Finnegan v. Monongahela Connecting R. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1954
• Citation: 108 A.2d 321,379 Pa. 63
• Parties: Thomas E. FINNEGAN v. MONONGAHELA CONNECTING RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 321

108 A.2d 321

379 Pa. 63

Thomas E. FINNEGAN v. MONONGAHELA CONNECTING RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 8, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 5, 1954.

T. W. Pomeroy, Jr., Emmet D. Hurley, Jr., Kirkpatrick, Pomeroy, Lockhart & Johnson, Pittsburgh, for Monongahela Connecting R. R. Co.

P. J. McArdle and James P.McArdle, Pittsburgh, for Thomas E. Finnegan.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, and CHIDSEY, JJ.

CHIDSEY, Justice.

This action to recover damages for personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., was instituted and tried in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. There are two appeals. No. 95 is the appeal of the Monongahela Connecting Railroad Company, defendant in the action, from the order of the court en banc refusing to enter judgment non obstante veredicto. No. 130 is the appeal of Thomas E. Finnegan, plaintiff in the action, from the order of the court en banc awarding a new trial.

On April 30, 1949, plaintiff was a conductor in the employ of defendant assigned to a train crew engaged in shifting cars in the vicinity of the plant of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, in the City of Pittsburgh. The crew had been instructed by the yardmaster to pull certain cars from a track located inside the doors of one of the Jones & Laughlin mills. This portion of the track together with all of the immediate area was owned by Jones & Laughlin, although the entire spur track was constructed by defendant. The track inside the mill runs along a loading dock or shipping platform on which Jones & Laughlin employes pile steel for loading into the railroad cars. On the other side of the track is a wall which prevents passage on that side while cars are standing on the track. A yellow line had been painted on the floor of the shipping platform about three feet from the edge to indicate to Jones & Laughlin employes what space was to be left clear for the use of railroad employes.

Upon receiving the instructions from the yardmaster, plaintiff, who by virtue of his position as conductor was in charge of the shifting crew, took his train up to the closed door of the mill. He then entered the mill by another door and proceeded to the shipping office where he received from Jones & Laughlin employes the bills of lading for the outgoing cars. The overhead door was then opened by employes of Jones & Laughlin to admit the shifting engine. Plaintiff uncoupled the last car to be pulled out from those cars which were to remain in the mill, and one of the brakemen coupled to the engine the car nearest the overhead door of the mill. Plaintiff then gave the starting signal which was relayed by the brakeman to the engineer, who started the engine in motion to pull the cars out of the mill. Plaintiff walked down the loading platform toward the overhead door, keeping abreast of the cars which were being pulled out at a rate of speed of about two miles an hour. As he proceeded toward the door he observed a pile of steel three to four feet high protruding beyond the yellow line to about three inches from the edge of the platform, thus obstructing his way. Plaintiff then gave a signal to stop the train. After the train had stopped plaintiff attempted to pass between the steel and the railroad car, a space of about 15 inches. The leg of his overalls caught on the edge of the steel and he fell from the platform to the track, a distance of about three and one-half feet, sustaining the injuries for which recovery is sought.

It is clear from the undisputed testimony that the steel was placed near the edge of the platform by Jones & Laughlin employes; that loaded cars were removed from the mill siding on an average of three times a day; and that the conductor of a shifting crew is responsible for the safety, prompt movement and proper care of his train, and for the conduct of the members of the crew.

After a trial lasting four days the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $9,000. Defendant filed a motion for judgment n. o. v., which was refused, and a motion for a new trial, which was granted because of the excessiveness of the verdict. As above stated, defendant appeals from the order of the court below refusing to grant judgment n. o. v., and plaintiff appeals from the order granting a new trial. We will first consider defendant's appeal.

The opinion of the court en banc held that the presence of the steel at the edge of the platform at the time of plaintiff's injury did not constitute negligence on the part of the defendant railroad company in the absence of actual or constructive notice to it that a dangerous condition existed, and that the evidence failed to disclose any such notice other than through plaintiff himself. The opinion then continued: 'However, plaintiff's counsel contends that our attention should not be limited solely to the pile of steel which caused the accident but should include other factors as well, viz.; the blank wall on the other side of the track affording no walking area for crewmen, the limited width of the actual track area, and the congested or as plaintiff expressed it: 'the littered condition' of the platform area with piles of steel sheets occupying the regularly established aisles set apart for use in moving the steel into position for shipment * * *. It was solely on account of these additional conditions that the case was submitted to the jury; for the express purpose of determining from them whether the defendant had any constructive notice of existing hazards at the place plaintiff was assigned to work. The issue therefore, was narrowed to the inquiry by the jury whether such congestion behind the cleared area along the edge of the platform was such as to warn defendant that there might be encroachments or impediments within that area as to interfere with plaintiff's performance of the duties assigned to him.' The court then held that because of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916; Bailey v. Central Vermont Railway, Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 87 L.Ed. 1944; Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282, and Stone v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 73 S.Ct. 358, 97 L.Ed. 441, it was bound to submit the issue of defendant's negligence to the jury.

In support of the position taken by the court below in this respect, plaintiff argues that because of these cases and a few others containing similar language, '* * * just about every case of injury to a railroader must be submitted to the tribunal of fact.'

Under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, contributory negligence is no bar to a recovery; rather it has the effect of diminution of the damages in proportion to the relative amounts of negligence and contributory negligence which caused the injury. However, the Act does require that plaintiff's injury be caused at least in part by the negligence of the defendant. In the absence of negligence of the defendant as a causal factor in plaintiff's injury, there can be no recovery. Where plaintiff's evidence of negligence and causation amounts to nothing more than a scintilla, the court must enter judgment for the defendant as a matter of law: Brady v. Southern Railway Co., 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239. The cases of the Supreme Court of the United States cited in the opinion of the court en banc and relied upon by plaintiff do not hold otherwise. It is true that in some of those cases there is language used in dictum which would tend to diminish the power of a court to exercise its usual judicial control of a verdict where plaintiff's evidence falls below the minimum standard accepted as a basis for the establishment of liability. For example in Lavender v. Kurn, supra, the authority principally relied upon by plaintiff, the opinion stated in 327 U.S. at page 653, 66 S.Ct. at page 744: 'It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court's function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.' Although this statement seemingly enlarged the function of the jury under the facts of the case, it does not have the effect ascribed to it by plaintiff. It requires that the evidence be such 'that fair-minded men may draw different inferences', and that there be an 'evidentiary basis' to support the jury's verdict. The 'speculation' portion of the above quotation was clarified by the Supreme Court of the United States in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 340 U.S. 573, 578, 71 S.Ct. 428, 430, 95 L.Ed. 547, where the court stated: '* * * Speculation cannot supply the place of proof.' In actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act the Federal courts have consistently required that plaintiff furnish evidence of negligence and causation of a standard that a jury could reasonably find liability in order to sustain a verdict: Brady v. Southern Railway Co., supra; Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., supra; Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., D.C., 71 F.Supp. 746, affirmed 3 Cir., 164 F.2d 966, affirmed 335 U.S....