Finley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1985
• Docket Number: No. 2599,2599
• Citation: 499 A.2d 64,5 Conn.App. 394
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3519 Thomas P. FINLEY v. AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY COMPANY.

Page 64

499 A.2d 64

5 Conn.App. 394, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3519

Thomas P. FINLEY v. AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY COMPANY.

No. 2599.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 13, 1985.

Decided Oct. 1, 1985.

Robert W. Heagney, Hartford, with whom were Thomas C. Austin, Jr., Ronald Sherlock, East Hartford, and, on brief, Mark Rademacher, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Albert Zakarian, Hartford, with whom, on brief, were Felix J. Springer and James Sicilian, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before HULL, BORDEN and SPALLONE, JJ.

BORDEN, Judge.

This appeal raises three issues involving employment contracts for an indefinite period: (1) whether the statute of frauds applies to this type of contract, precluding the use of evidence of oral promises made by the employer to the employee; (2) the extent to which statements contained in an employer's personnel manual can be the basis for a finding that a contract exists between employer and employee altering the traditional at will employment relationship; and (3) the extent to which a cause of action exists, based on the theory of promissory estoppel, binding the employer to promises on which the employee relied.

The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant for twenty-four years, brought suit alleging wrongful discharge after his employment was terminated following a feud among personnel in the plaintiff's department. The complaint was in three counts. The first count alleged that the defendant had breached an express contract which it had made with the plaintiff, in oral and written statements, that the defendant would only terminate the plaintiff's employment for just cause. The second count repeated some of the language of the first count, but also alleged that, by virtue of promises made by the defendant to the plaintiff on which the defendant intended the plaintiff to rely and on which the plaintiff did rely to his detriment, an agreement was created that the plaintiff would be The court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the second and third counts, and submitted the first count to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, requesting only that the court reverse its rulings on the second and third counts. The motion was denied. The court, in its memorandum of decision in response to the plaintiff's motion, stated that the second and third counts did not state causes of action and, furthermore, that there was insufficient evidence presented on those counts to submit them to the jury. The plaintiff appealed, claiming error in the court's charge to the jury on the first count, and in the direction of a verdict on the second count. ¹

                terminated only for just cause, and that this agreement was breached.   The third count alleged that the defendant had breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment contract between the parties
                

We first dispose of the defendant's claim, raised in its preliminary statement of issues; Practice Book § 3012(a); that the general verdict rule precludes consideration of the plaintiff's claims of error. The argument is essentially as follows: Each of the counts involved in this appeal has two issues, namely, whether a contract existed and whether the plaintiff was terminated for just cause. All of the plaintiff's claims of error relate solely to the issue of whether a contract existed and not to the issue of whether the plaintiff was terminated for just cause. Since the verdict for the defendant must be interpreted as including a finding for the defendant on the second issue, namely, that the plaintiff was terminated for just cause, the failure of the plaintiff to challenge this finding permits the verdict to stand even if the plaintiff's claims on the first issue have merit. We find this claim unpersuasive.

The general verdict rule operates to a plaintiff's detriment where there is more than one count in a complaint; Goodman v. Metallic Ladder Mfg. Corporation, 181 Conn. 62, 64-66, 434 A.2d 324 (1980); and where there is a complaint and one or more special defenses. Stone v. Bastarache, 188 Conn. 201, 204-205, 449 A.2d 142 (1982). Where, however, error is claimed "in submitting to the jury one of the specifications relating to [a] cause of action, a general verdict will not cure the error"; Novak v. Anderson, 178 Conn. 506, 508, 423 A.2d 147 (1979); or preclude this court from reviewing the error claimed. We turn, therefore, to the plaintiff's claims of error.

The plaintiff's first two claims of error arise from the charge to the jury on the first count of the complaint. Because these claims were not raised in the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, our scope of review of these claims is limited to the plain error standard. Practice Book § 3063; DeLorenzo v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 4 Conn.App. 560, 563, 495 A.2d 1106 (1985). Even under this standard, we conclude that there was error.

I THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

The plaintiff claims that the court erred when it charged the jury that it was precluded, by the statute of frauds, from considering any oral promises made by the defendant to the plaintiff when deciding whether a contract existed between the parties. The plaintiff argues that this was error because the statute of frauds does not apply to employment contracts for an indefinite term. The defendant argues that the charge was correct under Connecticut law, and that any error in the instruction was harmless because no cause of action was sufficiently pleaded or proven It is hornbook law and the law in Connecticut that "contracts of employment for personal services [of an indefinite duration] are held generally not to be within the statute, since the death of the employee, which may occur at any time, puts an end to the agreement. See notes, 35 A.L.R. 1432, 1440; 135 A.L.R. 646, 688." Burkle v. Superflow Mfg. Co., 137 Conn. 488, 493, 78 A.2d 698 (1951); 3 Williston, Contracts (3d Ed. Jaeger) § 495; 72 Am.Jur.2d, Statute of Frauds §§ 11, 40, 42. Even where it appears probable that the contract will extend beyond one year, if it is possible that it may be completed within one year, the agreement does not fall within the ambit of the statute of frauds. ² Burkle v. Superflow Mfg. Co., supra, 492-93, 78 A.2d 698; Toussaint v. Blue Cross, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).

                and no oral promises were in evidence to support a contract.   We agree with the plaintiff
                

The alleged employment contract between the parties was one for the services of the plaintiff for an unspecified time period which, while probably extending beyond one year, could have been completed within one year if, for example, the plaintiff died or became unable to work. It, therefore, did not need to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged; General Statutes § 52-550; but could be shown by evidence of oral promises. The court misstated the law when it instructed the jury that they could not take oral promises into account to determine if a contract of indefinite duration existed between the parties. This instruction constituted plain error.

The defendant's argument, namely, that any error in the instruction was harmless because no cause of action was pleaded in or proved under the first count, is without merit. The first count alleged that the parties had an express employment agreement, created at the time the plaintiff began his employment and supplemented by later written and oral commitments, that the defendant would not terminate the plaintiff as long as he performed his job satisfactorily. It further alleged that the defendant had breached this agreement by terminating the plaintiff's employment contrary to its terms. A cause of action in contract was clearly stated. ³

The record reveals that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence from which the jury might find the allegations of an express agreement proven. The plaintiff testified that at his initial employment interview with the defendant, he was concerned about job security and discussed the terms and conditions of his employment at length with a representative of the personnel department. The issues of career advancement and longevity were discussed The defendant's assistant vice president in charge of personnel also testified. He stated that the defendant's personnel policies and procedures manual was accessible to all the defendant's employees and that the defendant intended, by publishing its personnel policies in such a manual, for its employees to rely on the statements in it.

                and the plaintiff was asked if he intended to make his work with the defendant his life's work.   He replied affirmatively.   Then, during his first year of employment with the defendant, the plaintiff had a conference with one of his superiors after which he believed he had a lifetime career with the defendant available to him.   At about this time, the defendant was publicizing its personnel history and the fact that it did not lay off employees during the years of the great depression.   The plaintiff also testified that there were other conversations with his supervisors over the next twenty-four years of employment which contained promises regarding the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he relied on those promises
                

The manual contained a section on involuntary terminations, which stated that it was the defendant's policy to terminate any employee "who cannot perform satisfactorily, whose attendance is poor, or who is otherwise unsuited to his job." ⁴ The section also described the procedure to be followed in the event of involuntary dismissal. The next section of the manual discusses severance pay for discharged employees, and states that these benefits are not available to those terminated "for cause."

The defendant's vice...