First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. Langford

• Decision Date: 17 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 47150,47150,3
• Citation: 190 S.E.2d 803,126 Ga.App. 325
• Parties: FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ATLANTA v. Idora Lee LANGFORD
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 803

190 S.E.2d 803

126 Ga.App. 325

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ATLANTA v. Idora Lee LANGFORD.

No. 47150.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

May 17, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

1, 2. There was sufficient evidence to support a judgment in favor of the estate of an alleged depositor for the proceeds of a savings account held by the defendant in the name of the decedent as against the contention that he was not in fact during his lifetime the owner of the account.

3. The evidence does not support a finding that account no. 70698 belonged to the plaintiff's husband during his lifetime.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court sitting without a jury, awarding the proceeds of two bank savings accounts to the claimant, widow and executrix of the estate of one Henry Langford. The accounts were opened in the name of Henry Langford prior to 1931. Langford and the plaintiff were married in 1927; he died in 1959, and some time thereafter she commenced her long drawn out struggle to establish her entitlement to the funds. Her proof consisted basically of her testimony that she knew her husband had an account in the bank and had gone there with him to see about the money, and that she had seen the passbook which, however, was no longer in her possession. She did save from his effects certain confirmation requests sent him by the bank to the address where he was living, which the defendant contended were insufficient proof since it might have obtained the address for such mailings from a telephone book. The bank refused to pay on the basis that no passbook was presented and that the deceased was described as a small man who never weighed over 140 pounds, whereas on one of the accounts the words 'large stout' appear and were interpreted by the defendant as probably having been writeen at the time by some bank employee to describe the depositor. Other discrepancies were differences in address and detailed positive testimony by an eminent handwriting expert to the effect that neither of the signatures corresponded with uncontested signatures written by the plaintiff's husband.

As to the source of the deposits the plaintiff testified: 'Q. Now, could you relate where the money came from? A. Yes, sir. See, along at that time, times was hard and people was getting nothing much. Then along at that time my husband sold liquor, he sold some liquor . . . Q. Did your husband earn money like this? A. Sometimes, Lord please, he hit it really big. Q. You mean the Lord was involved in this wickedness? A. Didn't mean it like that. Q. Could you tell us what he did with the money? A. He put it in the bank. He put some of it in the bank and we lived off some of it and he bought him a car.' No deposits were made in either account after 1931 and no withdrawals after 1937.

The plaintiff produced all documents requested by the bank except the passbooks themselves, and at one time a certified check paying over one of the accounts was actually drawn up to her order, but was not signed. The bank then refused to relinquish the funds on the grounds that the initial depositor, whoever he might have been, was not the plaintiff's husband and that the statute of limitations had run. Plaintiff filed suit on one of the accounts. The defendant moved for and was granted a summary judgment which was reversed by this court in Langford v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 122 Ga.App. 210, 176 S.E.2d 484.

At the close of the evidence the trial court awarded judgment for the plaintiff in an amount equal to the sum of the two savings accounts as to which testimony had been offered and plaintiff thereafter amended her pleadings to pray for the additional amount.

Hansell, Post, Brandon & Dorsey, H. Boyce Connell, Jr., Terrence Lee Croft, Atlanta, for appellant.

J. L. Jordan, Atlanta, for appellee.

DEEN, Judge.

1. It is not the prerogative of this court to place itself in the position of an arbiter of contested evidence. The defendant had solid reasons for refusing to pay over the funds involved to the plaintiff and insisting on a determination of the controversy by the courts. On the other hand, there is some evidence supporting the plaintiff's position and the trial judge, acting as judge and jury, carries the unique burden of reaching a solution to a puzzle from which so many pieces are missing. Craddock v. Law, 203 Ga. 264(2), 46 S.E.2d 136. Appellant urges that the plaintiff's testimony is self contradictory and inherently incredible and should not be considered. She made some misstatements regarding dates and the contents of documents. They, however, are not of a character to demand impeachment of her testimony as a matter of law, but go to her credibility in view of her apparent lack of education and the time elapsed. 'The trial judge had the privilege of accepting as true that evidence which most commended itself to his approval.' Young v. Durham, 15 Ga.App. 678(3), 84 S.E. 165.

2. In reversing the grant of summary judgment to the defendant this court held, as against the bank's plea of statute of limitations, that it did not become liable for repayment...