Firestine v. Atkinson

• Decision Date: 06 March 1928
• Docket Number: 38802
• Citation: 218 N.W. 293,206 Iowa 151
• Parties: ADA FLORENCE FIRESTINE, Appellant, v. D. W. ATKINSON, Executor, et al., Appellees
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

218 N.W. 293

206 Iowa 151

ADA FLORENCE FIRESTINE, Appellant, v. D. W. ATKINSON, Executor, et al., Appellees

No. 38802

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

March 6, 1928

REHEARING DENIED JUNE 26, 1928.

Appeal from Guthrie District Court.--W. S. COOPER, Judge.

Action to set aside an order admitting a will to probate, and to set aside said will, upon the ground of undue influence and mental incapacity. The court directed a verdict in behalf of the executor, and the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Mays & Mays and W. D. Milligan, for appellant.

Moore & Moore and R. E. Duffield, for appellees.

FAVILLE J. STEVENS, C. J., and EVANS, KINDIG, and WAGNER, JJ concur.

OPINION

FAVILLE, J.

The appellant is the illegitimate child of the testator. She was born in Ohio, in 1868, and lived with her mother until she was 10 years of age. About that time, the mother married, and the parents of the testator kept the appellant in their home for about three years. The appellant bore her mother's name until she was 10 years of age, and after that time, until her marriage, when she was 15 and a half years of age, she was known by the name of the testator. Shortly before the birth of the appellant, the testator left Ohio, and came to Iowa. He was then without means; but by industry and thrift he accumulated a fortune, which it is admitted in the record amounted to at least $ 125,000 at the time of his death. He was twice married, but no children were born to either marriage. The testator employed his sister and her husband to care for the appellant for a time. The will in controversy was executed October 26, 1911. The testator died June 23, 1926. By his will he disposed of his estate to various relatives, and in respect to the appellant, made the following provision:

"To Ada Florence Firestine, whom it is alleged is my illegitimate daughter, I give and bequeath nothing."

I. The evidence in the record, in the form of proof of letters, declarations, and conduct of the testator, is sufficient to carry to the jury the question of the recognition by the testator of the paternity of the appellant, and to support a finding that there had been such recognition.

II. The evidence was insufficient to establish appellant's claim of undue influence in the procurement of the execution of said will, and in any event, this question should have been withdrawn from the consideration of the jury.

III. The question as to just what constitutes mental capacity to execute a will is not easy of accurate definition.

In Perkins v. Perkins, 116 Iowa 253, 90 N.W. 55, we laid down a general rule with regard to the mental capacity required for testamentary disposition of property, as follows:

"His mind may have become debilitated by age or disease, the memory enfeebled, the understanding weak, he may even want the capacity to transact many of the ordinary business affairs of life; but if he has mind enough to understand the nature of the instrument he is executing, to recollect the property he means to dispose of, the objects of his bounty, and the manner in which he wishes to distribute it among them, he has testamentary capacity."

This statement has been often repeated by this court. In re Will of Richardson, 199 Iowa 1320, 202 N.W. 114. It is not seriously contended on this appeal that the testator was so lacking in general mental capacity that he could not transact ordinary business, or did not know his estate and the natural objects of his bounty, and have capacity to exercise a will, and discretion in regard thereto. The evidence was not sufficient to support such a claim. The contention of the appellant, however, is that, at the time of the making of the will, the testator was possessed of an insane delusion in respect to the appellant, and that because thereof he was incapacitated to execute a valid will. In 1 Page on Wills (2d Ed.), Section 151, it is said:

" The insane delusion is frequently the only symptom of insanity, and is confined to a clearly marked set of subjects. This type of insanity is often called monomania, or partial insanity. Monomania is defined as 'insanity upon a particular subject only, and with a single delusion of the mind.'"

See, also, extensive note to Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 57 S.E. 69, as reported in 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1, 62; Potter v. Jones, 20 Ore. 239, 25 P. 769, and note in 12 L.R.A. 161.

It is not easy to define the characteristics of an insane delusion. It is obvious that it must be something more than a mere mistake of fact, and also must be a belief that cannot be removed, at least permanently, by evidence. If the belief is based upon evidence, even though it be slight and insufficient, and the belief is erroneous, still it is not an insane delusion. In re Estate of Henry, 167 Iowa 557, 149 N.W. 605. The courts have recognized many types of insane delusions,--such, for example, as the unfounded belief that the testator's wife was unfaithful to him, and that her children were not his own. Petefish v. Becker, 176 Ill. 448 (52 N.E. 71). Also, where the testator wrongly believes that those who would naturally be the objects of his bounty are hostile to him, and where such belief is not based on evidence, and is not removable by evidence, it is regarded as an insane delusion. Ballantine v. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216 (22 N.W. 392); Burkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337 (24 N.E. 118).

Coming to the specific question in hand, it has been held that, where a testator manifests a dislike for the natural objects of his bounty, based on an erroneous belief that such persons have been guilty of misconduct, and where such belief is not based on evidence, and cannot be removed by evidence, it may amount to an insane delusion. In Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 133 Iowa 1, 109 N.W. 1014, we considered a will contest in which it was alleged, regarding the testator, that:

"He, without any foundation therefor, was laboring under the delusion that his daughters were unchaste women, and not fit subjects of his bounty. He, without any foundation therefor, was laboring under the delusion that his daughter Mary Rahm had attempted to, and intended to, poison him; and that he labored under the further delusion that certain of his children had stolen money and other property from him. It is further alleged that all of said delusions caused him to dislike and to become insanely prejudiced against his said daughters, and particularly against Mary Rahm, and that such prejudice caused him to devise all of his property to others."

It was conceded in said case that there was no claim of general mental incapacity, except for the delusions claimed to exist. We said:

"The only other question presented for our determination is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict and judgment. It is almost conclusively shown that the testator was the subject of the delusions which are said to have existed in his mind, and, from a very careful examination of the evidence, we are fully satisfied that these delusions were insane in their nature and quality. At the time of the contest, the daughters were women well along in years. They were all women of respectability and high standing in the community where they resided. There had been nothing in their conduct, either in their private life or in public, indicating that they were not women of the severest virtue, and yet the charges of unchastity were frequently made against them. It is true, the charges were not made to the public, but were confined to the members of his own family, and oftentimes made directly to the persons accused. * * * It is the general rule that insane delusions existing in the mind of a testator will render invalid a will which is the direct offspring of such delusions, although the general capacity of the testator remains unimpaired. * * * In his will no provision was made for either of the contesting daughters. While it is true, as a general proposition, that one may dispose of his property by will as seems to him best, it is equally true that, where a will absolutely disinherits the children of the testator, it is a circumstance to be considered on the issue of the testator's mental condition. The children of the testator are the natural recipients of his bounty, and, when they are entirely ignored in the disposition of his property, it is prima facie an unnatural and unreasonable act. Bever v. Spangler, 93 Iowa 576, 61 N.W. 1072. We think the conclusion inevitable from the record that the will in question was the result of the testator's insane delusions, and that there is no substantial evidence to the contrary."

In Zinkula v. Zinkula, 171 Iowa 287, 305, 154 N.W. 158, we said:

" Not all insane delusions render one incapable of making a will. A man may possess all the mental qualities essential to the transaction of even intricate business, and yet have delusions about other matters that do not affect or concern the act which he is required to perform. It is true that, in some instances, delusions have been held sufficient to justify a court in holding that they had controlling force and dominated the action of a testator in making a will. Where it is shown that the delusion is unfounded, and without it, in all probability, a different course of conduct would have been pursued, or where it is shown that the act of the testator was influenced by the delusion, and that, without such influence operating on his mind, he would have done other than he did, then his act is said to be the result of the delusion, and not a deliberate act of a mind possessing testamentary capacity. Those are cases where it is shown that one has omitted from his will a child who, in the ordinary course of nature, was dear to him, and to whom his natural instincts would have directed the...