Finley v. Miami Univ.
| Decision Date | 01 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22AP-58 |
| Citation | 2022 Ohio 3066 |
| Parties | Natosha L. Finley, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Miami University, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio No. 2021-00129JD
On brief:
Croskery Law Offices, and Robert F. Croskery, for appellant.
Jackson Lewis P.C., Patricia Anderson Pryor, and Alessandro Botta Blondet, for appellee.
Argued:
Robert F. Croskery.
Patricia Anderson Pryor.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Natosha L. Finley, appeals a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee, Miami University, due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for appellant's R.C. 4112.02 employment discrimination claims. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment.
{¶ 2} Appellant was formerly employed as an Assistant Professor of microbiology by appellee, a state university in Oxford, Ohio. On December 11, 2017, appellee denied appellant tenure and a promotion. Appellant pursued appellee's administrative review processes but was unable to gain a reversal of that decision. She then filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in April 2019. The EEOC, without determining the merits of appellant's challenge, issued her a right-to-sue letter.
{¶ 3} On November 20, 2019, appellant filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging appellee discriminated against her on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On January 28, 2020, appellant amended her federal complaint to add state claims of discrimination under R.C. 4112.02. On May 12, 2020, appellant filed a separate action in the U.S. District Court that also alleged state discrimination claims under R.C. 4112.02.
{¶ 4} The U.S. District Court dismissed appellant's state law discrimination claims on November 30, 2020 without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and, after permitting appellant to again amend her complaint, dismissed appellant's federal discrimination claims with prejudice after finding those claims to be time-barred.[1]
{¶ 5} Appellant commenced the instant litigation on March 10, 2021 by filing a complaint in the Court of Claims alleging retaliation and discrimination based on race, national origin, and gender pursuant to R.C. 4112.02 and seeking reinstatement to her position with tenure, back-pay and raises, and/or damages. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as well as an answer. In both, appellee asserted appellant's claims are timed-barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
{¶ 6} Appellant opposed the motion to dismiss arguing, in part, that the Ohio savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, applied. She correspondingly filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint in order to add language clarifying that she originally brought her state law claims in federal district court. The trial court granted appellant leave to amend her complaint.
{¶ 7} Appellee moved to dismiss the amended complaint based, again, on the expiration of the statute of limitations. Appellant opposed the new motion to dismiss, contending the state claims raised in her federal amended complaint (filed January 28, 2020) related back under Civ.R. 15(C) to her original federal complaint (filed November 20, 2019), which fell within two years of the December 11, 2017 denial of tenure.
{¶ 8} The trial court converted appellee's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, gave the parties the opportunity to supplement their materials, and held a hearing on the matter. On December 21, 2021, the trial court issued a decision determining neither Civ.R. 15(C) nor R.C. 2305.19 saved appellant's claims. As a result, the trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations period.
{¶ 9} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
{¶ 10} Appellant sets forth one assignment of error for review:
A trial Court errs in granting summary judgment against a party when the original lawsuit was filed in federal court against the state, the state could have (but did not) consent to be sued, the original federal complaint was dismissed as being untimely but the operative facts of the state law claim are virtually identical, and the state law claim is timely since it relates back to the filing of the original federal complaint.
{¶ 11} An appellate court reviews an appeal of a trial court order granting summary judgment de novo governed by the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C). Watson v. Franklin Univ., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-146, 2019-Ohio-2929, ¶ 12-14. "Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 when the moving party demonstrates that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion when viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party." George v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-559, 2018-Ohio-719, ¶ 10.
{¶ 12} When seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case, the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). If the moving party meets its burden, then the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Civ.R. 56(E); Dresher at 293.
{¶ 13} In this appeal, the facts necessary to determine whether the statute of limitations expired are not in dispute. The parties do not dispute that appellant's state law claims of employment discrimination under R.C. 4112.02 against a state university are subject to a two-year statute of limitations,[2] that the clock began to run when appellant was denied tenure on December 11, 2017, and the statute of limitations for appellant's R.C. 4112.02 discrimination claims expired after December 11, 2019. Appellant also does not dispute that she raised her R.C. 4112.02 discrimination claims beyond the statute of limitations period, namely on January 28, 2020 in her amended complaint filed in the U.S. District Court and on March 10, 2021 in the instant complaint in the Court of Claims.
{¶ 14} The crux of this appeal, therefore, involves determining whether appellant has shown the R.C. 4112.02 discrimination claims should nevertheless be deemed to be timely filed by the operation of law. To that point, appellant cites to R.C. 2305.19 and Civ.R. 15(C). R.C. 2305.19, known as Ohio's "savings statute," states in pertinent part:
In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if * * * the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff * * * may commence a new action within one year after the date of * * * the plaintiff's failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.
R.C. 2305.19(A). To apply the savings statute, "[t]he original action must be commenced prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and a dismissal after such expiration must be other than on the merits." Stuller v. Price, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-29, 2003-Ohio-583, ¶ 18. See Portee v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 155 Ohio St.3d 1, 2018-Ohio-3263, ¶ 15 ( a case where the plaintiff commenced an action in another state and failed otherwise than upon the merits, "the Ohio saving statute generally does not apply to permit recommencement of an action in Ohio after the statute of limitations has expired."). See, e.g., Moore v. Dept. of Rehab. &Corr., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-732, 2011-Ohio-1607, ¶ 19 (determining R.C. 2305.19(A) did not apply to save a plaintiff's Court of Claims action based on her previous filings in federal court since the filings in federal court were untimely). "The savings statute is not to be used as a method for tolling the statute of limitations." Stuller at ¶ 18, citing Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Rd. Hosp., 73 Ohio St.3d 391, 397 (1995).
{¶ 15} Here, the only pleading appellant filed prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations is her original November 20, 2019 complaint in the U.S. District Court, which stated claims for discrimination under federal law (Title VII). The original complaint does not raise the R.C. 4112.02 discrimination claims. The Title VII discrimination claims raised in the original November 20, 2019 complaint were dismissed by the U.S. District Court with prejudice because they were untimely, which appellant agrees operates as a failure "on the merits" in this case. See Civ.R. 41(B)(3) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (providing that, unless a dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits, subject to exceptions for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party). Therefore, the original November 20, 2019 complaint, in isolation, does not meet the predicates to apply the Ohio savings statute.
{¶ 16} Perhaps because of this deficiency, appellant points us to her January 28, 2020 amended complaint filed in the U.S. District Court. In the amended complaint, appellant did raise the R.C. 4112.02 discrimination claims, and those claims were dismissed by the U.S. District Court without prejudice on November 30, 2020 due to the lack of subject-matter...
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