First Nat. Ins. Co. of America v. Clark, 77598
| Decision Date | 30 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 77598,77598 |
| Citation | 899 S.W.2d 520 |
| Parties | FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Respondent, v. Charles E. CLARK, Appellant, and Christopher Scott Flick, Defendant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
James B. Deutsch, Nelson L. Mitten, and R. Thomas Avery, Jefferson City, Organization of Defense Lawyers, amicus.
Thomas E. Deacy, Jr., Edward W. Mullen, and Patrick C. Cena, Kansas City, State Farm Ins., amicus.
Leo M. Newman and Mark S. Wallis, St. Louis, for appellant.
Gary E. Snodgrass, Evan D. Buxner, and Steven J. Hughes, St. Louis, for respondent.
The issue in this case is whether the Missouri Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, Section 303.010, RSMo 1994, et seq., requires stacking of automobile liability coverage. The trial court held that the law did not require stacking liability policies. The Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed. We granted transfer and have jurisdiction. Mo Const. art. V, § 10. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The parties stipulated to the underlying facts. At the time of the accident from which this case arises, Christopher Scott Flick owned a Ford Mustang and leased a Chevrolet Blazer. He purchased a separate policy for each automobile from respondent, First National Insurance Company. Each policy provided liability coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. On August 31, 1990, while driving the Blazer, Flick collided with Charles Clark ("appellant"), causing Clark grievous injury. Appellant sued Flick and obtained a $1,300,000 consent judgment. Respondent paid the limits of the Blazer's liability policy into the court and filed this declaratory judgment to determine whether it was liable for further damages under the Mustang's liability policy.
The Mustang insurance policy Flick purchased provided coverage for liability he incurred while driving "the owned automobile" and any "non-owned automobile." The parties stipulated that the leased Blazer was, as a factual matter, a "non-owned" vehicle; that does not relieve the Court of its responsibility to determine whether it fell within the meaning of that term in the insurance contract. The Mustang policy described the owned automobile as the one for which the insured paid the premium under the policy, and defined a "non-owned automobile" to include:
An automobile or trailer not owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative, other than a temporary substitute automobile.
Appellant's first point claims that the Blazer fell outside the insurance contract's exclusion.
A trial court may make reasonable inferences from the facts it has, and such judgments deserve appellate court deference. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). The parties' stipulation agreed that Flick leased the Blazer from an acceptance company, and that Flick purchased insurance on the Blazer. The trial court could reasonably infer that the leased Blazer was "furnished for the regular use" of Flick from these facts. See generally, Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Scott, 628 S.W.2d 355 (Mo.App.1981). We hold that the trial court correctly interpreted the Mustang policy to exclude liability coverage for Flick when he drove the Blazer, and appellant's first point is denied.
That interpretation of the Mustang policy leads to consideration of appellant's contention that the public policy of Missouri requires the Court to ignore the "non-owned vehicle" provision of the contract between Flick and respondent. Appellant's ultimate point assigns error to the trial court's declaration against stacking the liability policies in this case and urges the Court to conclude that
no condition, exclusion, or definition can be used by plaintiff insurance company, in light of Sections 303.024, 303.025, and 303.026 RSMo [1994] to defeat coverage under a policy which contains the name of the tortfeasor because public policy dictates that financial responsibility is the goal to be achieved.
App. brief at 16.
This Court's cases recognize freedom of contract in liability insurance. Halpin v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 823 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. banc 1992). Nevertheless, the Court will not recognize contractual provisions that are contrary to the public policy of Missouri as expressed by the legislature.
In Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. banc 1976), the Court held that Section 379.203, RSMo Supp.1972, expressed a public policy of Missouri requiring abrogation of a contractual provision "limiting an insured to only one of the uninsured motorist coverages provided by a policy." Id. at 545. The Court permitted stacking of uninsured motorist coverage.
Appellant argues that Section 303.025, which requires all drivers to maintain financial responsibility, requires the Court to employ the reasoning in Cameron to hold that the non-owned vehicle provision of the policy sub judice violates public policy, and that the statute requires stacking of all of the insured's liability policies.
We disagree.
Section 379.203.1, 1 the statute at issue in Cameron, provides in pertinent part:
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery ... unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto ... in not less than the limits for bodily injury or death set forth in section 303.030[.5], RSMo [$25,000], for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.
[Emphasis added.] The Court found that the language of the statute unambiguously requires that a liability policy include at least $25,000 of coverage for all injuries to the persons insured, caused by an uninsured motorist. Cameron discovered nothing in the statute that permitted limiting the statutorily mandated coverage to injuries caused to the insured while in a particular covered vehicle. The Court reasoned that the insured had purchased coverage, paid the premiums required and was entitled to all of the coverage he had purchased to cover his injuries. To have held otherwise would have permitted the insurer to collect multiple premiums for the same level of risk.
By its clear language, Section 379.203 requires a minimum amount of coverage to persons, not particularly described vehicles. Thus, Cameron held that a contract term that purported to limit uninsured motorist coverage to injuries received in a particularly described vehicle violated the statutory mandate.
Unlike uninsured motorist coverage, the liability insurance described under the safety responsibility law relates to the use and operation of a particularly described motor vehicle or class...
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