First Midwest Bank v. City of Chi.

• Decision Date: 29 August 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 14 C 9665
• Citation: 337 F.Supp.3d 749
• Parties: FIRST MIDWEST BANK, as Guardian of the Estate and Person of Michael D. LaPorta, a disabled person, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

337 F.Supp.3d 749

FIRST MIDWEST BANK, as Guardian of the Estate and Person of Michael D. LaPorta, a disabled person, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant.

Case No. 14 C 9665

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed August 29, 2018

Antonio Maurizio Romanucci, Bruno R. Marasso, Stephan David Blandin, Bryce Thomas Hensley, Debra Liss Thomas, Martin D. Gould, Nicolette A. Ward, Romanucci & Blandin, LLC, Andrew Martin Stroth, Action Injury Law Group, LLC, Brendan Shiller, Shiller Preyar Law Offices, Carl S. Salvato, Jason Edward Hammond, Paul George O'Toole, Salvato & O'Toole, Carlton E. Odim, Odim Law Offices, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Eileen Ellen Rosen, James Bryan Novy, Stacy Ann Benjamin, Theresa Berousek Carney, Rock Fusco & Connelly, LLC, Joseph M. Polick, City of Chicago, Department of Law, Robert M. Burke, Jr., Heineke & Burke LLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

After seven years of litigation and a month-long trial, a jury found in Plaintiff Michael LaPorta's favor on his claim that the City of Chicago had de facto policies that sustained serious flaws in its police force, namely: failing to investigate officers accused of misconduct; failing to discipline officers who deserved it; and failing to maintain an adequate Early Warning System to identify and correct problematic behavior. The jury further found that the last two of those policies constituted the moving force behind a January 2010 incident in which CPD Officer Patrick Kelly shot LaPorta in the head, causing severe and lasting injuries. For these injuries, the jury awarded LaPorta $44.7 million in damages. Before the Court are the parties' post-trial motions. Going forward, this opinion presumes familiarity with this Court's other rulings in this case, especially LaPorta v. City of Chicago , 277 F.Supp.3d 969 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (summary judgment ruling) and LaPorta v. City of Chicago , 102 F.Supp.3d 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (motion to dismiss ruling).

I. CHICAGO'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) allows a district court to enter judgment against a party who has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial if "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). Under the stringent judgement-as-a-matter-of-law standard, the court construes the facts strictly in favor of the party that prevailed at trial. Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chi. Park Dist. , 634 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). "Although the court examines the evidence to determine whether the jury's verdict was based on that evidence, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Id. (citations omitted). However, the court disregards all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Harvey v. Office of Banks & Real Estate , 377 F.3d 698, 707 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ). At bottom, the court determines whether a rational jury could have found for the plaintiffs. Id. (citation omitted).

A. Failure to Prove Constitutional Violation

The City recycles its first JMOL argument from the summary judgment stage, contending once more that LaPorta's theory of liability cannot get off the ground given that under DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services , 489 U.S. 189, 201-02, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), local governments cannot be liable for failing to prevent due process violations effected by private actors. Simply enough, the City contends that Kelly acted only as a private citizen during the evening in question, and as such his coincidental profession plays no part in the liability analysis. But as the Court already described, this misses the mark by mischaracterizing LaPorta's claim. See LaPorta v. City of Chicago , 277 F.Supp.3d 969, 986-87 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (denying summary judgment to City on same argument). LaPorta's Monell claim asserts that it is the City itself—and not Kelly—that supplies the "color of law" requirement under § 1983. See Gibson v. City of Chicago , 910 F.2d 1510, 1519 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing analogous Monell claim). Under LaPorta's theory, "the City's policies caused the harm." Cazares v. Frugoli , No. 13 C 5626, 2017 WL 1196978, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017). Such a claim is not appropriately considered under DeShaney , and as such the City's objection predicated upon the same cannot defeat LaPorta's claim nor entitle the City to judgment as a matter of law. See Obrycka v. City of Chicago , No. 07 C 2372, 2012 WL 601810, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Feb 23, 2012) (St. Eve., J.).

B. Evidence of Kelly's Reckless Indifference

The City argues in the alternative that even if DeShaney does not apply, LaPorta failed to produce sufficient evidence that Kelly acted intentionally or with reckless indifference when he shot LaPorta. (Chicago also argues that the "reckless indifference" standard has no place in the due process analysis; the Court dispatches this argument below at Part II.A.2.) First, LaPorta presented expert testimony undermining Kelly's version of events (Balash Tr. 1879:12-1880:11 (explaining that contrary to Kelly's statement that LaPorta picked up and cocked the gun, said model cannot be manually cocked in the manner Kelly described), 1887:6-21 (expressing disbelief at Kelly's story that his firearm had twice malfunctioned during Kelly's recruit school training) ), and concluding that the shooting was no suicide (id. 1892:1-1912:13 (describing the evidence and concluding that Kelly shot LaPorta) ). The jury also heard evidence from Defendant's witnesses that undermined the case for this being an accidental shooting. (See Brudenell Tr. 2689:18-21 (agreeing that the shooting did not occur as a result of someone dropping the gun); Wyant Tr. 2641:19-2642:3 (testifying that he had never heard of a Sig Sauer P226—the model of Kelly's firearm—misfiring).) Moreover, Kelly took the stand. On cross-examination, LaPorta's counsel asked whether Kelly removed the gun from its holster, held it in his hand, and then pulled the trigger and shot LaPorta in the head. Kelly responded by invoking the Fifth. As this is a civil case, the jury was permitted to take an adverse inference from Kelly's invocation. See Hillmann v. City of Chicago , 834 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see also infra at Part II.B.1.

Beyond all this, the City objects that LaPorta never painted a clear enough picture of Kelly's alleged motive in carrying out this shooting. But LaPorta did not have to prove motive to prevail in this case, and the circumstantial evidence adduced at trial certainly forms a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find that Kelly deliberately or with reckless indifference shot LaPorta in the head. See Harvey , 377 F.3d at 707.

C. Failure to Maintain an EWS

LaPorta presented substantial evidence of the City's failure to maintain an Early Warning System. This evidence included the findings from an April 2016 report put out by the City-created Police Accountability Task Force ("PATF"), which noted that:

No dedicated system exists to identify and address patterns or practices. While they are charged with investigating police misconduct, IPRA [the Independent Police Review Authority] and BIA [the Bureau of Internal Affairs] historically have not engaged in efforts to identify officers whose records suggest repeated instances of misconduct or bias. They also historically have not engaged in efforts to identify broader patterns or practices either of misconduct. The persistent failure of IPRA and BIA to examine pattern and practice evidence substantially contributes to the police accountability vacuum in Chicago.

(Tr. 2356:18-2357:3.) Alderman Moore, a member of the Chicago City Council, concurred with these findings. (Moore Tr. 887:23-888:15.) In the same vein, a January 2017 report issued by the DOJ and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois observed that:

The lack of a functional early intervention system coupled with inadequate supervision has placed officers and members of the public at risk. These longstanding systemic deficiencies in CPD's early intervention systems have prevented CPD from taking two steps that are crucial to ensuring officer safety and wellness as well as ensuring policing that is effective and lawful. First, CPD does not adequately and accurately identify officers who are in need for this type of action and, second, CPD does not consistently or sufficiently address officer behavior where CPD identifies negative patterns. Because of these failures, CPD officers are able to engage in problematic behavior with impunity which can and do escalate into serious misconduct. This has dramatic consequences for the public.

(Tr. 2249:1-15.)

Chicago takes issue with the PATF and DOJ reports, arguing that neither zeroes in on the proper time frame—that being the few years preceding the 2010 shooting, when perhaps some intervention could have changed Kelly's behavior and thus averted LaPorta's injury all together. This rejoinder is not as effective as Chicago hopes. First, as described in greater detail below, the PATF report reviewed CPD records dating back to 2007, and the DOJ report referred in sweeping terms to "longstanding" and "systemic" deficiencies in CPD policies. (See infra at Part II.B.3.) And second, LaPorta developed evidence beyond these reports that back up his contention that Chicago lacked an effective EWS during the pertinent years. Tisa Morris, the former chief administrator for the Office of Professional Standards, testified that during her tenure from 2004 to 2007, she was not aware of any system in place to identify and discipline repeat offenders. (Id. 1163:18-20,...