Finley v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1987
• Citation: 520 A.2d 208,202 Conn. 190
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 2 IER Cases 942 Thomas P. FINLEY v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY.

Page 208

520 A.2d 208

202 Conn. 190, 2 IER Cases 942

Thomas P. FINLEY v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 1986.

Decided Jan. 27, 1987.

Albert Zakarian, Hartford, with whom were Stefan R. Underhill, New Haven, and, on the brief, Felix J. Springer, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Robert W. Heagney and Alexandra Davis, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

John A. Speziale, Torrington, Jay E. Bovilsky, Stamford, and William H. Narwold, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Business and Industry Ass'n, Inc., as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO, CALLAHAN and KLINE, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves claims of an employee that he was wrongfully discharged despite assurances of lifelong employment so long as his performance remained satisfactory. The plaintiff, Thomas P. Finley, brought an action in three counts against the defendant, Aetna Life & Casualty Company, alleging that the defendant's termination of his employment was wrongful because of: (1) breach of express contract; (2) promissory estoppel; and (3) breach of an implied covenant of good faith. Following a jury trial, the trial court, Missal, J., granted the defendant's motion for directed verdicts on the second and third counts of the complaint, and submitted the first count, alleging breach of express contract, to the jury. The jury rendered a general verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which found error and ordered a new trial on the first and second counts of the complaint. We granted the defendant's petition for certification and now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

This case arises out of the defendant's decision to terminate the employment of the plaintiff on April 12, 1976. The plaintiff, who had been employed by the defendant for twenty-four years, was a manager in the defendant's Medicare department, part B, at the time of his discharge. The jury might reasonably have found that the defendant, through its agents and its personnel manual, ¹ made representations to him that his employment would not be terminated so long as his performance was satisfactory. Furthermore, the plaintiff at trial introduced into evidence written performance appraisals made during his employment with the defendant, as well as the oral statements of one of his former supervisors, to show that his job performance had been satisfactory. From the defendant's evidence, however, the jury might also reasonably have found that for some time before the plaintiff's discharge, he and his immediate supervisor had been involved in a divisive and acrimonious departmental dispute. Both men ultimately were discharged because of their inability to resolve their differences.

The plaintiff's amended complaint alleged, in the first count, the breach of an express contract arising out of the defendant's assurances that the plaintiff would remain employed so long as his job performance was satisfactory. Despite the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on this count, the trial court permitted this claim to go to the jury. The jury found for the defendant.

The plaintiff's second count, sounding in promissory estoppel, alleged that the plaintiff had relied to his detriment on the defendant's representations of continued employment. His third count alleged that the defendant violated an implied covenant of good faith by wrongfully terminating his employment. As to these two counts, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. After the adverse jury verdict on count one, the plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial on these latter counts only. This motion was denied by the trial court.

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. With respect to the first count, in which he was appealing from the adverse jury verdict, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that: (1) the statute of frauds barred it from considering any oral representations made by the defendant in deciding whether the parties had had an employment contract; and (2) it could not find an employment contract solely from statements made in the defendant's personnel manual. With respect to the second count, in which he was appealing from the directed verdict, the plaintiff claimed that he had detrimentally relied on the defendant's promises of continued employment while his job performance remained satisfactory. No appeal was taken with respect to the directed verdict on the third count. ²

The Appellate Court found error in each of the rulings challenged by the plaintiff. It rejected the defendant's argument that the general verdict rule barred its review of the plaintiff's allegations of error in the jury instructions; Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 5 Conn.App. 394, 396-97, 499 A.2d 64 (1985); and found plain error in the charge as given. Id., 402, 404-13, 499 A.2d 64. It also held that the trial court improperly directed a verdict for the defendant on the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. Id., 413-17, 499 A.2d 64. The Appellate Court accordingly set aside the verdict for the defendants on the first and second counts of the complaint and ordered a new trial on those counts. Id., 417, 499 A.2d 64.

On appeal to this court after certification, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court erred in holding that: (1) the general verdict rule did not apply to the circumstances of this case; (2) the plaintiff's claims of error relating to the trial court's jury charge were reviewable under the plain error doctrine, despite the plaintiff's failure properly to preserve these claims for appeal; (3) the errors in the charge were not harmless; and (4) the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant on the second count of the complaint, alleging promissory estoppel. We agree with the defendant that the general verdict rule requires the sustaining of the jury's verdict notwithstanding the Appellate Court's findings of error in the jury charge on the first count and the directed verdict on the second count.

I

As a threshold matter, we first consider the issue of whether the Appellate Court improperly invoked the plain error doctrine to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claims regarding the jury charge on the first count. The plaintiff, although he took exception to the portions of the charge relating to the statute of frauds and the effect of the defendant's personnel manual, failed to raise these claims of error in his motion to set aside the verdict. Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that it could review these claims only under the plain error doctrine. See Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, 185 Conn. 510, 515-16, 441 A.2d 163 (1981) (in civil action seeking money damages, claims of error must be raised in motion to set aside verdict in order to ensure their full appellate review). The plain error doctrine, as stated in Practice Book § 3063 (now § 4185), provides that the Supreme and Appellate Courts ³ "may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court." See also General Statutes § 52-265(a). ⁴ The defendant relies on several recent holdings of this court to argue that plain error review should be invoked only in extraordinary situations where the error is obvious. See Kolich v. Shugrue, 198 Conn. 322, 326, 502 A.2d 918 (1986); State v. Rothenberg, 195 Conn. 253, 262-63, 487 A.2d 545 (1985). In this case, the defendant contends, plain error review was inappropriate because the relevant portions of the trial court's charge were not contrary to "settled" Connecticut law. We disagree.

Practice Book § 3063 sets forth a discretionary standard under which the Supreme and Appellate Courts "may" review claims not properly raised in the trial court "in the interests of justice." See State v. Tatem, 194 Conn. 594, 595, 483 A.2d 1087 (1984); see generally Mickel v. New England Coal & Coke Co., 132 Conn. 671, 674, 47 A.2d 187 (1946). On certification, therefore, the scope of our review is limited to determining whether the Appellate Court abused its discretion in granting review under the plain error doctrine. The critical question, accordingly, is not whether this court would have granted review in the same circumstances, but whether, if we indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of the Appellate Court's decision, that court properly exercised its discretionary power under Practice Book § 3063. See Reynolds v. Ramos, 188 Conn. 316, 320-21, 449 A.2d 182 (1982); DeLorenzo v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 4 Conn.App. 560, 562, 495 A.2d 1106 (1985); DeSantis v. Piccadilly Land Corporation, 3 Conn.App. 310, 316, 487 A.2d 1110 (1985); see generally LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 75, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986). We answer this question in the affirmative.

We first examine the propriety of plain error review of the trial court's instruction regarding the statute of frauds. The trial court told the jury that "to determine whether an express contract of employment of a nature [the plaintiff] claims did exist, you cannot rely on anything that [the plaintiff] or any other witness may have said with regard to oral promises made to [the plaintiff] about a contract of employment with the defendant.... It is the law of this state that they could not be the basis of a contract of employment ... for any agreement that is not to be performed within one year of the making thereof must be in writing." The defendant claims the Appellate Court erred in reviewing this instruction under the plain error doctrine because Connecticut law is "unsettled" on the issue of whether the statute of frauds applies to an employment contract of indefinite duration. It further claims that the parties' alleged contract "had a minimum intended term of more than one year," and that, therefore,...