Finney v. Finney
| Decision Date | 16 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. COA14–420.,COA14–420. |
| Citation | 768 S.E.2d 64 (Table) |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Mary H. FINNEY, Plaintiff v. Richard H. FINNEY, Defendant. |
Hyler & Lopez, P.A., by Stephen P. Agan and George B. Hyler, Jr., for Plaintiff.
Mary Elizabeth Arrowood for Defendant.
Plaintiff Mary Finney appeals from a judgment unequally distributing the parties' marital and divisible assets in favor of Defendant Richard Finney. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by failing to follow this Court's instruction requiring the correction of an erroneous finding of fact contained in its initial equitable distribution judgment and by concluding that an equitable distribution of the parties' property would involve the distribution of 60% of the parties' marital and divisible assets to Defendant and 40% of the parties' marital and divisible assets to Plaintiff. After careful consideration of Plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
I. Factual Background
On 29 May 1993, Plaintiff and Defendant were married. The parties separated on 4 January 2006 and were subsequently divorced. On 9 January 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for divorce, post-separation support, permanent alimony, and equitable distribution. In her complaint, Plaintiff requested that the court approve an unequal division of the parties' marital and divisible property in her favor. On 15 February 2006, Defendant filed a responsive pleading in which he requested, among other things, that an unequal distribution of the parties' marital and divisible assets be made in his favor. On 15 March 2006, Plaintiff filed a reply to the counterclaims asserted in Defendant's responsive pleading.
On or about 23 February 2006, Plaintiff filed an affidavit in support of her spousal support claim. On 5 April 2006, Defendant filed an affidavit in support of his position with respect to the spousal support issue. On 2 May 2006, the trial court entered an order awarding Plaintiff $1,500 per month in post-separation support.
On 23 May 2006, Plaintiff filed an equitable distribution affidavit. Plaintiff filed an amended equitable distribution affidavit on 13 November 2007. Defendant filed an equitable distribution affidavit on 3 January 2007. On 30 May 2008, the trial court entered a pre-trial order setting forth the parties' stipulations and position with respect to the valuation and distribution of various assets and debts.
The parties' equitable distribution claims were heard before the trial court in August and September of 2010. On 15 July 2011, the trial court entered an equitable distribution order in which it found, among other things, that Plaintiff believed that the 14 acres of land that she owned separately from Defendant to be worth $123,000, with this amount being also set forth in an exhibit that accompanied the judgment in which Plaintiff's separate property was listed. Based on its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that an unequal distribution of the parties' marital and divisible property in favor of Defendant would be equitable and divided the parties' marital and divisible property so that Plaintiff received 40% of the parties' property, which was valued at $98,855.23, and Defendant received 60% of the parties' property, which was valued at $148,283.00. Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's equitable distribution judgment.
On 15 January 2013, this Court filed an opinion in Finney v. Finney,––– N.C.App. ––––, 736 S.E.2d 639 (2013), in which we concluded that “the record contains no testimony that [Plaintiff] believed the 14 acres were valued at $123,000.00.” Instead, we stated that “[i]t appears that the trial court confused this acreage with [Plaintiff's] condominium—an entirely different asset—which she indeed purchased for $123,000.00.” Id.at –––, 736 S.E.2d at 644. As a result of this and other determinations, this Court reversed the trial court's equitable distribution order and remanded this case to the trial court with instructions to enter a new equitable distribution order that, among other things, contained proper findings of fact addressing the value of Plaintiff's separate property and other issues. Id.at –––, 736 S.E.2d at 646.
The trial court held a hearing on remand in this case on 6 August 2013. On 31 December 2013, the trial court entered a new equitable distribution order in which it found, among other things, that Plaintiff believed that the 14 acre tract of real property that she owned separately from Defendant had a value of $50,000. However, the exhibit delineating Plaintiff's separate property that accompanied the trial court's new equitable distribution judgment continued to state that the value of Plaintiff's 14 acre tract of real property was $123,000. Based upon the findings of fact contained in its order on remand, the trial court divided the parties' property by awarding 60%, which was valued at $148,283, to Defendant and 40%, which was valued at $98,855.23, to Plaintiff. Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's remand order.
II. Substantive Legal Analysis
A. Standard of Review
“The standard of review on appeal from a judgment entered after a non-jury trial is whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment.” Pegg v. Jones,187 N.C.App. 355, 358, 653 S.E.2d 229, 231 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd per curiam,362 N.C. 343, 661 S.E.2d 732 (2008). “Mere formal defects in findings ordinarily will be ignored if the substance of the judgment is sufficient;” for that reason, an error must affect a party's substantial rights in order to justify an award of appellate relief. Andrews v. Andrews,79 N.C.App. 228, 232, 338 S.E.2d 809, 812, disc. review denied,316 N.C. 730, 345 S.E.2d 385 (1986), disapproved of on other grounds in Armstrong v. Armstrong,322 N.C. 396, 403, 368 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1988). Thus, this Court “will not remand a judgment for obviously insignificant errors” in cases involving “the complex litigation of equitable distribution.” Mishler v. Mishler,90 N.C.App. 72, 74, 367 S.E.2d 385, 387, disc. review denied,323 N.C. 174, 373 S.E.2d 111 (1988). “[W]here matters are left to the discretion of the trial court, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion.” White v. White,312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 820, 833 (1985). Under the abuse of discretion standard, the trial court's judgment will be upheld unless it is “so arbitrary that [it] could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Lawing v. Lawing,81 N.C.App. 159, 162, 344 S.E.2d 100, 104 (1986).
B. Applicable Legal Principles
According to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–20, “[u]pon application of a party, the court shall determine what is the marital property and divisible property and shall provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property and divisible property between the parties[.]”N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–20(c) provides that “[t]here shall be an equal division by using net value of marital property and net value of divisible property unless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable.” In determining how to equitably divide the parties' property, the court must consider the following factors:
(1) The income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.
(2) Any obligation for support arising out of a prior marriage.
(3) The duration of the marriage and the age and physical and mental health of both parties.
(4) The need of a parent with custody of a child or children of the marriage to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects.
(5) The expectation of pension, retirement, or other deferred compensation rights that are not marital property.
(6) Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services, or lack thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker.
(7) Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential of the other spouse.
(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate property which occurs during the course of the marriage.
(9) The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property and divisible property.
(10) The difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest, intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party.
(11) The tax consequences of each party, including those federal and State tax consequences that would have been incurred if the marital and divisible property had been sold or liquidated on the date of valuation. The trial court may, however, in its discretion, consider whether or when such tax consequences are reasonably likely to occur in determining the equitable value deemed appropriate for this factor.
(11a) Acts of either party to maintain, preserve, develop, or expand; or to waste, neglect, devalue or convert the marital property or divisible property, or both, during the period after separation of the parties and before the time of distribution.
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(12) Any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–20(c). According to well-established principles of North Carolina law, “an equal division is mandatory absent a determination that it would not be equitable.” Hendricks v. Hendricks,96 N.C.App. 462, 464, 386 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1989) (citing Bradley v. Bradley,78 N.C.App. 150, 151, 336 S.E.2d 658, 659 (1985) ), cert. denied,326 N.C. 264, 389 S.E.2d 113 (1990). “[A] party...
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