Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1950
• Citation: 35 Cal.2d 409,218 P.2d 17
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: FINNEGAN v. ROYAL REALTY CO. MERCHUT v. ROYAL REALTY CO. L. A. 21048, 21049.

Page 17

218 P.2d 17

35 Cal.2d 409

FINNEGAN v. ROYAL REALTY CO.

MERCHUT v. ROYAL REALTY CO.

L. A. 21048, 21049.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

May 12, 1950.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1950.

Lasher B. Gallagher, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Norman S. Sterry, Gerold C. Dunn and Frederic H. Sturdy, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Walker, Meyers, Ingram & Moser, Parker, Stanbury & Reese and Raymond G. Stanbury, Los angeles, for respondents.

CARTER, Justice.

These appeals are taken by the defendant, Royal Realty Company, a corporation, from judgments for plaintiffs entered upon verdicts of a jury in two actions for damages for personal injuries. The complaints named as defendants the appellant and Herman Helbush, its president. The verdicts were in favor of plaintiffs against the appellant corporation, and in favor of the defendant Helbush. The actions were consolidated for trial and tried together. The two appeals have been submitted on one set of briefs and involve identical questions.

The cases arose out of a fire which occurred on January 20, 1944, in a workroom in a building located at the corner of Wilshire Boulevard and Alvarado Street in Los Angeles. Appellant corporation was the lessor of the second floor of the building. Norman Noll, doing business as Noll & Company, was the lessee. The lease was executed on June 22, 1937, for a term which was to expire July 22, 1942, and provided that the premises were to be used for 'the business of manufacturers of and dealers in club furniture and equipment, and for no other purpose' and 'That the lessee will not use, or permit to be used, the said premises, or any part thereof, for any purpose or purposes other than the purpose or purposes for which the said premises are leased, demised and let unto the lessee, as hereinbefore specified.' After the expiration of the lease, noll held over as tenant from month to month under the terms of the lease and was in possession on the day of the fire. At the time of the fire, seven of Noll's employees were in the building. Of these seven, three met their death, and these two respondents were horribly burned. Respondent Merchut, who was once a pretty girl, is now a hideous caricature of her former self. Plastic surgeons have been unable to replace her eyelids, and there is the possibility that her eyesight will be permanently impaired. Respondent Finnegan's hands and arms were so badly burned that they are now useless and she is thus permanently disabled.

Noll, the lessee, was principally engaged in the manufacture of dice from celluloid. Cellulose tetranitrate is blended with camphor to produce celluloid which is a highly imflammable material. When celluloid burns, it does so rapidly and as it burns it emits the gases of nitrogen, carbon and hydrogen, and various combinations of these gases, all of which are hot and toxic in that they burn the mucous membrane. Celluloid shavings and dust burn faster and with more violence than celluloid in the solid form and will ignite instantly upon contact with flame. Celluloid is explosive at its ignition temperature, 350 degrees Fahrenheit, without contact with flame.

The upper floor of the premises occupied by Noll was divided into two rooms, the 'showroom' and the 'workroom'. Between these two rooms were double doors which opened into the workroom rather than outward from it. Against one of these doors on the workroom side, Noll had placed a heavy table on which was placed a cash register thus effectively blocking one-half of this exit which on the day of the fire was the only way out of the room.

In the manufacture of dice, small particles of celluloid were drilled or shaved from the cubes and these particles had collected on the machines and on the floor. Dust and shavings were blown off the machines with electric blowers and had settled on shelves, curtains, walls, floor and the clothing, hair and persons of the workers. There was no suction equipment of any kind with which to remove the dust in the room. At the close of each day, the refuse, shavings and dust, were swept up by the employees and put into sacks which were then stacked against the wall until Noll found it convenient to take them away. At the time of the fire there were four such sacks of shavings and dust stacked against the north wall immediately east of the double doors, and a half full sack under Mrs. Finnegan's machine. Beside the sacks there was an open trashbox full of shavings and dust. In addition, there were over 150 pounds of cellulose nitrate stored in the room. The doors and windows offered the only ventilation in the room. It is conceded by the parties that Noll conducted his business in a grossly negligent manner.

The fire started about five o'clock in the afternoon when the workers were preparing to leave for the day. Mrs. Finnegan was standing about six or seven feet from the double doors leading into the showroom and had just asked Miss Merchut, who was in the southwest corner of the room, if she could help her. Mr. Reuter, another employee, was standing close to where the sacks were stacked, and made some remark to Mrs. Finnegan. As she turned toward him she saw some object, which she could not identify, fly through the air and land in the cardboard trash box. Flames immediately shot forth and hit the sacks causing an explosion. A sheet of fire then spread over the entire room. The smoke was intense.

The following points are raised on this appeal:

(1) The Ordinance: Appellant contends that certain sections of Ordinance No. 8700 were improperly received in evidence as they created no duty on its part to these respondents; that there is no proof that the violation of any section thereof contributed in any way to respondents' injuries; that the trial court erred in giving and refusing certain instructions with reference thereto.

(2) Negligence: Appellant contends that it owed no duty to these respondents under the common law.

(3) Contributory Negligence and Assumed Risk: Appellant contends that as a matter of law, these respondents were guilty of contributory negligence and that they assumed the risks involved in their employment.

(4) Damages: Appellant contends that there was no evidence from which the jury could find, without indulging in conjecture and speculation, what part of respondents' injuries was attributable solely to its acts or omissions.

(5) Special Damages: Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting proof of respondents' special damages and in instructing the jury thereon.

(6) The Neuber case as a precedent: (Neuber v. Royal Realty Co., 86 Cal.App.2d 596, 195 P.2d 501). Appellant contends that the Neuber decision (an action arising out of the same fire) was correct in holding that the various provisions of the ordinance (with the exception of the 'door' section) had no application to a 'building as a building' but were concerned with the use and occupancy of such buildings and placed the defendant corporation under no legal duty to prevent the violations of ordinances by either the tenant, Noll, or his employee. Appellant does not concede that the 'door' section is applicable.

(7) The Instructions.

The Ordinance

Ordinance No. 87000 of the City of Los Angeles became effective January 1, 1943 and constituted a new building code which expressly amended the 'old' building code 'in its entirety' and repealed everything that was in the old ordinance and not contained in the new one.

Section 91.0101(b): 'Purpose. The purpose of this Article is to safeguard life or limb, health, property and public welfare by regulating and controlling the design, construction, quality of materials, use and occupancy, location and maintenance of all buildings and structures erected or to be erected within the city.'

Section 91.0102 provides in part that: 'No person shall construct, alter, repair, demolish, remove, move, use, occupy or maintain, within the city, any building or structure, or any portion thereof, except as provided by this Code.' Also that 'All of the provisions of this Code shall be limitations for safeguarding life or limb, health, property and public welfare.'

Section 91.0502(e): 'Group E. Occupancies: Sub-Group E-1: Every room in which explosive materials in lots of more than eight pounds weight or flammable liquids are manufactured or used in any process or kept in unsealed containers; also film laboratories, film cutting rooms, and cellulose-nitrate processing rooms.'

Section 91.0505(b): 'Groups A and E: Every Gropu A Occupancy and every Group E Occupancy shall be housed in a Type I building.'

Section 91.0642 (Special Requirements for Sub-Group E-1 Occupancies):

'(b) Exits. Every part of every building shall have two separate exits and shall be within seventy-five feet (75 ) of a doorway opening into an exit.

'(c) Film and Explosive Material Storage. Every room appropriated to the storage of explosive materials, film or cellulose nitrate in excess of 100 pounds shall conform to the requirements of Division 42 of this Code (Film and Explosive Vaults), unless stored in film cabinets as specified in Article 7 of Chapter 5 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code.

'(i) Fire-Extinguishing Apparatus. Every room housing a Sub-Group E-1 Occupancy shall be sprinklered.'

Section 91.3303. '(a) Scope. Every door serving as an exit from an aggregate floor area of more than one thousand square feet (1,000 sq. ft.) shall be constructed and installed in conformity with the requirements of this Section. * * * (c) Location. Every door shall open on a landing at least equal in width and length to the width of the door. Doors when in any position shall not reduce the width of an exitway to less than thirty inches (31 '). (d) Details. Every door to an exit enclosure shall be self-closing. Doors serving as exits shall open only in the direction of exit and shall be openable from the inside without the use of a key. Sliding doors and rolling shutters shall not be used on...