Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Griffin
| Decision Date | 18 February 1936 |
| Docket Number | 25227. |
| Citation | 54 P.2d 1032,176 Okla. 94,1936 OK 163 |
| Parties | FIREMEN'S FUND INS. CO. v. GRIFFIN. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Courts of general common-law jurisdiction have control of all judgments, decrees, or other orders, however conclusive in their character, during the term at which they are rendered and may set aside, vacate, and modify them during said term in the exercise of a wide and extended discretion, and in the absence of an abuse of such discretion, an order of the trial court vacating a judgment during the term will not be reversed.
Appeal from District Court, McCurtain County; Geo. T. Arnett, Judge.
Action by C. A. Griffin against Firemen's Fund Insurance Company, a corporation. From an order vacating a judgment for defendant, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Rittenhouse Webster & Rittenhouse, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Finney & Cook, of Idabel, for defendant in error.
Defendant in error brought suit against plaintiff in error on a fire insurance policy for loss by fire of a dwelling and household furniture. The defense was made that the defendant in error did not own the dwelling. There was some evidence that the defendant in error owned the dwelling and was in possession under an unrecorded deed. The court entered judgment on February 7, 1933, allowing a recovery for the household furniture, but denying recovery for the dwelling.
Thereafter on April 19, 1933, and during the same term the judgment was rendered, defendant in error filed a motion to vacate the judgment on the grounds: (1) That the judgment was not sustained by sufficient evidence and was contrary to the evidence; (2) that the judgment was contrary to law; (3) for irregularity in obtaining said judgment in that the court was misadvised as to the law and the rights of the plaintiff; (4) that the plaintiff had filed a good cause of action on a fire insurance policy and substantiated the allegation by good and sufficient proof, and that the term of court at which the adverse judgment was rendered had not expired, and that the court in its discretion may vacate and set aside said judgment. The court granted such motion and vacated the judgment on June 23, 1933, the court finding that the judgment is not sustained by the testimony and is contrary to law, and that the term at which judgment was rendered had not expired, and that the court had inherent authority to vacate and set aside said judgment. From this order vacating the judgment, the defendant in the court below, plaintiff in error here, appeals.
The only question raised and argued in the brief of plaintiff in error is that the court below was without jurisdiction to vacate its own judgment during the term, since the plaintiff had failed to file a motion for new trial within three days after the judgment was rendered.
The argument of the plaintiff in error is that section 400 of the Oklahoma Statutes of 1931 requires an application for new trial to be made within three days after the judgment, except for the cause of newly discovered evidence and unless unavoidably prevented; that this motion to vacate was in reality a motion for new trial and it was not made within three days after the judgment, and it did not set up newly discovered evidence or show that the defendant in error was unavoidably prevented from filing it sooner, the grounds thereof being that the judgment was irregular, contrary to the evidence, and contrary to law; and that section 556 of the Oklahoma Statutes of 1931 restricts the power of the district court to vacate its own judgments to the granting of a new trial for the cause, within the time and in the manner prescribed in section 400, with certain exceptions specified in section 556 not here material. Plaintiff in error cites in support of its position a number of cases. All of the Oklahoma cases cited except Dunham...
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