First Nat. Bank of Seattle v. Dudley

• Citation: 141 P. 884,80 Wash. 376
• Decision Date: 11 July 1914
• Docket Number: 11848.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: FIRST NAT. BANK OF SEATTLE v. DUDLEY.

141 P. 884

80 Wash. 376

FIRST NAT. BANK OF SEATTLE v. DUDLEY.

No. 11848.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 11, 1914

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Everett Smith Judge.

Action by the First National Bank of Seattle against W. L. Dudley. From an order overruling defendant's motion to vacate and set aside a default judgment, he appeals. Affirmed.

James M. Palmer, of Seattle, for appellant.

James Kiefer, of Seattle, for respondent.

MAIN J.

This is an appeal by the defendant, W. L. Dudley, from an order of the superior court overruling a motion to vacate and set aside a judgment.

On August 5, 1910, as shown by the sheriff's return, the appellant was personally served with a summons and a copy of the complaint in an action in which he was a party defendant. Nothing further appears to have been done in connection with the prosecution of the action until the 3d day of October 1913, on which date the complaint was filed with the clerk of the superior court, and a default judgment entered against the appellant. Prior to the entry of the judgment the appellant had not in any manner appeared in the action. On October 18, 1913, a motion was interposed to vacate and set aside the judgment. This was the appellant's first appearance. This motion was based upon the claim that the judgment was void because more than three years had elapsed between the date of service of process and the date of filing the complaint and entry of judgment.

The only point presented upon this appeal is whether the court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment on October 3, 1913. It is claimed that the respondent had remained inactive for an unreasonable length of time after service of the summons and a copy of the complaint, and that therefore there was an abandonment of the action, and that the court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment. This contention seems to overlook the provision of the statute relative to the manner in which an action in the superior court may be commenced. By section 220, Rem. & Bal. Code, it is provided:

'Civil actions in the several superior courts of this state shall be commenced by the service of a summons, as hereinafter provided, or by filing a complaint with the county clerk as clerk of the court: Provided, that unless service has been had on the defendant prior to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff shall cause one or more of the defendants to be served personally, or commence service by publication within ninety days from the date of filing the complaint.'

Under this section of the statute an action may be commenced in the...