First African M. E. Church v. Brown

• Decision Date: 21 June 1888
• Citation: 147 Mass. 296,17 N.E. 549
• Parties: FIRST AFRICAN M. E. CHURCH v. BROWN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

147 Mass. 296

17 N.E. 549

FIRST AFRICAN M. E. CHURCH v. BROWN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 21, 1888

COUNSEL

Moulton, Loring & Loring, for plaintiff.

OPINION

In all cases of alleged fraud, equity requires that the party alleging fraud should proceed to establish it within a reasonable time after he has knowledge of the same, and, if he does not, he is guilty of laches, and equity will not help him, and especially where more than six years has elapsed since the fraud was known. In such case, equity will adopt the statute of limitations as a bar to recovery, if he should begin a suit. Evans v. Bacon, 99 Mass. 213. A suit to set aside the deed to plaintiff must be brought within a reasonable time, and we submit an unreasonable time has elapsed, and therefore the caveat he filed is now utterly without effect and invalid, and in no way an incumbrance upon this property, even if it ever had any validity as an incumbrance, which we submit it never had. Said caveat, as filed, is not a paper or writing required by law, or proper to be filed in the registry of deeds, and made a part of the record thereof; and is not, therefore, and never was, an incumbrance upon the record title of said estate. Nickerson v. Loud, 115 Mass. 94; Peirsoll v Elliott, 6 Pet. 95; Hayes v. Cemetery, 108 Mass. 400; Pub.St. c. 126, § 13.

A.J Pratt, for defendant.

A court of equity will not compel a person who has agreed to purchase land to accept a title so doubtful that it may be exposed to litigation. Bisp.Eq. 378; Richmond v. Gray, 3 Allen, 25; Davis v. Parker, 14 Allen, 94; Sturtevant v. Jaques, Id. 523; Pyrke v. Waddingham, 10 Hare, 1. Like an attachment, the caveat is a cloud and an incumbrance. To compel the defendant to accept this title will be simply to transfer from the plaintiff to the defendant whatever risk or inconvenience there may be from such cloud, and it may be reasonably expected that the defendant may be exposed to controversy to maintain his title, The defendant ought not to be subjected, against his agreement or consent, to the necessity of litigation to remove even that which is only a cloud upon the title. Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184; Cunningham v. Blake, 121 Mass. 333. Where the cloud to the title is such that the damage to the title can be definitely estimated, the court will sometimes decree specific performance; deducting from the purchase price the damages to the title. Davis v. Parker, supra. A court of equity will not decide that the title is a clear and good one when the parties who may be entitled to take advantage of the caveat are not before it, and when the court has no information of the facts which caused the caveat to be recorded. Chesman v. Cummings, 142 Mass. 65, 7 N.E. 13; Butts v. Andrews, 136 Mass. 222; Noyes v. Johnson, 139 Mass. 436.

DEVENS J.

There is no provision by statute for filing in the registry of deeds any document of a character similar to that which Scott was permitted there to place upon record. It acquired no greater importance from being thus filed; nor did it, for this reason, constitute a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff. Pub.St. c. 126, § 13; Nickerson v. Loud, 115 Mass. 94. The question presented by the case at bar is therefore, whether a mere assertion by the plaintiff's grantor, some seven years since, unsupported by any evidence or any subsequent action on his part, that the deed from him to the plaintiff was obtained from him by fraud, and that he shall dispute its validity, renders the plaintiff's title so doubtful that the defendant will not be compelled to accept it, and comply with his contract to pay for the land. In Nickerson v. Loud, ubi supra, a paper signed and recorded in the registry of deeds by A., who was not the plaintiff's grantor, stating that certain real estate, the record title to which was in B., was held by B., subject to a trust in favor of A. and others, and that A. would dispute any title that B. might attempt to make, was held not to constitute a cloud on the title. Whether recorded or unrecorded, such statements could not, under such circumstances, be evidence against B., or in favor of A., and it was held that B. was not entitled to an order directing the paper to be withdrawn by A. from the registry or surrendered to him. The general rule is well settled that, in order to maintain a bill for specific performance of a purchase of land, the plaintiff must show that the title tendered by him is good beyond reasonable doubt. But a doubt must be reasonable, and such as would cause a prudent man to pause and hesitate before investing his money. It would be seldom that a case could occur where some state of facts might not be imagined which, if it existed, would defeat a title. When questions as to the validity of a title are settled beyond reasonable doubt, although there may be still the possibility of a defect, such mere possibility will not exempt one from his liability to complete the purchase he has made. Hayes v. Cemetery, 108 Mass. 400. Thus it might be conceived, in a case similar to that at bar, that plaintiff's grantor, from infancy, insanity, or similar cause, was without legal capacity to have conveyed to him; but that plaintiff would not, therefore, be required to prove affirmatively the existence of such...