Finn v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 19 February 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 22620,22620 |
| Parties | John B. FINN, Plaintiff in Error, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Colorado, Adolph Coors Company, a corporation, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, a corporation, Defendants in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Marshall Quiat, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Zarlengo, Mott & Carlin, Denver, for Adolph Coors Co. and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Industrial Commission.
This is a writ of error from the denial by the Industrial Commission and the trial court of a claim for Workmen's Compensation by John B. Finn who had suffered an unexplained injury.
Claimant, an employee of the Adolph Coors Company, shortly after reporting for work, was found lying unconscious on the floor of his place of employment with blood running from his ears. It later developed that he had sustained a small fracture inside his skull along with head abrasions and bruises; and, in addition, his eyes were blackened and his forearms were black and blue. He later surmised that he had been struck by a forklift truck. Actually, however, he did not know what had happened to him and was unable to produce any evidence as to what had occurred. There were no witnesses to any accident or as to how or why he was on the floor. There was testimony that Finn had been in perfect health all his life up to this occurrence. A supervisor who had seen the claimant a few minutes before the accident found him twisted behind some boxes, his feet thrashing as he repeatedly lifted his head which fell striking his face on the floor.
The referee's Findings were that Finn was injured while at work; but as he had failed to prove that his injury arose out of his employment the referee held that it was not compensable. In addition, it was the referee's belief that the onset of the injury was triggered by some 'mysterious innerbody malfunction.' The Commission concurred in and adopted these Findings and the trial court affirmed.
Claimant's basic position before this court is that a presumption exists that an injury arises out of the employment where there is an unexplained injury which occurred during the course of the employment. In this connection, reliance is placed on our pronouncement in Industrial Commission v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 118, 314 P.2d 698, 701 (1957). In addition, claimant asserts that the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur applies to this type of situation. It is also urged, on grounds hereinafter set forth, that the Workmen's Compensation Act (C.R.S.1963, Chapter 81) is unconstitutional if it denies Finn the right to sue his employer on a common law basis.
The difficulties with claimant's position as to the first ground are several. In the first place the Havens case is easily distinguishable from this fact situation. As pertinent here, in Havens the claimants not only proved the decedent's immediate prior good health, but also unaccustomed exertion as well as a blow on the body while unloading his vehicle. We there held that such evidence made out a prima facie case which was unrebutted. Then too, in the instant case, and unfortunately for Finn, he was unable to prove more than that he had something happen to him during his employment. He did not show how or why his condition arose out of his work. He failed to adduce evidence to the point of making a prima facie case. Thus, urging that some of the employer's evidence was erroneous is immaterial. In addition, since there is proper evidence to support the findings, we should not set the denial of award aside. This further demonstrates the inapplicability of Havens where we affirmed an award.
We do not agree that a presumption exists that an employee found injured on his employer's premises is presumably injured from something arising out of his work, i.e., that the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur or some...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Stewart v. U.S.
...of the injured employee on the employer's premises is, without more, insufficient to invoke the bar of the Act. Finn v. Industrial Comm., 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542; Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Kruzic, 94 Colo. 398, 30 P.2d 868; McKnight v. Houck, 87 Colo. 234, 286 P. The Sieck case is inst......
-
Bushnell v. Sapp
...in the area of workmen's compensation. O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 177 Colo. 190, 493 P.2d 344; Finn v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542. No constitutional right of appellant's has been violated by this legislation. We decline appellant's invitation to overru......
-
City of Brighton & Cirsa v. Rodriguez
...while located on a twenty-five-foot-high scaffold, a “special hazard” of employment). ¶ 32 The City relies on Finn v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968), for the proposition that an unexplained fall can never “arise out of” employment. Specifically, the City points to......
-
Kandt v. Evans
...190 Colo. 512, 549 P.2d 780 (1976); O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Productions, 177 Colo. 190, 493 P.2d 344 (1972); Finn v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968). See 81 Am.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation §§ 10, 21 (1976). That the General Assembly amended provisions of the Act t......
-
The Positional Risk Doctrine-compensability of Neutral Force Injuries
...by an accidental shooting is not compensable. Murphey v. Marquez, 155 Colo. 89, 393 P.2d 553 (1964). 27. Finn v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968). 28. Larson, note 9, supra,§ 10.30 at 3-87. 29. Irvine, note 5, supra. 30. Tolbert, note 4, supra at 1099, 1101. 31. Lar......
-
Three Years After City of Brighton: Its Effect on the Compensability of Workers’ Compensation Claims
...1994). [6] Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n of Colo., 254 P. 995 (Colo. 1927). [7] Brighton, 318 P.3d 496. [8] Finn v. Indus. Comm’n, 437 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1968). [9] Rodriguez v. City of Brighton, W.C. No. 4-782-516 (ICAO August 23, 2011). [10] Rodriguez v. City of Brighton, 343 P.3d 975......