Fire Dep't of City of New York v. Stanton

• Decision Date: 06 June 1899
• Citation: 54 N.E. 28,159 N.Y. 225
• Parties: FIRE DEPARTMENT OF CITY OF NEW YORK v. STANTON.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

159 N.Y. 225

54 N.E. 28

FIRE DEPARTMENT OF CITY OF NEW YORK

v.STANTON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 6, 1899.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action by the fire department of the city of New York against George A. Stanton. From a judgment of the appellate division (51 N. Y. Supp. 242) reversing a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

William B. Ellison, for appellant.

William L. Findley, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

The plaintiff, acting under the authority conferred by section 523 of the New York City consolidation act of 1882, demands that the defendant be decreed to account to its treasurer for all premiums for insurance against loss or injury by fire received by him as agent in the city and county of New York for or on behalf of an association of individuals not incorporated by the laws of this state, and that he be required to pay 2 per cent. of the amount of premiums collected. The actual language of the statute upon whose provisions the plaintiff relies to enforce this claim is that ‘there shall be paid to the treasurer of the fire department, for the use and benefit of said fire department, on the first day of February, in each year, by every person who shall act in the city and county of New York as agent for or on behalf of any individual or association of individuals, not incorporated by the laws of this state, to effect insurances against losses or injury by fire in the city and county of New York, although such individuals or association may be incorporated for that purpose by any other state or country, the sum of two dollars upon the hundred dollars, and at that rate upon the amount of all premiums,’ etc. The defendant, in his defense, objects primarily that he is not liable to the plaintiff's demand, inasmuch as he was the general manager and the attorney in fact of an organization of underwriters under the name of the American Lloyds, and did not effect insurances himself, or receive premiums. Such insurances, he says, were effected through brokers, and the premiums therefor were paid to the underwriters. But this objection is disposed of by the finding of the trial judge that the defendant acted as agent for the association of underwriters in question, and received premiums for effecting insurance. This finding is not only justified by the evidence, but partly by the averment in the answer that, ‘as general manager and attorney in fact, * * * he has received premiums of insurance effected on property in the city of New York.’

The more serious objection which is made to this demand is twofold in its nature. It is insisted that the law in question was not intended to, and does not, apply to the defendant, or, if it be held to so apply, then that it is violative of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, by reason of the unequal application of the tax. With respect to his first point,-that the law does not apply to him,-the defendant has resort to the history of this species of legislation on our statute books, and, as the result of his examination of previousstatutes, deduces the conclusion that as the legislative intent was originally to reach the agents of nonresident insurers only, and as at the time of the enactment of this law there were no such associations as the one represented by him, it could not have been designed to operate upon the representatives of such domestic or resident associations. Of course, if we read the provisions of the law as they are, they very plainly cover the case of the defendant; for there is no qualification of the language in its application to ‘every person who shall act * * * as agent for or on behalf of any * * * association of individuals not incorporated by the laws of this state,’ etc. While in the construction of a law which presents a difficulty in administration, by reason of its purpose or object being rendered doubtful through inartificial or defective expression, reference to the historical growth of the legislation or to contemporaneous exposition is often and very properly made, and a more or less sure guide thus secured in the delicate work of construction, I should say that it is with questionable right, if with any at all, that the courts resort to such aids when the law is plain in its reading, and appears to offer no doubt upon its face. Where construction is not called for, it is the province of the courts to administer the law as it reads; and if the statute, in its operation, is complained of as working inequitably, or differently from some presumed purpose leading to its enactment, the complaint should be addressed to the legislative body, and the cure sought there. But I think that, if we should follow the defendant in his historical investigations, we should still have to differ with him in reaching a conclusion, and perhaps the importance of the question warrants us in further discussion.

The first act, which was passed in 1814 (chapter 49, Laws 1814), made it ‘unlawful for any person residing in a foreign country, or for any association or company of persons residing in any foreign country, or for any corporation established in any foreign county, or for any person * * * on behalf of such * * * to make any contract of insurance against loss or injury by fire,’ etc. This was a plain exclusion of corporations and of citizens of foreign countries from the transaction of that business within this state, and it is needless to infer the reasons, from the reference in the preamble to an English company, which, at that period of our existence as a people, may have led to such legislation. In 1824 another act was passed (chapter 277, Laws 1824), which required ‘every person, who shall hereafter act as agent for any individuals, or association of individuals, not incorporated by the laws of this state, (although the same may be incorporated by the laws of any other state), for the purpose of effecting insurance * * * to pay into the treasury of the state ten per cent. on the amount of all premiums.’ The preamble of this act gives the reason for its passage, in that ‘associations or companies of individuals, resident without this state and not incorporated by its laws, do by reason of agents, * * * effect many insurances * * * thereby securing to themselves all the benefits, without being subject to any of the burdens of insurance companies, regularly incorporated,’ etc. The obvious purpose of this legislation was to promote and to strengthen the development of domestic corporations by removing the element of an unfair competition on the part of corporations or associations organized in other states, and an additional politic purpose may have been in the...