Finley v. Smith
| Decision Date | 21 February 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 5-3794,5-3794 |
| Parties | Hannah FINLEY, Appellant, v. Myrtle A. SMITH, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Pope, Pratt & Shamburger, Little Rock, for appellant.
Smith, Williams, Friday & Bowen, by William F. Sherman, Little Rock, for appellee.
On April 10, 1963, the appellee, Myrtle A. Smith, a retired school teacher, was knocked down and seriously injured by a large dog owned by the appellant. In the court below Mrs. Smith recovered a verdict and judgment for $3,500.00. The appellant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence, which amply supports the view that the dog was known by its owner to be a vicious and dangerous animal that should not have been allowed to run at large in the neighborhood.
There was much proof that the dog had bitten or otherwise injured various persons on other occasions. It is contended that the court erred in allowing the plaintiff to prove incidents that occurred after she was injured, for the reason that such subsequent events would not tend to prove that the owner of the dog had prior notice of its dangerous propensities. Subsequent conduct is admissible, however, to prove the particular animal's dangerous nature. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 9 S.Ct. 696, 33 L.Ed. 110 (1889); Todd v. Rowley, 8 Allen 51, 90 Mass. 51 (1864); Boatman v. Miles, 27 Wyo. 481, 199 P. 933, 26 A.L.R. 864 (1921). When testimony is competent for one purpose a general objection is unavailing. There should be a request that the jury be instructed to consider the testimony only for its permissible purpose. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Ford, 82 Ark. 555, 102 S.W. 896 (1907). No such request was made here.
It is argued that Dana Beyer, a thirteen-year-old boy, should not have been permitted to testify that the dog had bitten him, because he was not certain that the incident took place before the animal's attack upon the plaintiff. This contention is answered by the authorities already cited, and, furthermore, the testimony of the child's mother would have justified the jury in finding that the child's encounter with the dog preceded the incident now complained of.
The only other objection being urged is to an instruction telling the jury that if the owner of a dog has notice of its propensity to injure people it is immaterial that the animal is not savage but acts in good nature and playfulness. That is a correct statement of law. Prosser, Torts, § 75 (3d ed. 1964); ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Moura v. Randall
...month after the attack was competent to give lay testimony concerning the dog's vicious and dangerous disposition); Finley v. Smith, 240 Ark. 323, 399 S.W.2d 271, 272 (1966) (stating that "[s]ubsequent conduct is admissible ... to prove the particular animal's dangerous nature," despite the......
-
Hamby v. Haskins
...he knew it had bitten appellee. Subsequent conduct is admissible to prove the particular animal's dangerous nature. Finley v. Smith, 240 Ark. 323, 399 S.W.2d 271 (1966). And language in Reeves v. John A. Cooper Co., 304 F.Supp. 828 (W.D.Ark.1964) is dispositive of appellant's claim that he ......
-
Van Houten v. Pritchard
...of its propensity to injure people, it is immaterial whether the animal acts out of savagery or out of playfulness. Finley v. Smith, 240 Ark. 323, 399 S.W.2d 271 (1966). In this case the trial court held that the plaintiff failed to prove the cat had a propensity to injure people, which was......
-
Bradley v. Hendricks
...141 Ark. 32, 216 S.W. 8; McIntyre v. Prater, 189 Ark. 596, 74 S.W.2d 639; Holt v. Leslie, 116 Ark. 433, 173 S.W. 191; Finley v. Smith, 240 Ark. 323, 399 S.W.2d 271; see also Cagle v. Monroe, 215 Ark. 518, 221 S.W.2d The record reveals that about ten days prior to August 10, 1969, Mrs. Dorot......