Finley v. Giacobbe
| Decision Date | 05 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 45,D,45 |
| Citation | 79 F.3d 1285 |
| Parties | Joanne E. FINLEY, MD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George T. GIACOBBE, Individually and as Commissioner, Department of Hospitals, Rockland County, New York, John T. Grant, Individually and as Rockland County Executive, Rockland County Department of Hospitals, Summit Park Hospital/Rockland County Infirmary and County of Rockland, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 95-7014. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Lucinda Finley, Buffalo, NY (Debra L. Raskin, Vladeck, Waldmand, Elias & Engelhard, New York City, Joseph E. Finley, Baltimore, MD, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
John D. Winter, New York City (Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler, New York City), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: KEARSE, JACOBS and LEVAL, Circuit Judges.
In this appeal, we consider issues bearing on whether an at will public employee who resigned during her probationary term of employment has a cause of action against the state and its officers for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and deprivation of procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Joanne E. Finley had held the position of hospital medical director for approximately five months when she was told that she would not be awarded permanent staff status at the end of her probationary period. Facing termination, Dr. Finley resigned from her position on May 18, 1992. She commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Goettel, J.) on March 10, 1993, against defendants George T. Giacobbe, the Rockland County Commissioner of Hospitals; Rockland County Executive John T. Grant; the Rockland County Department of Hospitals; Summit Park Hospital/Rockland County Infirmary; and Rockland County.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on April 12, 1994, holding (a) that New York law required Dr. Finley to assert her claim for breach of her employment contract in an article 78 proceeding before bringing an action at law, and that her article 78 claim was time-barred; (b) that Dr. Finley could not maintain an action for tortious interference because she had failed to establish the existence of an express or implied contract; and (c) that Dr. Finley did not have an actionable procedural due process claim because, as a probationary employee, she had no protectible property interest in her position. Finley v. Giacobbe, 848 F.Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y.1994). The district court declined to allow Dr. Finley to add an additional defendant by way of an amended complaint because the amendment would be futile. The court entered final judgment for the defendants on December 20, 1994.
Dr. Finley appeals the district court's dismissal of each of her claims. With respect to the dismissal of her contract claim, Dr. Finley argues that an article 78 proceeding is not the proper or exclusive recourse for an employment contract claim that seeks damages as the principal form of relief. In the alternative, Dr. Finley contends that, even if an article 78 proceeding is a prerequisite for an employment contract claim, the decision to terminate her is not subject to review under article 78 because Commissioner of Hospitals Giacobbe, who made the decision to terminate her, lacked authority to do so as a matter of law. With respect to the dismissal of her tortious interference claim, Dr. Finley contends that under New York law even employees who are terminable at will may assert claims for tortious interference. With respect to the dismissal of her procedural due process claim, Dr. Finley contends that We affirm the district court's dismissal of Dr. Finley's contract claim largely for the reasons stated in the district court's opinion. We affirm the dismissal of the due process claim for a reason not adduced by the district court, although we consider and find no error in the district court's analysis. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the tortious interference claim, but we do so on different grounds. Finally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment of the complaint.
New York state health law and Summit Park Hospital's bylaws create a protectible property interest in her position as Medical Director. Finally, Dr. Finley asserts that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting her motion for leave to amend
On November 14, 1991, defendant Giacobbe, the Rockland County Commissioner of Hospitals, offered Dr. Finley a position as the Medical Director and Chief Medical Officer of Summit Park Hospital/Rockland County Infirmary, a hospital and health care facility operated by Rockland County, New York (referred to herein as the "Hospital"). The Medical Director's primary duties include supervising the medical staff and determining whether to admit patients to the Hospital, as well as attending patients and periodically serving as the physician on call.
Dr. Finley accepted Giacobbe's offer and started work on December 3, 1991. In his letter offering the position, Giacobbe stipulated Dr. Finley's salary, vacation and other benefits. Consistent with Rockland County Civil Service Rule XVI(1)(a), Dr. Finley was hired for a probationary period of "not less than eight nor more than twenty-six weeks." 1 If the employing agency does not extend the employee's probation period at the end of eight weeks, the Civil Service Rules provide that the probation period ends automatically and the employee achieves "permanent" status. That probation period may be extended up to twenty-six weeks by written notice from the agency to the employee, and it is automatically extended one day for every day in excess of ten work days that a probationary employee is absent. Dr. Finley was absent for twelve days during the first eight weeks of her employment. The initial probationary period was thus automatically extended until January 29, 1992. On January 28, 1992, Giacobbe gave timely notice that Dr. Finley's probation period was being extended to a full twenty-six weeks, until June 12, 1992. 2
On April 27, 1992, Giacobbe met with Dr. Finley and asked her to resign. When she refused, Giacobbe advised her that, if she did not resign, she would not be appointed to permanent staff status at the end of her probation period. Giacobbe declined to give Dr. Finley his reasons for that decision. In a memorandum to his file dated that same day, Giacobbe recorded that the "reason for non-appointment was not any grievous or erroneous problem," but rather that it "was an incapability [sic] as far as management styles were concerned." 3
Shortly after this meeting, the office of the county attorney advised Giacobbe in writing that, as Commissioner of Hospitals, he had the legal authority to terminate the Medical Director. The letter from the county attorney's office invoked section C8.02 of the Rockland County Charter, which confers upon the Commissioner the "charge and supervision" of all county hospitals and "all the On May 7, 1992, after confirming his authority to terminate Dr. Finley, Giacobbe drafted a letter of termination. Giacobbe never presented Dr. Finley with that letter, however, because Dr. Finley, anticipating imminent termination, tendered a resignation letter to the Hospital on May 18, 1992. 5
powers and duties conferred or imposed by the General Municipal Law or any other law," and cited a 1990 written opinion that the county attorney had rendered to the Rockland County Hospital Board of Governors concerning the scope of the Commissioner's authority. 4
Dr. Finley's original complaint alleged seven causes of action. Her first four claims alleged that she was forced to resign, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the New York Human Rights Law, as a reprisal for admitting a patient with AIDS into the Hospital's long-term care facility. Her state claims were dismissed in an order and opinion published at 827 F.Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.1993); that order has not been challenged on appeal. Prior to this appeal, the parties stipulated to the voluntary dismissal with prejudice of the federal disability claims. The first four claims, therefore, are not before this Court, and nothing more will be said of them in this procedural history.
Dr. Finley's fifth cause of action alleged that she was dismissed in breach of an implied contract with the Hospital. Her sixth claim, pleaded against defendants Grant and Giacobbe in their individual capacities only, alleged that in terminating her they tortiously interfered with her employment arrangement with the Hospital. Dr. Finley's seventh and final claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that all the defendants deprived her of procedural due process.
The defendants moved at the outset of discovery to dismiss the due process claim for failure to make a timely notice of claim upon the county as required by New York General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i. The defendants also moved to dismiss all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
In its opinion, Finley v. Giacobbe, 827 F.Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.1993) ("Finley I "), the district court first rejected the defendants' motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim for failure to file a timely notice with the county, holding that New York's notice of claim requirement does not apply to actions under § 1983. Id. at 218-19. On the motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, the district court conducted a detailed review of the pleadings and concluded that plaintiff had successfully pled each cause of action. Id. at 220-24.
Near the close of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims, and Dr. Finley filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on her...
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