First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. State Highway Dept., 22020

Decision Date29 May 1963
Docket NumberNo. 22020,22020
Citation132 S.E.2d 263,219 Ga. 144
PartiesFIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ATLANTA, Ex'r. v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT of Georgia.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

Where property is condemned for public road purposes under the provisions of the 1957 Act (Ga.L.1957, pp. 387-397, Code Ann. Ch. 36-6a), and the value of the property is fixed by the jury on appeal at a sum less than the award of the special master, interest is due by the condemnee only from the date of the verdict.

On May 14, 1959, the State Highway Department filed a proceeding to condemn described lands under the provisions of the Act of the General Assembly of 1957 (Ga.L.1957, pp. 387-397, Code Ann. Ch. 36-6A). A special master, as provided by that act, was appointed by the judge of the superior court. After a hearing, the special master, on February 23, 1960, awarded to Mrs. W. J. Stewart, as life tenant, and the First National Bank of Atlanta, as executor and trustee of W. J. Stewart, (hereinafter referred to as the condemnee) the sum of $48,625. On February 27, 1960, the judge entered a decree condemning the property in fee simple upon payment of the award.

On March 4, 1960, the State Highway Department filed its appeal to a jury in the superior court. On October 9, 1962, the jury returned a verdict for the condemnee in the sum of $31,934. On October 11, 1962, the judge entered a judgment reciting that condemnee had received an overpayment of $16,691. It was decreed that the condemnor have judgment for this amount, together with interest at 7% per annum from April 27, 1960, in the sum of $2,953.35.

On October 15, 1962, the condemnee filed a motion to strike the item of interest in the sum of $2,953.35, and on the same date the judgment was amended striking the item of interest. On October 22, 1962, the condemnor filed a motion to vacate and set aside the order of October 15, 1962, amending the judgment of October 11, 1962, which included interest.

On this motion the court entered a rule nisi requiring the condemnee to show cause why the motion should not be granted. To this motion the condemnee filed a response wherein it was alleged in part: '* * * interest in said judgment is illegal * * * there being no express contract on the part of condemnee to pay interest on any amount, nor is there any basis for holding there is any implied contract * * * to do so.' A requirement for 'the condemnee, to pay interest on any said amount paid into court under the proceedings under eminent domain, brought by the State of Georgia,' and 'to accept an involuntary loan forcibly, would be violating the Constitution of the State of Georgia Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II, Code Section 2-102, which provides that: 'protection to person and property is the paramount duty of the Government and shall be impartial and complete.'' To 'charge interest on the amount which condemnor was required to pay into court to take possession of the private property of condemnee under the statute, would be forcing the condemnee to accept a loan from the State of Georgia involuntarily and be charged with interest, thereby depriving the condemnee of equal protection under the aforesaid section of the law * * * and condemnor is undertaking to make a contract by charging interest on an unliquidated demand, when the primary and only purpose of the taking or condemning said land is for the purpose of establishing the value of the property, to be paid to condemnee, and until the same is established by law there could be no interest charged * * * The Act of 1957, pp. 387-396 * * * which provides 'If the verdict of the jury be less than the award of the special master, the owner shall be bound to refund any excess paid to or received by him and a judgment for such excess shall be rendered against him, plus lawful interest thereon from the date of such payment,' is unconstitutional as herein set out and alleged and void for the reasons herein set forth * * * requiring your petitioner to involuntarily borrow money and accept a loan from the Government and then being charged with interest against its wishes or consent * * * would violate the due process clause of Georgia * * * Art. I, Sec. I, Par. III, Code Sec. 2-103, 'That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law,' * * * and it would require the condemnee, movant herein, to pay interest on money which is involuntarily forced on it, * * * The law only allows interest because of a contract, express or implied, for its payment, or as damages for the detention of money, or for breach of some contract, or the violation of some duty * * * interest at 7% per annum in the amount of $2,953.35 is wholly illegal * * * and would deprive this movant * * * of due process of law * * *'

On January 4, 1963, the judge passed an order reciting that the judgment of October 11, 1962, had been amended on October 15, 1962. It was ordered, 'after the consideration of all pleadings and all issues raised therein,' that the judgment of October 15, 1962, be vacated and the judgment of October 11, 1962, be reinstated, 'except the interest as specified in said judgment of October 11, 1962, as $2,953.35 shall be $2,865.75.'

The writ of error of the First National Bank of Atlanta, as executor, was directed to the Court of Appeals, and was transferred by that court to this court.

Shirley C. Boykin, Carrollton, for plaintiff in error.

Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Carter Goode, E. J. Summerour, Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, William J. Wiggins, Carrollton, for defendant in error.

HEAD, Presiding Justice.

The response of the condemnee to the rule nisi (issued on October 22, 1962, pertaining to the validity of the provision for the payment of interest by the condemnee in the judgment of October 11, 1962) was filed on December 4, 1962. In his final judgment reinstating the requirement for the payment of interest by the condemnee the judge of the superior court recited that such judgment was rendered 'after the consideration of all pleadings and all issues raised therein.' This recital by the court could only mean that the subsequent reinstatement of the interest as provided in the judgment of October 11, 1962, was a ruling by the court adverse to the contentions of the condemnee that the interest provision of the 1957 Act (Ga.L. 1957, pp. 387, 396, § 15, Code Ann. § 36-615a) was unconstitutional and void. Any contention by the condemnor that the trial court did not so rule would be in direct conflict with the recitals of the court's final judgment.

A constitutional attack upon a statute must show how and wherein the statute offends the Constitution in order to invoke any ruling upon its validity. Emerson v. Southwest Georgia Regional Housing Authority, 196 Ga. 675, 27 S.E.2d 334; Heard v. Pittard, 210 Ga. 549,...

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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • May 25, 2016
    ...Home Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co. , 192 Ga.App. 551,385 S.E.2d 736, 741 (1989)33 (emphasis added); First National Bank v. State Highway Dep't , 219 Ga. 144, 132 S.E.2d 263, 266 (1963) ; Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickle Properties , 861 F.2d 1532, 1537 (11th Cir.1988) (citing Georgia law......
  • Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.
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    ...it is not entitled to interest. In support of this position, Heller relies upon First National Bank of Atlanta, Executor v. State Highway Department, 219 Ga. 144 (132 S.E.2d 263). Such reliance is misplaced as that case is inapposite to the facts presented here. In the cited case the Court ......
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    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 2, 1979
    ...145 S.E. 68; Roberts v. Prior, 20 Ga. 561(2), 562; Cochran v. Bell, 106 Ga.App. 106, 107, 126 S.E.2d 283; First Nat. Bank v. State Hwy. Dept., 219 Ga. 144, 147, 132 S.E.2d 263, and cases cited. Nor at the point in time when summary judgment was granted was there a definite determination of ......
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