First Baptist Church of Sharon v. Harper
| Decision Date | 07 March 1906 |
| Citation | 191 Mass. 196,77 N.E. 778 |
| Parties | FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH OF SHARON v. HARPER et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John Everett, for appellant Hattie M. Harper.
Robert E. Belcher, for appellee.
The more important of the 11 exceptions taken by the defendant Harper to the master's report, refer to the acquisition to title by the plaintiff's grantor to the land described in the bill, and to the vesting of that title in the plaintiff. That Elijah Hewins, the great-grandfather of the defendant, under whom she claims, held at his death the record title to the property then in the physical possession of a voluntary religious organization known as the Sharon Baptist Church is undisputed. The facts, However, set forth in the report make it plain that after purchasing the land in 1832, a meeting-house was built thereon in 1833 for the use of the society, which since then has uninterruptedly occupied the premises for religious worship until merged in the corporation, which is the present plaintiff. There would seem to be little, if any, doubt from the entries made in his book of accounts that the funds required to buy the land, and erect and furnish the building were raised by voluntary subscriptions, which were expended by him for this purpose. It also is expressly found that during his life he was a regular attendant upon the services, and impliedly, if not expressly, must have acquiesced in the use to which the premises were being put, and that he did not assert, nor have his heirs, during the forty-five years which have elapsed since his death, asserted, any interest in the land.
To overcome the presumption which arises under these findings that a prescriptive title was acquired, the defendant takes the position that being a voluntary religious organization it could not, at the date of the deed, or for more than 20 years thereafter, acquire by disseisin a fee, because not being a corporation it was incapable of taking a grant of real property. If there was no artificial person whom the law could recognize as a disseisor no matter how great the lapse of time a title by prescription would not ripen as against the owner of record. But this question is settled adversely to the defendant by reason of the statutes in force during the entire period necessary to create a title by adverse possession. By St. 1811, c. 6, § 3, re-enacted in St. 1834 c. 183, § 5, and in Rev. St. 1836, c. 20, § 25, an unincorporated religious society was enabled to acquire, use and enjoy property in the same manner as if duly incorporated, and no change is found in these statutory provisions in subsequent revisions. Gen. St. 1860, c. 30, § 24; Pub. St. 1882, c. 39, § 9; Rev. Laws, c. 37, § 12. The effect of these enactments is that for the purpose of taking holding, and transmitting property a voluntary religious society possessed all the qualifying attributes of a duly organized corporation. Fisher v. Whitman, 13 Pick. 350, 356; Lawrence v. Fletcher, 8 Metc. 153, 163; Silsby v. Barlow, 16 Gray, 329; Hamblett v. Bennett, 6 Allen, 140, 144; Glendale Union Christian Society v. Brown, 109 Mass. 163, 165; Atty. Gen. v. Clark, 167 Mass. 201, 204, 45 N.E. 183.
With the exceptions which relate to this question, the admission of certain evidence in connection therewith must be considered. For the purpose of showing the original organization of the voluntary society, as well as its action when contemplating the purchase of the lot now in controversy, and the erection of the house of worship, the entries shown on the record book of the society were admissible. This body having, for the limited purpose given to it by statute, the power to acquire real and other property, possessed the implied correlative right inherent in a duly organized corporation to show by its records, the authentication of which does not appear to have been questioned, not only its organization. but the vote taken to purchase the land and erect the building. Fisher v. Whitman, ubi supra; Stebbins v. Merritt, 10 Cush. 27. A further objection to the admission of this evidence was that it tended to prove self-serving declarations in derogation of the defendant's title, but the record was relevant to establish the fact that in taking the deed of the land, though in his own name, he was acting in its behalf, rather than purchasing for himself, for it is stated by the master that the several entries in evidence were signed by Elijah Hewins as clerk, who must be presumed to have known that the votes which he recorded were inconsistent with any subsequent claim of ownership by him and those claiming under him must be charged with his knowledge, as well as bound by the entries in his hand writing found in his account book relating to the expenditure of the money which had been contributed. Pickering v. Reynolds, 119 Mass. 111.
Nor is the defendant's next contention, that the occupation of the society was permissive rather than adverse, tenable. After the meeting house was built and occupied, a regular attendance by him upon divine worship does not constitute a user on his part of the property in common with the society, or its members, so that it can be said there was a mixed possession by both, for his attendance was properly found to have been not as an owner of the soil, but as a member and communicant of the society. It is obvious that the society was in sole occupation, and he does not appear to have asserted any individual right antagonistic to his claim of a freehold shown by the erection and maintenance of the church, and the pecuniary support of regular preaching. It must have been generally understood that these things were not being done by his permission and for his sole benefit as a land owner, and such an understanding is sufficient, as no doubt the master found, to repel any presumption that when he was present upon these occasions he attended for the purpose of making a technical entry in conformity with his legal title. At his death the disseisin had continued for more than the full statutory period, and not only was any right of entry barred, but by the operation of the statute of limitations the time within which a real action must be brought had passed, and the estate had vested in the society as effectually as if originally deeded to it instead of having been conveyed to him. School District No. 4 in ...
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