liens; the defendant Crooks, as holder of a mortgage for $3,000, made February 5, 1890, by Larson and Christianson, and against other mortgagees. The defendant Crooks appeals from an order refusing a new trial after a trial before Kerr, J., and judgment ordered subordinating the appellant's mortgage to the liens of plaintiff, of Bjornstadt & Omdahl, and of other lien-claimants, and directing a sale, etc.

James H. Foote, for appellant.

William F. Carroll, for plaintiffs, respondents.

Williams & Schoonmaker, for Bjornstadt & Omdahl, respondents.

MITCHELL, J.

This action was brought to enforce a lien claimed under Laws 1889, c. 200. Other lien-claimants, the owner of the premises, and several mortgagees, including appellant, Crooks, whose mortgages were alleged to be subsequent to the plaintiff's lien, were made parties defendant. The appellant, by motion to dismiss the action as to him, and by objection to the admission of any evidence affecting his rights, made the point that the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate his rights, his contention then and now being that, in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien, only the rights of those claiming liens under the statute can be adjudicated, and only such lien-claimants can be made parties defendant.

If such is the correct construction of the statute, it certainly furnishes a very inadequate and incomplete remedy; for, without an adjudication of the rights of incumbrancers and others claiming to have acquired an interest in the premises, lien-claimants would never know to a certainty what interest in the property was subject to their liens, nor purchasers at the sale what they were buying. Any such method of procedure as that contended for would be contrary to a fundamental principle and policy in all equity proceedings, to do complete justice by deciding upon and settling at once the rights of all persons included in the subject of the suit, for "a court of equity, in all cases, delights to do complete justice, and not by halves." The chief fallacy of appellant consists in assuming that an action to enforce a mechanic's lien is a special statutory proceeding, in which the express provisions of the statute are at once the source, and a definition of the extent, of the powers and jurisdiction of the court. But there is nothing in the statute requiring or even looking to any such construction. While it is true that most of its provisions have reference to lien-claimants, as that is the subject of which it specially treats, yet it does not assume to prescribe any special code of practice or procedure, but leaves all such matters to be regulated by the general rules governing other actions of a similar nature. It expressly provides (§ 10) that a lien given by its provisions may be enforced "in the same manner as in actions for the foreclosure of mortgages upon real estate, except as otherwise herein provided." Now, it is a very familiar rule that in foreclosure actions every person who has acquired any interest in the property subsequent to the lien of the mortgage is a proper party. In one sense they are necessary parties, because, in order to make a foreclosure complete, to transfer a perfect title by the sale, it is necessary that the holder of every such interest should be brought before the court. There is nothing in the subsequent provisions of the act either prohibiting or inconsistent with a similar practice in suits to enforce liens. On the contrary, section 10 not only clearly contemplates, but in terms provides for, bringing in as parties "other persons" besides "lien-claimants." The argument, that because the statute expressly provides that all lien-claimants under the act shall be made parties, therefore no other persons can be, proceeds upon the same erroneous theory as to the nature of the action already referred to. Moreover, it proves altogether too much, for there is no express provision for making even the owner of the premises a party.

While undoubtedly the lien itself is purely the creature of the statute, yet an action to enforce it is an ordinary civil action, proceeding according to the usual course of the law, and governed by the same rules of practice and procedure as any other similar action, except as expressly modified by the statute itself. Consequently, a mortgagee, or any other person claiming an interest in the premises, may be joined as a party, and his rights adjudicated, whenever it might be done in an action to foreclose a mortgage....